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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
THE YEAR 2010
by
Martin J. McMahon, Jr.
Ira B. Shepard
Daniel L. Simmons
This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to
understand the significance of the most important judicial decisions and
administrative rulings and regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue
Service and Treasury Department during the year 2010 - and sometimes a
little farther back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or
outrageous. Most Treasury Regulations, however, are so complex that they
cannot be discussed in detail and, anyway, only a devout masochist would
read them all the way through; just the basic topic and fundamental
principles are highlighted - unless one of us decides to go nuts and spend
several pages writing it up. This is the reason that the outline is getting to be
as long as it is. Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code generally are not
discussed except to the extent that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they
have led to administrative rulings and regulations, (3) they have affected
previously issued rulings and regulations otherwise covered by the outline,
or (4) they provide Dan and Marty the opportunity to mock our elected
representatives; again, sometimes at least one of us goes nuts and writes up
the most trivial of legislative changes. The outline focuses primarily on
topics of broad general interest (to the three of us, at least) - income tax
accounting rules, determination of gross income, allowable deductions,
treatment of capital gains and losses, corporate and partnership taxation,
exempt organizations, and procedure and penalties. It deals summarily with
qualified pension and profit sharing plans, and generally does not deal with
international taxation or specialized industries, such as banking, insurance,
and financial services. Please read this outline at your own risk; we take no
responsibility for any misinformation in it, whether occasioned by our
advancing ages or our increasing indifference as to whether we get any
particular item right. Any mistakes in this outline are Marty's responsibility;
any political bias or offensive language is Ira's; and any useful information
is Dan's.
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ACCOUNTING
A. Accounting Methods
1. Is the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board in the intensive care unit? Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 537
F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 8/22/08) (2-1), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (5/18/09).
Judge Rogers held that the Article II Appointments Clause was not violated
by having members of the PCAOB appointed by the SEC commissioners,
nor was the separation of powers doctrine violated by the for-cause limitation
on removal of PCAOB members.
Judge Kavanaugh dissented strongly,
stating:
The two constitutional flaws in the PCAOB statute
are not matters of mere etiquette or protocol. By restricting
the President's authority over the Board, the Act renders this
Executive Branch agency unaccountable and divorced from
Presidential control to a degree not previously countenanced
in our constitutional structure. This was not inadvertent;
Members of Congress designed the PCAOB to have
"massive power, unchecked power." 148 CONG. REC. at
S6334 (statement of Sen. Gramm). Our constitutional
structure is premised, however, on the notion that such
unaccountable power is inconsistent with individual liberty.
"The purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers
in general, and of the unitary Executive in particular, was
not merely to assure effective government but to preserve
individual freedom." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Liberty is
always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to
transgress the separation of powers."). The Framers of our
Constitution took great care to ensure that power in our
system was separated into three Branches, not concentrated
in the Legislative Branch; that there were checks and
balances among the three Branches; and that one individual
would be ultimately responsible and accountable for the
exercise of executive power. The PCAOB contravenes those
bedrock constitutional principles, as well as long-standing
Supreme Court precedents, and it is therefore
unconstitutional.
a. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. There is less to this decision than meets the eye because the
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PCAOB continues to operate as before but its members may be removed
without cause by the SEC. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (6/28/10) (5-4, with the usual
liberals dissenting). The Court held that the for-cause limitations on the
removal of PCAOB members contravene the Constitution's separation of
powers but that the unconstitutional provisions are separable from the rest of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The consequence is that the Board may continue to
function as before, but its members may be removed at will by the
Commission.
2. Just because you might have to perform work in
the future and incur future costs doesn't necessarily mean you have a
long-term contract eligible for deferred reporting of income. Koch
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 603 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 4/27/10). In
connection with a contract to construct a highway for the State of New
Mexico, the taxpayer and New Mexico entered into a "rehabilitation"
contract under which the taxpayer provided a "pavement warranty" that
required it to perform all work necessary to assure performance of the
pavement for a period 21.5 years and a "structures warranty" to perform all
work necessary to assure performance of the bridges, drainage, and erosion
structures for 11.5 years, in consideration of a $62,000,000 payment. The
taxpayer had no obligation to perform any work on the highway or structures
unless and until the highway and/or structures failed to meet performance
standards included in the warranty agreements. The taxpayer sought to use
the percentage of completion method under § 460 to report the income, but
the Court agreed with the IRS that the percentage of completion method was
unavailable. Neither warranty was a long-term contract under § 460 because
under Reg. § 1.460-1(b)(2)(i) "to be classified as a long-term contract,
'manufacture, building, installation, or construction of property [must be]
necessary for the taxpayer's contractual obligations to be fulfilled,"' which
''necessarily entails a fixed and definite obligation on the part of the
contractor to provide specified construction services." This standard was not
met because even though it was virtually certain that some work would be
performed at some point, the taxpayer "had no obligation to perform any
work on the highway unless and until the highway and/or structures thereon
failed to meet the performance standards included in the warranty
agreements." The contracts were "warranties" within the meaning of Reg.
§ 1.460-1(d)(2), and thus the consideration was not eligible for reporting
under the percentage of completion method.
3. New and improved automatic consent procedures
for changes of accounting methods. Rev. Proc. 2011-14, 2011-4 I.R.B. 330
(1/1 1/1 1). This revenue procedure provides automatic consent procedures for
a wide variety of accounting method changes. Rev. Proc. 97-27 clarifled and
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modified. Rev. Procs. 2001-10, 2002-28 2004-34, and 2006-56 modified.
Rev. Procs. 2008-52 and 2009-39 superseded, in part.
B. Inventories
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
C. Installment Method
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
D. Year of Inclusion or Deduction
1. The long arm of § 267(a)(2). Bosamia v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-218 (10/7/10). Section 267(a)(2) applies to
the determination of the cost of goods sold when an accrual method taxpayer
purchases from a related cash method taxpayer property that will be included
in the purchaser's inventory. Thus, because the costs were not paid within
two and one-half months after the close of the purchaser's taxable year, the
amounts could not be included in COGS. Furthermore, because the
adjustment was a change of accounting method, § 481 applied to eliminate
from the COGS amounts previously included in that remained unpaid in the
current year for goods purchased in years beyond the statute of limitations.
II. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Income
1. This looks pretty good, but at first a few serious
questions were lurking. The 2009 ARRA, § 1231(a), added Code § 108(i),
which defers and then ratably includes income arising from business
indebtedness discharged by the reacquisition of a debt instrument. This new
provision allows a taxpayer to irrevocably elect to include cancellation of
debt income realized in 2009 and 2010 ratably over five tax years, rather
than in the year the discharge occurs, if the debt was issued in connection
with the conduct of a trade or business or by a corporation. For partnerships
and S corporations, the election is made by the partnership or corporation,
not by the individual partners or shareholders. I.R.C. § 108(i)(5)(B)(iii).
Under the § 108(i) election, income from a debt cancellation in 2009 is
recognized beginning in the fifth taxable year following the debt
cancellation; the income is recognized ratably in each of 2014 through 2018.
Income from a debt cancellation in 2010 is recognized beginning in the
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fourth taxable year following the debt cancellation; the income is recognized
ratably in each of 2014 through 2018. If a taxpayer elects to defer debt
cancellation income under § 108(i), the § 108(a) exclusions for bankruptcy,
insolvency, qualified farm indebtedness, and qualified real property business
indebtedness do not apply to the year of the election or any subsequent year.
§ 108(i)(5)(C). Thus, the election cannot be used to move the year of
inclusion to a year in which it is expected that one of the exceptions will
apply. Once the election is made, inclusion is inevitable; the statute requires
acceleration of inclusion to the taxpayer's final return in the event of the
intervening death of an individual or liquidation or termination of the
business of an entity. § 108(i)(5)(D). The acceleration rule also applies in the
event of the sale or exchange or redemption of an interest in a partnership or
S corporation by a partner or shareholder.
* Although the statute speaks in terms
of cancellation of debt income arising from "reacquisition" of a "debt
instrument," the statutory definitions of "reacquisition" and "an applicable debt
instrument," respectively, are broad enough the provision applies to most
situations in which the debt is cancelled. Section 108(i)(3)(B) broadly defines
"debt instrument" to include a bond, debenture, note, certificate, or any other
instrument or contractual arrangement constituting indebtedness within the
meaning of § 1275(a)(1). Section 108(i)(4)(B) defines "acquisition" to include
(1) an acquisition of the debt instrument for cash, (2) the exchange of the debt
instrument for another debt instrument, including an exchange resulting from a
modification of the debt instrument (which includes a reduction of the principal
amount of the debt), (3) the exchange of the debt instrument for corporate stock
or a partnership interest, (4) the contribution of the debt instrument to capital,
and (5) the complete forgiveness of the indebtedness by the holder of the debt
instrument.
* However, the statutory definition of
"acquisition" appears to omit the cancellation of a debt in connection with a
property transfer, for example, a deed in lieu of foreclosure, although the
legislative history contains some indication that this type of debt cancellation is
included.
* Query when and to what extent real
estate ownership qualifies as a trade or business.
a. Many of the questions have been
answered. Rev. Proc. 2009-37, 2009-36 I.R.B. 309 (8/17/09). This revenue
procedure provides the exclusive procedure for taxpayers to make § 108(i)
elections. Debt cancellation in connection with a property transfer is included
in § 108(i). Section 4.04(3) permits partial elections, with the partnership
permitted to determine "in any manner" the portion of the COD income that
is the "deferred amount" and the portion of the COD income that is the
"included amount" with respect to each partner. Section 4.11 permits
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protective elections where the taxpayer concludes that a particular
transaction does not generate COD income but fears that the IRS may
determine otherwise. A partner's deferred § 752(b) amount, arising from a
decrease in his share of partnership liabilities, will be treated as a current
distribution of money in the year that the COD income is included.
Taxpayers are allowed an automatic one-year extension from the due date to
make the election, and taxpayers who made elections before the issuance of
the revenue procedure will be given until 11/16/09 to modify (but not
revoke) their existing elections. Corporate taxpayers making a § 108(i)
election are required to increase earnings and profits for the year of the
election.
b. Temporary Regulations allocate deferred
cancellation of debt income. T.D. 9498, Application of Section 108(i) to
Partnerships and S Corporations, 75 F.R. 49380 (8/13/10). Section 108(i)
provides an election to include cancellation of indebtedness income resulting
from a reacquisition (broadly defined in § 108(i)(4)) of a debt instrument,
issued by a C corporation or other person engaged in a trade or business,
ratably over five years beginning with the fifth year following reacquisition
occurring in 2009, and the fourth year following reacquisition in 2010. Under
§ 108(i)(5)(B)(iii) an election is made by the partnership, not the partners
individually. Section 108(i)(6) requires a partnership to allocate the COD
income to partners according to partnership share on the day immediately
preceding reacquisition and provides that the discharge will not trigger
§ 752(b) recognition under § 731 because of a reduction in a partner's share
of partnership liabilities.
* Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(d)(1)
provides five safe harbors where debt instruments issued by a partnership or S
corporation will be treated as issued in a trade or business: (1) The gross fair
market value of the trade or business assets of the partnership or S corporation
represent at least 80 percent of the fair market value of all of its assets on the
date of issuance, (2) trade or business expenses of the partnership or S
corporation represent at least 80 percent of all expenditures, (3) at least 95
percent of the interest paid on the debt instrument is allocable to trade or
business expenditures under the interest allocation rules of Temp. Reg. § 1.163-
8T, (4) at least 95 percent of the proceeds from the debt instrument were used to
acquire trade or business assets within six months of the issue of the debt, or (5)
the partnership or S corporation issued the debt instrument to the seller of a
trade or business to acquire the trade or business. Absent anchoring in one of
the safe harbors, qualification of a trade or business debt is a matter of facts and
circumstances.
* While § 108(i)(5)(B)(iii) requires the
election to be made at the partnership level, Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(b)(1)
allows the partnership to allocate both deferred and included portions of COD
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income to the partners. The temporary regulations first require that COD
income be allocated to the partners in the partnership immediately before the
reacquisition in the manner the income would be included in distributive shares
under § 704, then the partnership must determine the amount of COD income
from the applicable instrument that is the deferred amount includible in the
partner's share and the amount that is immediately includible. With respect to
deferred COD income of an S corporation, the Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(c)(1)
requires that on an election by the S corporation, deferred income must be
shared pro rata on the basis of stock ownership immediately prior to the
reacquisition.
* Temp. Reg. § 1. 108(i)-2T(b)(2)
provides that a partner's basis is not adjusted under § 705(a) to account for the
partner's share of partnership deferred COD income until the deferred item is
recognized by the partner. Likewise, § 1.108(i)-2T(c)(2) provides that neither
an S corporation shareholder's basis under § 1367 nor the shareholder's
accumulated adjustment account is adjusted for deferred COD income until the
shareholder recognizes the deferred COD income.
* Following the rules of Rev. Proc.
2009-37, and applying the rules of § 108(i)(6), Temp. Reg. § 1. 108(i)-2T(b)(3)
provides that reduction in a partner's share of partnership liabilities is
determined under § 752(b) when a debt instrument is reacquired, but that the
reduction in liabilities is not treated as a distribution of money until deferred
COD income is recognized by the partner. The temporary regulations provide
additional rules for determining a partner's deferred amounts where the partner
would recognize § 731 gain in the year of the reacquisition.
* Partners' capital accounts are
adjusted as if no § 108(i) election were made.
* Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(d)(3)
provides that gain attributable to a reduction in a partner's or S corporation
shareholder's amount at-risk under § 465(e) will not be taken into account in
the year of reacquisition and will be deferred to the date the COD income is
recognized.
* In the case of an acceleration event
under § 108(i)(5)(D) that requires a partnership or S corporation to recognize
deferred items, under Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(c)(3) the partners or S
corporation shareholders must account for deferred COD in the year that the
accelerating event takes place. In addition, the temporary regulations described
various circumstances in which a partner or S corporation shareholder
terminates the interest in the entity that will require acceleration of deferred
COD income, including death, liquidation, sale or exchange, redemption, or
abandonment.
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* Identical proposed regulations were
issued simultaneously. REG-144762-09, Application of Section 108(i) to
Partnerships and S Corporations, 75 F.R. 49427 (8/13/10).
c. Significant guidance on a soon to expire
beneficial Code section that leaves a nasty hangover. T.D. 9497, Guidance
Regarding Deferred Discharge of Indebtedness Income of Corporations and
Deferred Original issue Discount Deductions, 75 F.R. 49394 (8/13/10). The
IRS and Treasury have promulgated Temp. Reg. § § 1.108(i)-OT through
1.108(i)-3T providing detailed rules for C corporations regarding the
acceleration of deferred COD income and deferred OID deductions under
§ 108(i)(5)(D), and the calculation of earnings and profits as a result of an
election under § 108(i). The regulations also provide rules applicable to all
taxpayers regarding deferred OID deductions under § 108(i) as a result of a
reacquisition of an applicable debt instrument by an issuer or related party.
* Identical proposed regulations were
issued simultaneously. REG-142800-09, Guidance Regarding Deferred
Discharge of Indebtedness Income of Corporations and Deferred Original Issue
Discount Deductions, 75 F.R. 49428 (8/13/10).
2. Rev. Rul. 2010-10, 2010-13 I.R.B. 461 (3/29/10)
provides standard industry fare level cents-per-mile rates and terminal
charges for the first half of 2010 for determining the value of noncommercial
flights on employer provided aircraft.
3. These winds blow in capital contributions.
Southern Family Insurance Company v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-
7200 (M.D. Fla. 12/1/10). Following Hurricane Andrew, the State of Florida
created a joint underwriting association (JUA) as a windstorm insurer of last
resort. State legislation provided for a "takeout bonus" payable to private
insurers for each risk they removed from the JUA. The taxpayer was formed
to provide residential insurance and participate in the JUA takeout program.
The taxpayer reported bonuses received from the JUA as nonshareholder
contributions that were excluded under § 118. Following an "intent of the
contributor test" that it derived from case law, the court found that the
Florida legislature intended the takeout bonuses to constitute a
nonshareholder contribution to capital and excluded the payments from
income under § 118.
* The case did not discuss the
treatment of the contributed capital under § 362(c).
4. But this claim of a tax-free contribution to capital
goes down in flames. AT&T, Inc. v. United States, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-
321 (5th Cir. 1/3/111), af'g AT&T, Inc. v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d
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2009-6036 (W.D. Tex. 7/16/09). The Court of Appeals (Judge Dennis)
affirmed a District Court decision holding that payments from the Federal
government for universal telephone access are includible in income, and are
not excluded under § 118 as contributions to capital. The payments were part
of state and federally mandated programs funded by fees collected from
telecommunications carriers based on revenues. Payments are made to
carriers with high cost obligations to provide universal access to telephone
services. The District Court followed the decision in United States v. Coastal
Utilities, Inc., 514 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2008). The Court of Appeals traced
the history of the exclusion for contributions to the capital of a corporation,
ending with the five characteristics of a nonshareholder contribution to
capital set forth in United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Co., 412 U.S. 401 (1973).
[1] It certainly must become a permanent part of the
transferee's working capital structure. [2] It may not be
compensation, such as a direct payment for a specific,
quantifiable service provided for the transferor by the
transferee. [3] It must be bargained for. [4] The asset
transferred foreseeably must result in benefit to the
transferee in an amount commensurate with its value. And
[5] the asset ordinarily, if not always, will be employed in or
contribute to the production of additional income and its
value assured in that respect.
From the Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court derived "three principles."
(1) Whether a payment to a corporation by a non-
shareholder is income or a capital contribution is controlled
by the intention or motive of the transferor. (2) When the
transferor is a governmental entity, its intent may be
manifested by the laws or regulations that authorize and
effectuate its payment to the corporation. (3) Also, a court
can determine that a transfer was not a capital contribution if
it does not possess each of the first four, and ordinarily the
fifth, characteristics of capital contributions that the
Supreme Court distilled from its jurisprudence in CB&Q.
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the court concluded that,
"either by construing the controlling statutes and regulations or by applying the
CB&Q five-factor test, the governmental entities in making universal service
payments to AT&T did not intend to make capital contributions to AT&T; and
thus, that the payments were income to AT&T." Under the statutes authorizing
the payments, the administrative implementation in regulations, the payments
[Vol. 10:9576
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"were not intended to be capital contributions to AT&T, but to be supplements
to AT&T's gross income to enable it to provide universal service programs
while meeting competition ... ." The payments "were compensation to AT&T
for the specific and quantifiable services it performed for high-cost and lower-
income users as well as for developing and maintaining universal service ...
Furthermore, the payments did not become "a permanent part of AT&T's
working capital structure, as is demanded by the first CB&Q requirement."
B. Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization
1. Those fancy Pyrex® and Oneida@ branded
kitchen products are made by Robinson Knife Manufacturing, which is
required to capitalize license fees. Robinson Knife Manufacturing Co., Inc.
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-9 (1/14/09). The taxpayer designs and
produces kitchen tools for sale to large retail chains. To enhance its
marketing, the taxpayer paid license fees to Coming for use of the Pyrex
trademark and Oneida for use of the Oneida trademark on kitchen tools
designed and produced by the taxpayer. The taxpayer's production of kitchen
tools bearing the licensed trademarks was subject to review and quality
control by Coming or Oneida. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer's licensing
fees were subject to capitalization into inventory under § 263A under Reg.
§ 1.263A-1(e)(3)(ii)(U), which expressly includes licensing and franchise
fees as indirect costs that must be allocated to produced property. Agreeing
with the IRS, the court (Judge Marvel) rejected the taxpayer's argument that
the licensing fees, incurred to enhance the marketability of its produced
products, were deductible as marketing, selling, or advertising costs excluded
from the capitalization requirements by Reg. § 1.263A-l(e)(3)(iii)(A). The
court noted that the design approval and quality control elements of the
licensing agreements benefited the taxpayer in the development and
production of kitchen tools marketed with the licensed trademarks. The court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that Rev. Rul. 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 331,
which allowed a current deduction for costs incurred in obtaining ISO 9000
certification as an assurance of quality processes in providing goods and
services, was applicable to the quality control element of the license
agreements. The court noted that although the trademarks permitted the
taxpayer to produce kitchen tools that were more marketable than the
taxpayer's other products, the royalties directly benefited and/or were
incurred by reason of the taxpayer's production activities. The court also
upheld the IRS's application of the simplified production method of Reg.
§ 1.263A-2(b) to allocate the license fees between cost of goods sold and
ending inventory as consistent with the taxpayer's use of the simplified
production method for allocating other indirect costs.
2011] 577
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a. But the Second Circuit disagrees.
Robinson Knife Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 600 F.3d 121 (2d
Cir. 3/19/10). Like the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals rejected Robinson's
arguments that the royalty payments were deductible as marketing, selling,
advertising or distribution costs under Reg. § 1.263A- 1 (e)(3)(iii)(A), and that
the royalty payments were deductible as not having been incurred in securing
the contractual right to use a trademark, corporate plan, manufacturing
procedure, special recipe, or other similar right associated with property
produced under Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(ii)(U). The Court of Appeals
concluded, however, that "royalty payments which are (1) calculated as a
percentage of sales revenue from certain inventory, and (2) incurred only
upon sale of such inventory, are not required to be capitalized under the
§ 263A regulations." The court held that the royalties were neither incurred
in, nor directly benefited, the performance of production activities under
Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(i). Unlike license agreements, the court concluded
that Robinson could have manufactured the products, and did, without
paying the royalty costs. The royalties were not, therefore, incurred by
reason of the production process. The court also concluded that since the
royalties were incurred for kitchen tools that have been sold, "it is
necessarily true that the royalty costs and the income from sale of the
inventory items are incurred simultaneously." The court noted further that
had Robinson's licensing agreements provided for non-sales based royalties,
then capitalization would have been required.
b. Proposed regulations make you wonder
why the IRS ever litigated Robinson Knife. REG-149335-08, Sales-Based
Royalties and Vendor Allowances, 75 F.R. 78940 (12/17/10). The IRS has
proposed regulations under § 263A that generally provide the taxpayer-
favorable result reached by the Second Circuit in Robinson Knife. The
proposed regulations provide that sales-based royalties must be capitalized,
but also provide that sales-based royalties required to be capitalized are
allocable only to property that a taxpayer has sold, rather than to closing
inventory. The preamble asserts that the Second Circuit in Robinson Knife
misconstrued the nature of costs required to be capitalized; according to the
preamble, the costs of securing rights to use intellectual property directly
benefit, or are incurred by reason of, production processes, which requires
that the costs be capitalized, even if the costs are payable only on the basis of
the number or units sold or as a percentage of revenue. Nonetheless, the
proposed regulations are consistent with the holding of Robinson Knife
where they provide that sales-based royalties are related only to units that are
sold during the taxable year. Thus, Prop. Reg. § 1.263A-3(d)(3)(i)(C)(3)
would provide that sales-based costs would not be included in ending
inventory under § 471.
* However, in light of the generous
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treatment of sales-based royalties, the proposed § 263A regulations, along with
proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.471-3(e), require that sales-based vendor
allowances [which are rebates or discounts from a vendor as a result of selling
the vendor's merchandise] must be taken into account as an adjustment to the
cost of merchandise sold, effectively requiring that such allowances be included
in gross income immediately, and would not be taken into account in ending
inventory.
The formulas allocating additional
indirect costs to ending inventory under the simplified production and resale
methods would be modified to remove capitalized sales based royalties and
vendor allowances allocable to property that has been sold.
2. Legal fees incurred resisting states' attorney
general challenges to the privatization of Blue Shield are capital
expenses. Wellpoint, Inc. v. Commissioner, 599 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 3/23/10).
The taxpayer provides health insurance coverage through operating
subsidiaries that are licensees of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association
and are a result of mergers with Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations
that were once characterized as tax-exempt charitable entities. Several state
attorneys general brought cy pres or charitable trust actions against the
taxpayer claiming assets of the charitable organizations that were impressed
with charitable trusts. The taxpayer made payments of nearly $114 million to
settle these actions. The Circuit Court affirmed the Tax Court holding (T.C.
Memo. 2008-236) that the taxpayer's legal fees and settlement payments
were incurred in a dispute over the equitable ownership of assets allegedly
impressed with charitable trust obligations, and that the fees and payments
were thus required to be capitalized. Judge Posner described an expenditure
as a capital expense "if its 'utility ... survives the accounting period' in which
it is made" (citing Sears Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191, 197 (2d Cir.
1966)) and added that "expense incurred to enhance the value of a capital
asset must be capitalized, and thus amortized over the asset's remaining life."
The court concluded that the settlement was based on claims involving
Wellpoint's title to the assets acquired from the formerly tax-exempt entities.
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the payments were incurred
to protect its business practices.
3. Starting-up is cheaper. The Small Business Jobs
Act of 2010 increases the amount of deductible § 195 start-up expenses for
investigating or creating an active trade or business from $5,000 to $10,000
for expenses incurred in a year beginning in 2010. The phase out amount is
also increased from $50,000 to $60,000.
4. A retail safe harbor for car dealers. Rev. Proc.
2010-44, 2010-49 I.R.B. 811 (11/11/10). Section 263A(a) and Reg.
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§ 1.263A-3(c) require a taxpayer who acquires property for resale to
capitalize acquisition costs and other costs allocable to the property,
including purchasing, handling, and storage costs. However, a reseller is not
required to capitalize handling and storage costs incurred at a retail sales
facility. Under the safe harbor, a motor vehicle dealership may treat its entire
sales facility from which it normally and routinely conducts on-site sales to
retail customers, including any vehicle lot that is an integral part of its sales
facility and that is routinely visited by retail customers, as a retail sales
facility with respect to which the dealership is not required to capitalize
handling and storage costs. A motor vehicle dealer without production
activities may treat itself as a reseller under the Revenue Procedure. The
costs of handling activities with respect to services performed on dealership
owned vehicles and customer owned vehicles, other than the cost of parts,
are not required to be capitalized. Parts used in dealer-owned vehicles must
be capitalized as acquisition cost of its vehicles. A motor vehicle dealership
using the "reseller without production activities safe harbor method" may use
the "simplified resale method" under § 1.263A-3(d) for its vehicles and other
eligible property. Adoption of the safe harbor is a change of accounting
method subject to the automatic change in method under Rev. Proc. 2008-52,
2008-2 I.R.B. 587, clarified, modified, and superseded by Rev. Proc. 2011-
14, 2011-4 I.R.B. 330 (1/11/11).
5. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 744,
extends the election under Code § 181 to expense up to $15 million qualified
film and television production costs incurred in low-income or distressed
communities through 2011.
6. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 745,
extends the deduction under Code § 198 of otherwise capitalized
environmental remediation expenses incurred to abate or control hazardous
substances at a qualified environmental site through 2011.
7. The cost of figuring out what kind of work you're
going to do isn't deductible. Forrest v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-
004 (1/4/11). The court held that expenses incurred in a "fledgling effort"
solo law practice by a lawyer who reported no income from her law practice,
but which were incurred to make contacts and network in an effort to "figure
out what kind of work ... [the taxpayer] was going to do," were
nondeductible start-up expenses under § 195.
C. Reasonable Compensation
1. Throwing the TARP over compensation of
insurance executives even though they never received a TARP. The 2010
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Health Care Act amended § 162(m) by adding subsection (m)(6) to limit
deductions for compensation paid by health insurance providers, which is
defined as any employer that is a health insurance issuer (as defined in
§ 9832(b)(2) of the Act) not less than 25 percent of the gross premiums of
which are received from providing health insurance coverage (as defined in
§ 9832(b)(1) of the Act) "that is minimum essential coverage." The
deduction for compensation for services rendered in any year is limited to
$500,000, regardless of whether the compensation is paid during the taxable
year or in a subsequent taxable year. As under § 162(m)(5) for remuneration
from TARP participants, there are no exceptions for performance based
compensation or compensation under existing binding contracts. The
limitation applies not only to all officers, directors, and employees, but also
to any other service providers, such as consultants, performing services for or
on behalf of a covered health insurance provider. The provision is effective
for remuneration paid in taxable years beginning after 2012 with respect to
services performed after 2009.
* OMG - Does it apply to outside
counsel? Probably not.
a. Thank God! The legal fees are safe.
Notice 2011-2, 2011-2 I.R.B. 260 (12/23/10). The § 162(m)(6) limitation
applies to remuneration for services performed in a "disqualified taxable
year" beginning after 12/31/12 that is otherwise deductible by a covered
health insurance provider in a taxable year beginning after 12/31/12. It also
applies to deferred deduction remuneration attributable to services performed
in a taxable year beginning after 12/31/09 and before 1/1/13 if the employer
was a pre-2013 covered health insurance provider for the year in which
services were performed and the employer is a post-2012 covered health
insurance provider for the year in which the deferred deduction remuneration
is otherwise deductible. The guidance also has a de minimis rule, as well as a
definition of "applicable individual" that excludes an independent contractor
who provides substantial services to "multiple unrelated customers."
2. Why was over $2 Mil reasonable comp in one
year, but the next year only about $1.3 Mil was reasonable? Multi-Pak
Corporation v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-139 (6/22/10). In this case
appealable to the Ninth Circuit, the Tax Court (Judge Goeke) allowed
deductions for the full $2,020,000 of compensation paid to the taxpayer's
sole shareholder/CEO and COO, for 2002, but reduced the allowable
compensation deduction for 2003 from $2,058,000 to $1,284,104. Both
amounts were greater than the $655,000 and $660,000 amounts that the IRS
asserted as reasonable. The court applied the five factor test of Elliotts, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241, 1243-1245 (9th Cir. 1983): (1) The
employee's role in the company; (2) comparison with other companies;
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(3) the character and condition of the company; (4) potential conflicts of
interest; and (5) internal consistency in compensation. The court rejected the
opinions of dueling experts, noting that neither expert looked to companies
comparable to the taxpayer. The court also faulted the taxpayer's expert for
not performing the "analysis, required in the applicable case law, of whether
an independent investor would have been satisfied by his or her return on
investment." Noting that the Court of Appeals in Elliotts found that a 20
percent return on equity would satisfy the hypothetical investor, the court
indicated that the taxpayer's 2.9 percent return in 2002 supported the salary
in light of an impressive growth in sales, but the -15.8 percent return in 2003
called into question the amount of compensation paid in that year. Finally,
the court refused to apply a § 6662(a) accuracy penalty.
D. Miscellaneous Deductions
1. Standard mileage rate rules published in a
revenue procedure while the amounts will be disclosed in a separate
notice. Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883 (12/3/10). The IRS indicated
that beginning in 2011 it will publish mileage rates in a separate annual
notice. The revenue procedure indicated that a taxpayer may use the business
standard mileage rate to substantiate expenses for business use of an
automobile in lieu of fixed and variable costs. Parking fees and tolls are
deductible as separate items. The basis of an automobile used for business is
reduced by a per-mile amount published in the annual notice. Separate rates
are provided both for charitable use of an automobile and medical and
moving use of an automobile. The revenue procedure also provides details
for treating as substantiated a fixed and variable rate allowance for expenses
incurred by an employee in driving an automobile owned or leased by the
employee in performing services for the employer
a. Standard mileage rates announced.
Notice 2010-88, 2010-51 I.R.B. 882 (12/3/10). Standard mileage rates for
2011 are: (1) 51 cents per mile for business miles driven [up from 50 cents];
(2) 19 cents per mile driven for medical or moving purposes [up from 16.5
cents]; and (3) 14 cents per mile driven in service of charitable organizations
[unchanged because the rate is statutory, § 170(i)].
2. Throw another log on the fire! Loss of
contemporaneous § 274(d) mileage log in a fire doesn't cause loss of
mileage deductions too. Freeman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-213
(9/16/09). Judge Gustafson allowed the taxpayer a deduction, at mileage
rates, for business use of his automobile on the basis of the taxpayer's
credible testimony regarding the route he drove in connection with his auto
parts delivery business. The taxpayer had maintained and at one time
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possessed adequate documentation, in the form of a daily log, to comply with
§ 274(d), but his failure to produce that daily log was the result of an
accidental fire that destroyed his house and the logbook. Reg. § 1.274-
5T(c)(5) allows a taxpayer to "substantiate a deduction by reasonable
reconstruction of his expenditures or use" when records are lost through
circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control, including a fire.
a. But if you lose the mileage log books due
to CRS [misplacing them], or they're just plain s****y [smudgy?],
you're out of luck. Royster v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-16 (2/1/10).
The taxpayer was denied a deduction for claimed 2003 business mileage
because he had "lost" his log books. But it probably didn't matter. He was
also denied any deductions for 2004 and 2005 business mileage because his
log books recorded only the odometer readings at the beginning and end of
each day and had no indications of the business purpose of the trips or the
destinations.
3. Restitution of insurance fraud proceeds is
deductible. Cheating wife produces business losses. Cavaretta v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-4 (1/5/10). The taxpayer dentist's wife,
who managed the billing for the taxpayer's dental practice, billed an
insurance company for work that had not been done. The dentist was
unaware of his wife's false claims, but unfortunately for her the insurance
company figured it out. She subsequently pled guilty to criminal health-care
fraud and received a prison sentence followed by supervised release.
Restitution was not ordered in the criminal proceeding, but the wife had
agreed to repay $600,000 in civil restitution before sentencing and
compliance with the restitution agreement was required as a condition for
supervised release from prison. The repayment was made by the taxpayer
over three taxable years. The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) held, first, that the
restitution payments, which were made by the husband, were deductible
because payment was compensatory, not punitive, and thus § 162(f) did not
disallow the deduction. The court agreed with the taxpayer's claim that the
repayments were deductible as losses incurred in a trade or business under
§ 165(c)(1) and rejected the IRS's argument that the payments constituted
restitution deductible as a loss in a transaction entered into for profit under
§ 165(c)(2), which is not eligible for carryback under § 172(d). The court
refused to apply the holding of Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (2d
Cir. 1990), which states that a payment constituting "restitution" is never
deductible under § 162 and only sometimes deductible under § 165. The
court concluded that the "restitution" label does not make a repayment
automatically ineligible for deduction as a business expense. The court
distinguished Stephens as involving restitution for criminal fraud and
embezzlement without any connection to a separate trade or business. The
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court also rejected the IRS's argument that because the payments were
expenses of committing fraud they cannot be considered as business
expenses. The court found that the repayment was an ordinary and necessary
expense of the dental practice.
4. Multi-employer life insurance plan too good to be
true? Yes, says the Tax Court. Curcio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-
115 (5/27/10). This case consolidated IRS assessments and penalties against
three companies that had been involved in The Benistar 419 Plan and Trust,
established by Daniel Carpenter and promoted in a book entitled A
Professional's Guide to 419 Plans. Participating companies contributed
money to a trust account which in turn acquired cash rich life insurance
policies covering employees insured by the plan. Benistar withdrew nine
percent of the surrender value of the policies to cover its expenses.
Promotional materials promised unlimited deductions, contribution rates that
are variable from year to year, benefits that could be provided to key
employees on a selective basis, that contributions to the plan are not limited
by qualified plan rules and will not interfere with qualified plans, funds
inside the Benistar trust accumulate tax free, death benefits are income and
estate tax free, arrangements can be made for later tax-free distributions, and
the funds are secure from creditors. Section 419(a) provides that
contributions to a welfare benefit fund are deductible, limited under § 419(b)
to the plan's qualified cost, but only if the contributions are otherwise
deductible under Chapter 1 of the Code. Section 419(f)(6) provides that
contributions to a multi-employer plan are not subject to the limit of
§ 419(b). The court (Judge Cohen) held that contributions to the plans were
not deductible under § 162 because the taxpayers had the right to receive the
value reflected in the underlying insurance policies in the Benistar plan, and
that the taxpayers used the plan to funnel pretax business profits into cash-
laden life insurance policies over which they retained control. The court also
held that contributions to the plan were constructive dividends rather than
deductible expenses. The court found that the costs of insurance policies
under the plans claimed as deductions far exceeded the costs of providing
term life insurance to the covered employees, that the taxpayers treated the
underlying policies as their own, and that the policies could be withdrawn
from the plan without cost.
* With respect to S corporation
employee shareholders in one of the cases, the court pointed out that deductions
claimed and denied for 2002 would properly increase income under § 1366 and
basis under § 1367 which would offset subsequent distributions. With respect to
the S corporation shareholder involved, since the corporation claimed a
deduction in 2002, a year not before the court, and the actual contribution was
paid in 2003, there was no increase in income in 2003 to create basis. Absent
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evidence regarding basis at the end of 2002, the court presumed that the basis
was zero.
* The court also affirmed accuracy
related penalties assessed under § 6662(a), rejecting both the taxpayers'
arguments that their positions were supported by substantial authority and that
they reasonably relied on professionals. On the latter point the court found that
the accountants on whom the taxpayers asserted reliance had no expertise in
employee benefit rules and the insurance agents had no tax expertise on which
reliance was reasonably warranted.
a. And another one goes down. McGehee
Family Clinic, P.A. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-202 (9/15/10).
Same book, same plan, same judge (Cohen, J.), different taxpayer, same
result with penalties.
5. This mountain does not blossom into cost of
goods. D.L. White Construction, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C Memo. 2010-
141 (6/28/10). The taxpayer, a C corporation, purchased 80 acres in Idaho
with plans to construct four houses for sale to customers. Unfortunately the
access road to the property was owned by another who disputed in the Idaho
courts the taxpayer's right to an easement. As a consequence the taxpayer
claimed the purchased land was worthless and claimed the loss as a cost of
goods sold. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) rejected the taxpayer's argument
that the purchased land represented a cost of goods sold. The court noted that§ 471 generally prohibits inventory accounting for property that is not
merchandise and added that land is not merchandise. The court also rejected
the taxpayer's claim that it was entitled to a business loss under § 165(a),
holding that the taxpayer's claimed loss was not evidenced by a closed and
completed transaction because the adjacent land owner's lawsuit was not
finally resolved.
6. Have you documented that your own cell phone
is used for business rather than personal purposes? Tash v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-120 (4/29/08). Among the many
deductions claimed by a lawyer that Judge Haines disallowed was the
deduction claimed for his cellular telephone, because "[t]he record did not
indicate whether petitioner used his cellular telephone for business and/or
personal calls." Inasmuch as cell phones are listed property, Reg. § 1.274-
5(c) and (f) require substantiation for the deduction.
a. How do you steer the car? It might or
might not be OK to drive while talking on your cell phone, but it is
imperative to take notes in your log book while chatting on the phone.
Alami v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-42 (2/23/09). Judge Vasquez
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denied the taxpayer's claimed business deductions for cellular telephone
service because the taxpayer failed to establish the amount of time he used
his cell phone for business and personal purposes. A cellular phone is "listed
property" that is subject to the strict substantiation requirements of § 274(d)
pursuant to § 280F(d)(4)(A)(v), and a taxpayer must establish the amount of
business use and the amount of total use for the property to substantiate the
amount of expenses for listed property. An alternative ground for denying
the deduction was that the taxpayer's employer did not require that he have a
cell phone.
* Query whether there are employer
reporting obligations with respect to cell phones furnished to employees who
fail to keep records?
b. But, simplified methods for reporting cell
phone use are under consideration. Notice 2009-46, 2009-23 I.R.B. 1068
(6/8/09). IRS is considering methods to simplify treatment of employer-
provided cell phones, including a (1) "minimal personal use method" (if the
employee accounts to the employer that he has a personal cell phone for use
during business hours); and (2) a safe harbor method under which an
employer would treat 75 percent of each employee's use of the cell phone as
business usage.
* In a letter to Representative Skelton,
INFO 2009-0141 (7/8/09), the IRS advised that it is seeking clarifying
legislation from Congress. 2009 TNT 216-62.
c. And the Prez says to Congress "delist"
cell phones. President Obama's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget calls for Congress
to amend § 280F to remove cellular telephones from the category of listed
property, thereby "effectively removing the requirement of strict
substantiation and the limitation on depreciation deductions." Department of
the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2011
Revenue Proposals 26 (February 2010). The substantiation requirements are
"burdensome for employers;" it is difficult to document the cost of cell
phone calls, and "the cost of accounting for personal use often exceeds the
amount of any resulting income." The proposal specifically contemplates
that "a cell phone (or other similar telecommunications equipment) provided
primarily for business purposes would be excluded from gross income."
d. Finally, there is no longer a need to keep
a log book on the front seat of your car. Section 2043 of the Small
Business Jobs Act of 2010 removed "cellular telephones and similar
telecommunications equipment" from the definition of "listed property"
contained in § 280F(d)(4) for taxable years beginning after 12/31/09. This, in
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turn, eliminates the § 274(d) substantiation requirement for business cell
phone use.
7. The courts really socked it to this CPA. The legal
fees he paid in connection with defending a criminal charge arising from
his kissing a client's employee do not give rise to deductions in his
accounting business. Argyle v. Commissioner, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-6759
(3d Cir. 10/14/10), affig T.C. Memo. 2009-218. In a nonprecedential per
curiam opinion the court upheld the Tax Court's conclusion that a CPA
could not deduct legal expenses incurred in a criminal simple assault case
brought by the female employee of a client who the taxpayer kissed at her
home. The court rejected the taxpayer's assertion that the criminal action was
brought because he had reprimanded the woman for misconduct in the
client's business and that the fees, therefore, arose out the CPA's
professional activities. The court concluded that the origin of the criminal
complaint was the taxpayer's personal activities. The court also upheld the
Tax Court's finding that the taxpayer was not entitled to claimed home office
expense deductions.
8. Non-salaried members of a religious organization
are employees whose compensation is deductible by the tax-exempt
organization. Stahl v. United States, 626 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 11/29/10). The
taxpayer was a member and president of the Stahl Hutterian Brethren (SHB),
a § 501(d) religious or apostolic organization in which the members pooled
their efforts in farming and selling produce. The organization paid no salaries
but took care of the members' personal needs such as food, shelter, and
medical care. The members did not contribute to or collect social security
benefits. Under § 501(d) a religious or apostolic organization is exempt from
tax if it maintains a common treasury and its members include in gross
income their pro rata share of the entity income, whether or not distributed.
The taxpayer claimed that he was an employee of SHB so that his medical
and meal expenses were deductible in determining the entity's taxable
income. Reversing summary judgment in the District Court, the court held
that, applying the common law factors defining employment status, the
members of SHB were employed by the business, even though they have
many other relationships among themselves and to the organization.
E. Depreciation & Amortization
1. Stimulate the economy, buy a new car, light
truck or van and claim $100 more depreciation. Rev. Proc. 2010-18,
2010-9 I.R.B. 427 (2/16/10). The annual dollar limit on depreciation for
passenger automobiles placed in service in 2010 is generally increased by
$100 for the first year as follows: $3,060 for the placed in service year,
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$4,900 for the second tax year, $2,950 for the third tax year, and $1,775 for
each succeeding year. The limits for light trucks and vans are: $3,160 for the
placed in service year, $5,100 for the second tax year, $3,050 for the third
tax year, and $1,875 for each succeeding year.
2. Now that's a whole lotta expens'n goin' on! For
taxable years beginning in 2008 and 2009, the 2009 ARRA, § 2021,
increases the § 179 maximum deductible amount to $250,000 and provides a
phase-out threshold of $800,000. The maximum amount allowed to be
deducted under § 179 is increased by another $35,000 for (a) qualified
enterprise zone property, I.R.C. § 1397A(a)(1), and (b) qualified renewal
community property acquired and placed in service after 2001 and before
2010. I.R.C. § 1400J. In addition, for both qualified enterprise zone property
and qualified renewal community property, only fifty percent of the cost of
property in excess of the threshold for the phase-out is taken into account.
I.R.C. § 1397A(a)(2). I.R.C. § 179(e) increases the maximum amount
allowed to be deducted under § 179 by $100,000, and increases the phase-out
threshold by $600,000, for qualified disaster assistance property placed in
service after 2007 (with respect to disasters declared after that date) and
before 2010. The increased expensing and ceiling limits under the 2009
ARRA also affect the special expensing rules for enterprise zone property,
renewal property, and for qualified disaster assistance property. Thus, the
maximum § 179 deduction for qualified enterprise zone and renewal
property is $285,000 for 2008 and 2009 ($250,000 + $35,000). For qualified
disaster assistance property in 2008 and 2009 the maximum deduction is
$350,000 ($250,000 +$100,000), and the phase-out threshold is $1,400,000
($800,000 + $600,000).
a. And the tide of the expens'n rolls on. The
2010 HIRE Act extended the increased $250,000 ceiling on deducting the
cost of equipment under § 179, and the increased phase-out threshold of
$800,000, through taxable years beginning before 2011.
b. Rev. Proc. 2010-24, 2010-25 I.R.B. 764
(6/1/10), superseded by Rev. Proc. 2010-47, 2010-50 I.R.B. 827 (12/1/10).
The Revenue Procedure modifies Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-45 I.R.B. 617, to
update inflation adjusted § 179 first year depreciation to reflect increases
provided by the 2010 HIRE Act increasing for taxable years beginning in
2010 the aggregate cost of § 179 property eligible for expensing to $250,000
and the amount above which the deduction is reduced to $800,000. After the
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 increased the § 179 increased the
deductible amount to $500,000 for tax years beginning in 2010 or 2011, Rev.
Proc. 2010-24 became irrelevant.
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c. The tide is growing into a tsunami. The
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 increases the § 179 increased the deductible
amount to $500,000 for tax years beginning in 2010 or 2011 and increases
the phase-out threshold to $2,000,000.
d. And certain real property becomes
eligible. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 extended the § 179 deduction
to "qualified real property" as defined in § 179(f), through cross-reference to
§ 168(e). Section 179(f) allows the deduction of up to $250,000 of capital
expenditures for qualified leasehold improvement property, qualified
restaurant property, and qualified retail improvement property. The qualified
real property allowance is within the overall $500,000 expenditure limit of
§ 179 and is limited to depreciable real property used in the taxpayer's trade
or business.
e. Section 179 limits are extended again - is
this becoming permanent like research credits? The Compromise Tax
Relief Act of 2010, § 402, provides for Code § 179 first year expensing for
tax years beginning in 2012 in an amount not to exceed $125,000 with a
phase-out amount beginning at $500,000. For tax years beginning after 2012
the maximum deduction drops to $25,000 with the phase-out beginning at
$200,000 (at least until the business community makes sufficient campaign
contributions to extend the higher numbers into later years).
f. And applied to computer software for
another year. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 402, extends
eligibility as qualified Code § 179 property to off-the-shelf computer
software placed in service before 2013.
3. Fifty percent bonus depreciation is extended for
2010. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 extends application of the 50
percent bonus depreciation allowance of § 168(k) for one year to property
placed in service before 1/1/11. The 50 percent allowance is available for
depreciable machinery and equipment and most other tangible personal
property, and is available for computer software and certain leasehold
improvements, the first use of which began with the taxpayer.
a. But why worry about § 179 with bonus
depreciation at 100% extended for 2011. The Compromise Tax Relief Act
of 2010, § 401, increases first year bonus depreciation under Code § 168(k)
to 100% of the cost of qualified property placed in service after 9/8/10, and
before 1/1/12.
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4. Certain real property is 15 year MACRS
property. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 737, extends
application of Code § 168(e)(3)(E) and (e)(8)(E), which allow 15 years
MACRS recovery for certain qualified leasehold improvement property,
qualified restaurant property, and qualified retail improvement property, to
property placed in service on or before 12/31/11.
5. NASCAR wins again. The Compromise Tax Relief
Act of 2010, § 738, extends the 7-year cost recovery period for real property
improvements at motor-sports facilities under Code § 168(i)(15)(D) to
property placed in service before 1/1/12.
6. Ouch! Fifteen year recovery period for a one-
year lived asset. Covenant not to compete from a minority S corporation
shareholder is a § 197 intangible. Recovery Group, Inc. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2010-76 (4/15/10). The taxpayer S corporation paid a retiring 23
percent shareholder/employee $400,000 for a one-year covenant not to
compete. The taxpayer asserted that the acquisition of a 23 percent interest
was not "entered into in connection with an acquisition (directly or
indirectly) of an interest in a trade or business or substantial portion thereof'
as provided in § 197(d)(1)(E), and claimed a full year's deduction for the
amount paid. The court (Judge Gustafson) upon a careful analysis of the
statutory phrase concluded that the covenant was part of an acquisition of an
interest in a trade or business, that the interest was "substantial," and that in
any event the term "thereof' in the statutory language does not modify "an
interest," which, therefore, need not be substantial.
7. Fiat Lux but only for seven years. Street lights
are not land improvements. Here, it's better not to be assigned an asset
class. PPL Corporation v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 8 (7/28/10). The
taxpayer public utility company claimed that streetlights were depreciable
over seven years, as property for which there is no assigned recovery period,
while the IRS asserted that the proper recovery period for the streetlights was
20 years, as electric utility transmission and distribution plant, or
alternatively 15 years, as land improvements. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern)
held that street lighting, including lamps, poles and wiring, owned and
installed by an electric utility for public and private customers constituted
property without a class life and were thus eligible for seven year MACRS
recovery under § 168(e)(2) & (3). Judge Halpern found that the streetlights
were neither (1) electric utility transmission and distribution plant, because
they were "'primarily used' to make light, not to distribute electricity," and
not used in the distribution of electricity for sale, nor (2) land improvements,
because they were bolted to wood poles and buildings and not affixed to
anything in an inherently permanent way. Judge Halpern applied the six
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factors of Whiteco Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 664 (1975),
which focus on the permanence of the depreciable property and the damage
caused to it or to realty upon removal of the depreciable property: (1) "Is the
property capable of being moved, and has it in fact been moved?" (2) "Is the
property designed or constructed to remain permanently in place?" (3) "Are
there circumstances which tend to show the expected or intended length of
affixation, i.e., are there circumstances which show that the property may or
will have to be moved?" (4) "How substantial a job is removal of the
property and how time-consuming is it? Is it 'readily removable'?" (5) "How
much damage will the property sustain upon its removal?" and (6) "What is
the manner of affixation of the property to the land?" Every factor suggested
that street lights, including poles bolted to concrete foundations, which were
easily moved, were not land improvements.
a. Entergy Corporation & Affiliated
Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, T.C .Memo 2010-166 (7/28/10). This case
follows PPL Corp. v. Commissioner, (7/28/10), on essentially similar facts.
8. Oral leases don't cut it if you want a § 179
deduction for the leased property. Thomann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2010-241 (11/1/10). Pursuant to § 179(d)(5)(B), a taxpayer (other than a
corporation) who leases property to others may not deduct the cost of the
leased property under § 179 unless the taxpayer meets a two-prong test:
(1) the term of the lease, taking into account options to renew, must be less
than 50 percent of the class life of the leased property, and (2) the taxpayer's
§ 162 business expenses for the leased property during the initial 12-month
period following the transfer of the property to the lessee must exceed 15
percent of the rental income from the property. In this case, the taxpayer
leased property pursuant to an oral lease, the annual term of which was
extended several times. Judge Kroupa held that the lease term was indefinite
and that the statutory test thus was not met. The § 179 deduction was denied.
F. Credits
1. A credit for Vinny Gambini hiring disconnected
"yutes." The 2009 ARRA, § 1221, added two new categories of eligible
employees for 2009 and 2010 under the existing Code § 51 Work
Opportunity Tax Credit: unemployed veterans and "disconnected youth." To
qualify as an unemployed veteran, the employee (1) must have been
discharged from active duty in the military (after serving at least 180 days or
being discharged for a service-connected disability) during the five-year
period ending on the hiring date, and (2) must have received unemployment
compensation for at least four weeks during the one-year period ending on
the hiring date. A disconnected youth is an individual certified by the
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designated local agency who is (1) at least age 16 but not yet age 25 on the
hiring date, (2) not regularly attending any secondary, technical, or post-
secondary school during the six-month period preceding the hiring date,
(3) not regularly employed during the six-month period preceding the hiring
date, and (4) not readily employable by reason of lacking a sufficient number
of skills.
a. Disconnected yutes defined. Notice 2009-
28, 2009-24 I.R.B. 1082 (5/28/09). 2009 ARRA amended § 51 to add two
new targeted groups for purposes of the § 51 work opportunity credit:
unemployed veterans and disconnected youths who begin work for an
employer during 2009 or 2010. This provides guidance on the definition of
"disconnected youth." It also provides transition relief for employers who
hire unemployed veterans or disconnected youths after 12/31/08, and before
7/17/09.
b. The IRS is paying you not to fire newly
hired people. Code §§ 38(b) and 39, as amended by the 2010 HIRE Act,
provide a credit for retaining newly hired workers. The amount of the credit
is the lesser of (1) $1,000 or (2) 6.2 percent of the wages paid to the worker
during the 52 week period following the commencement of employment in a
tax year ending after 3/18/10. The credit is not available unless the
employee's wages (as defined for income tax withholding in § 3401(a))
during the last 26 weeks of the period are at least 80 percent of the wages for
the first 26 weeks of that period. The credit is allowed in the year in which
the 52 week period ends. No portion of the unused business credit under § 38
for any tax year that is attributable to the increased credit under the 2010
HIRE Act may be carried to a tax year beginning before 3/18/10.
2. The research credit is available for the whole
boat. Trinity Industries, Inc. v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D.
Tex. 1/29/10). For purposes of the § 41 research credit, substantially all of
the research activities undertaken for the discovery of technological
information must constitute elements of a process that relates to a new or
improved function. The tests of § 41 are applied to each "business
component" of the taxpayer, which is a product or process held for sale or
used in the business. I.R.C. § 41(d)(2). A Trinity subsidiary designed and
built six prototype "first in class" ships. The court rejected the IRS's
argument that the special order ships were not held for sale because they
were not sold out of inventory. The court also refused to accept the assertion
that because each ship consisted of numerous existing subassemblies
incorporated into a ship design that the total development cost of each ship
did not constitute a qualified research expense. Citing Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(6),
the court held that as long as the taxpayer can demonstrate that 80 percent of
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a first-in-class ship was part of a process of experimentation, the entire cost
is a research expenditure. The court also indicated that the taxpayer failed to
offer evidence from which the court could determine the amount of research
expenditure relating to any business component smaller than the entire ship.
The court then found that 80 percent of the costs of two of the six projects
for which the taxpayer claimed the research credit represented qualified
experimentation.
3. Who says Congress doesn't love small bidnesses?
Big bidnesses are required to buy health insurance for their employees
and must pay excise taxes if they don't; small bidnesses, which aren't
required to buy health insurance for their employees, get a tax credit if
they do. New § 45R, added by the 2010 Health Care Act, adds to the § 38
general business credit a credit for health insurance expenses of small
business employers, effective for taxable years beginning in 2010. This
provision is generally intended to encourage small employers, who are not
required to provide health insurance to their employees under other
provisions of the Act, to provide health insurance benefits to their
employees. Some amount of the credit is available to a business employer
with no more than 25 full-time equivalent employees (2,080 hours is an
FTE), if the employees have average annual full-time equivalent wages of no
more than $50,000 (as adjusted for inflation after 2014). The full amount of
the credit is available only to an employer with 10 or fewer full-time
equivalent employees, whose employees have average annual full-time
equivalent wages from the employer of less than $25,000 (as adjusted for
inflation after 2014). Seasonal workers are not taken into account. Employer
aggregation rules apply. Self-employed individuals, including partners and
sole proprietors, two percent shareholders of an S Corporation, and five
percent owners of the employer (as defined in § 416(i)(1)(B)(i)) are not
treated as employees, and sole proprietors cannot claim the credit with
respect to employees who are family members. The credit applies only to
contributions under a plan that requires the employer to make a nonelective
contribution on behalf of each employee who enrolls in certain defined
qualifying health insurance offered to employees by the employer equal to a
uniform percentage (not less than 50 percent) of the premium cost of the
qualifying health plan. Before the phase-out rules are applied, the amount of
the credit equals the "applicable percentage" of the employer's mandatory
health insurance premium for each covered employee; amounts paid under a
cafeteria plan are not taken into account. For 2010 through 2013, the
applicable percentage is 35 percent; for years after 2013, the applicable
percentage is 50 percent. However, the credit cannot exceed the applicable
percentage multiplied by the contributions that the employer would have
made during the taxable year if each employee had enrolled in coverage with
a "small business benchmark premium" (as defined in the statute). The phase
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out formula depends on (1) whether the employer has more than 10
employees, (2) whether the employees' average wages exceed $25,000,
(3) whether both (1) and (2) apply, and whether the year is claimed, i.e., the
year after the taxable year with respect to which the credit is claimed, is 2011
through 2013 or after 2013. We will not provide the gory details. The credit
is nonrefundable, but may offset AMT liability. The employer's § 162
deduction is reduced by the amount of the credit.
a. Healthy credits. Rev. Rul. 2010-13, 2010-
21 I.R.B. 691 (5/3/10). Section 45R enacted in the Health Care Act, provides
a credit to eligible small employers (fewer than 25 employees with average
annual wages around $50,000), including tax exempt employers, who make
nonelective contributions (contributions that are not part of a salary reduction
agreement) towards employee health care based on a percentage of the lesser
of (1) the amount of nonelective contributions paid by the small employer
and (2) the amount of nonelective contributions the employer would have
paid if employees were enrolled in a plan that required the average premium
for the small group market in the state in which the employer is offering
health care coverage. The ruling sets forth the average premiums for the
small group market in each state for the 2010 taxable year. The tables
include average premiums for both single coverage and family coverage.
b. The IRS tells employers how to count,
and throws in some transition relief. Notice 2010-44, 2010-22 I.R.B. 717
(5/17/10), amplified by Notice 2010-82, 2010-51 I.R.B. 857 (12/4/10). These
notices provides comprehensive (?) guidance regarding the § 45R credit for
small employers that make nonelective contributions towards their
employees' health insurance premiums, including guidance for determining
eligibility for the credit, calculating the credit, and claiming the credit. It
explains how to determine the number of hours of service worked by
employees during the taxable year and how to compute FTEs. The credit is
available for add-on dental and vision coverage as well as for traditional
health insurance. Because the § 45R credit applies to taxable years beginning
in 2010, including the period in 2010 before its enactment, the notice
provides transitional relief under which an employer will be deemed to
satisfy the requirement that the employer pay a uniform percentage, not less
than 50 percent, of the premium cost of the health insurance coverage. For
taxable years beginning in 2010, this uniformity requirement will be deemed
to have been met if the employer pays an amount equal to at least 50 percent
of the premium for single (employee-only) coverage for each employee
enrolled in coverage offered to employees by the employer, even if the
employer does not pay the same percentage of the premium for each such
employee.
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c. More guidance. Notice 2010-82, 2010-51
I.R.B. 857 (12/4/10). This notice amplifies Notice 2010-44, 2010-22 I.R.B.
717, to provide additional guidance regarding the § 45R credit for small
employers that make nonelective contributions towards their employees'
health insurance premiums under a qualifying arrangement. Among the
issues addressed are (1) tax-exempt organizations that are not both described
in § 501(c) and exempt from tax under § 501(a) are not eligible to claim the
credit; (2) a household employer that otherwise satisfies the statutory
requirements is eligible o claim the credit; (3) spouse of owners that are
treated as employees even if employed by the business: (4) the treatment of
leased employees; (5) determination of average annual wages, number of
hours worked, and number of FTEs; (6) HSAs and self-insured plans,
including HRAs and FSAs, are not qualifying arrangements; (7) calculation
of the credit, including the application of the average premium cap.
4. It will be difficult for Alliantgroup to be
retrospectively generating these new research credits for clients. Section
48D, added by the 2010 Health Care Act, provides a 50 percent
nonrefundable investment tax credit for qualified investments in qualifying
"therapeutic discovery projects," which is a term with a complicated
definition. The credit is available only to companies having 250 or fewer
employees, and the right to claim the credit must be awarded by the Treasury
company-by-company, in consultation with HHS, to companies that apply.
Oh, yeah, only a total of $1 billion can be awarded. The many small details
will probably bore you.
a. The IRS creates the program. Notice
2010-45, 2010-23 I.R.B. 734 (5/22/10). This notice establishes the qualifying
therapeutic discovery project program and provides the procedures under
which an eligible taxpayer may apply for certification from the IRS of a
qualified investment with respect to a qualifying therapeutic discovery
project as eligible for a credit, or for certain taxpayers, a grant under the
program.
5. Leveraging the new markets tax credit is OK!
Rev. Rul. 2010-17, 2010-26 I.R.B. 769 (6/8/10). Section 45D(b) provides
that an equity investment in a qualified community development entity
eligible for the new markets tax credit is a qualified equity investment in
cash. The IRS ruled that, consistent with the holding of Rev. Rul. 2003-20,
2003-1 C.B. 465, an equity investment by an LLC which is funded with a
nonrecourse loan to the LLC qualifies for the new markets tax credit, an
equity investment includes cash from a recourse loan obtained by an LLC.
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6. Mid-audit CCA changing the IRS's view doesn't
cut the mustard as authority to support an asserted deficiency. The
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5433 (S.D.
Ohio 6/25/10). Section 41(a)(1) allows a credit of 20 percent of the amount
by which the taxpayer's qualified research expenditures for the year exceed
the taxpayer's "base amount" of qualified research expenditures. Generally
speaking, the Obase amount" is the company's "fixed base percentage" -
the percentage of the company's gross receipts expended for research from
1984 through 1988 (subject to a 16 percent ceiling) - multiplied by the
company's average annual receipts for the preceding four years (but the base
will not be less than 50 percent of the qualified research expenses for the
credit year). Section 41(f) provides that for purposes of computing the credit,
all members of the same controlled group of corporations will be treated as a
single corporation. Reg. § 1.41-6(b), as well Temp. Reg. § 1.41-6T(b), which
was the controlling regulation for the years in question, provides that "[t]he
group credit is computed by applying all of the section 41 computational
rules on an aggregate basis." Pursuant to § 41(f)(5), a "controlled group" is
defined by a cross reference to § 1563(a), substituting 50 percent for 80
percent, and thus should include foreign group members. In computing its
credit, P&G excluded receipts from intercompany transactions within its
group, including transactions with foreign members, from gross receipts.
This method was acceptable to the IRS under CCA 200233011, but during
the course of the audit, the IRS issued CCA 200620023, which provided that
only research expenditures and not gross receipts within a controlled group
should be disregarded, the position that the government maintained in the
litigation. The court held that P&G had properly computed the § 41 research
credit by disregarding both research expenditures and gross receipts within
its controlled group. The court rejected the government's argument that
Deere & Company v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 246 (2009), supported its
position, concluding that Deere was not relevant because specific statutory
and regulatory language was controlling.
7. Once enacted, credits never die. The Compromise
Tax Relief Act of 2010, extends a number of expiring and expired credits.
* The research credit of Code § 41 was
retroactively extended to apply to amounts paid or accrued before 1/1/12. Act
§ 731.
* The 20% credit under Code § 45A
for qualified wages and health benefits paid to enrolled Indian tribe members
was retroactively extended to amounts paid or incurred in tax years beginning
before 1/1/12. Act § 732.
* The 5% credit under § 45D for
investment in stock of a community development entity was retroactively
extended through 2011. Act § 733.
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* The 20% credit provided by § 45P
for differential wages paid to employees called to active duty in the armed
services was extended through 2011. Act § 736.
* The Work Opportunity Credit of § 51
was extended to individuals who begin work before 1/1/12. The date was
extended from 8/31/11. Act § 757.
a. But the paper manufacturers take a hit.
The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010 retroactively eliminates the § Code§ 6426(d) alternative fuels credit eligibility for "black liquor" produced by
paper milling processes for fuel sold or used after 12/31/09. Act § 704.
G. Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
1. HIRE tax credits explained. Notice 2010-35,
2010-19 I.R.B. 660 (4/26/10). The Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment
Act provides for an irrevocable election to receive direct payment of
otherwise allowable tax credits to holders of new clean renewable energy
bonds (§ 54C), qualified energy conservation bonds (§ 54D), qualified zone
academy bonds (§ 54E), and qualified school construction bonds (§ 54F) that
are issued after 3/18/10. Direct Pay Tax Credit Bonds provide a federal
borrowing subsidy through payment of a refundable tax credit to issuers with
respect to each interest payment. The credit is the lesser of (1) the amount of
interest payable, or (2) 100 percent of the interest on school construction and
qualified zone academy bonds and 70 percent of the interest on clean
renewable energy bonds and qualified energy conservation bonds that would
have been payable if the interest were determined at the tax credit bond rate
under § 54A(b)(3). The notice describes requirements for qualifying an issue
as a Direct Pay Tax Credit Bonds and requires issuers to elect that status the
day before issue. Issuers are required to file a revised Form 8038-CP to
request payment of a refundable credit. The credit will be paid
contemporaneously with the applicable interest payment date of fixed rate
bonds. Payments will be made quarterly with respect to variable interest rate
bonds. The notice also specifies reporting requirements.
2. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 706,
suspends the Code § 613A limitation on percentage depletion for oil and gas
from marginal wells for two years (to apply to tax years beginning before
1/1/12).
a. Under the Compromise Tax Relief Act of
2010, § § 701-711, energy credits were reinstated and extended two years,
including the biodiesel fuels credit, biodiesel mixtures excise tax credit,
refined coal credit, alternative fuel tax credit, alternative fuel mixtures excise
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tax credit, alcohol fuels credit, ethanol blenders credit, alcohol fuels excise
tax credit, energy efficient appliances credit, and the alternative fuel vehicle
refueling property credit.
H. Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs
1. Carry me back to those long ago days of yore,
when there were profits to be offset by today's NOL. The 2009 ARRA,
§ 1211(b), amended Code § 172 to permit an "eligible small business" to
elect to extend the carryback period for a net operating loss arising in 2008 to
any number of years greater than two or fewer than six - i.e., the elected
carryback period may be five, four, or three years. (Absent an election the
normal two year carryback rule still applies.) An "eligible small business" is
defined in § 172(b)(1)(H)(v)(II) (through cross references to
§ 172(b)(1)(F)(iii)) as a corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship with
average annual gross receipts of $15 million or less. An election under
§ 172(b)(1)(H) must be made by the due date (including extensions) for
filing the taxpayer's return for the year the net operating loss arose (i.e.,
2008). If the taxpayer is on a fiscal year, the election can be made with
respect to either the taxable year ending in 2008 or the taxable year
beginning in 2008, but not with respect to both taxable years. I.R.C.
§ 172(b)(1)(H)(ii),(iii). The election is irrevocable.
a. And here's instructions on how to get
back to those days of yore. Rev. Proc. 2009-19, 2009-14 IRB 747 (3/16/09).
This revenue procedure provides guidance under § 1211 of 2009 ARRA,
which amended § 172(b)(1)(H) to allow a taxpayer that is an eligible small
business to elect a 3-, 4-, or 5-year NOL carryback for a taxable year ending
after 2007.
b. Rev. Proc. 2009-19 was modified and
superseded by Rev. Proc. 2009-26. Rev. Proc. 2009-26, 2009-19 I.R.B. 935
(4/25/09). This revenue procedure was issued because many eligible small
businesses inadvertently failed to make valid elections that complied with
Rev. Proc. 2009-19.
c. Now the carryback is available to larger
businesses as well. Section 13 of the Worker, Homeownership, and Business
Assistance Act of 2009 (WHABA) amends § 172 to permit larger businesses
to make the 2008 and 2009 NOL carryback election of up to five years
(which in 2009 ARRA was allowed only for and "eligible small business").
The election applies with respect to NOLs incurred in either 2008 or 2009,
but not both years. In addition, 2008 or 2009 NOLs can be used to offset
only fifty percent of the taxable income earned in the fifth prior taxable year.
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This 50 percent limit does not apply to carrybacks of 2008 losses by "eligible
small businesses." In addition, an "eligible small business" may take
advantage of the extended carryback rules with respect to both 2008 and
2009 losses, rather than the losses of only one of those years. Generally, the
extended NOL carry back election is not available for TARP recipients or
corporations that, at any time during 2008 or 2009 were a member of an
affiliated group including a TARP recipient.
* This provision also increases the use
of NOLs to offset a corporation's alternative minimum taxable income by the
NOLs the taxpayer elects to carry back up to five taxable years and removes the
90 percent AMT limit.
d. More instructions. Rev. Proc. 2009-52,
2009-49 I.R.B. 744 (11/20/09). This revenue ruling provides guidance
regarding procedures for making the election and its effect. The revenue
procedure explains which business can elect the NOL carry back periods
provided by WHABA.
e. Notice 2010-58, 2010-37 I.R.B. 326
(8/20/10). This notice provides guidance in Q&A format regarding twenty
particular issues that have arisen regarding the election to carryback NOLs
for three, four, or five years under § 172(b)(1)(H), as amended by the
Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009.
2. AMT NOLs are different. Metro One
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 28 (12/15/10). In
computing AMTI, § 56(a)(4), allows a corporation to claim an AMT NOL in
lieu of a regular NOL deduction allowed under § 72. The taxpayer claimed
an AMT NOL deduction for 2002 based on a carryback of an AMT NOL
from 2004. Analyzing a very complicated statutory pattern, Judge Paris held
that § 56(a)(1) does not allow for an AMT NOL carryover to a prior year.
I. At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses
1. Limited Liability Partnership and Limited
Liability Company membership interests are not presumptively limited
partnership interests under the passive activity loss rules. Garnett v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. 368 (6/30/09). The taxpayers held a number of
direct and indirect interests in limited liability partnerships and LLCs that
were engaged in agribusiness. Section 469(h)(2) provides that a limited
partnership interest will not be treated as an interest with respect to which a
taxpayer is a material participant, except as provided in regulations. Temp.
Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(2) provides that a limited partner materially participates
in a partnership activity only if (1) the taxpayer devotes more than 500 hours
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to the activity in the year, (2) the taxpayer materially participates in the
activity for five of the preceding ten taxable years, or (3) the activity is a
personal service activity in which the taxpayer materially participated for any
three preceding years. Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(2)(1), (5), (6). Temp. Reg.
§ 1.469-5T(e)(3) defines a limited partnership interest as an interest
designated as a limited partner interest in a partnership agreement or an
interest for which the partner has limited liability. Temp. Reg. § 1.469-
5T(e)(3)(ii) has an exception from the material participation rule for an
interest of a limited partner who also holds a general partnership interest. The
court (Judge Thornton) concluded that in the case of an interest in a limited
liability partnership or a limited liability company, both of which the court
described as different from a limited partnership, the interests are not to be
treated as limited partnership interests under § 469(h)(2). Holders of such
interests are not barred by state law from materially participating in the
affairs of the entity and thus hold their interests as general partners within the
meaning of the temporary regulations. Thus, whether or not the taxpayer is a
material participant requires a full factual inquiry and an LLC member can
satisfy the material participation requirement under any of the seven tests in
Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a).
a. The Court of Federal Claims agrees.
Thompson v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 728 (7/20/09). The court (Judge
Block) granted summary judgment treating the taxpayer member/manager of
an LLC as a material participant. The taxpayer's degree of participation was
stipulated and the only question was whether § 469(h)(2) precluded treating
the taxpayer as a material participant in a Texas LLC. The court noted that
§ 469(h)(2) treats limited partners differently because of an assumption that
limited partners do not materially participate in their limited partnerships. In
an LLC, on the other hand, all members have limited liability but members
may participate in management. The court noted that Temp. Reg. § 1.469-
5T(e)(3) treats a partnership interest as a limited partner interest if the holder
has limited liability "under the law of the State in which the partnership is
organized." The court held that the quoted language applies only to an entity
that is a partnership under state law, which does not include an LLC, which,
although treated as a partnership for tax purposes, is a different type of entity
under state law. The taxpayer was both a member and manager of the LLC.
Unlike a limited partner, a member manager does not lose limited liability by
participation in the management of the LLC. The court also recognized that
shareholders of an S corporation have limited liability as shareholders, but
participate in management, and are not subject to being automatically treated
as passive participants. The taxpayer, therefore, was able to demonstrate his
material participation in the activity by using all seven of the Temp. Reg.
§ 1.469-5T(a) tests.
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b. Ditto. Hegarty v. Commissioner, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2009-153 (10/6/09), is to the same effect.
c. Ditto again. Newell v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2010-23 (2/16/10). Relying on Garnett v. Commissioner, supra,
Judge Marvel held that the interest of a managing member of a California
LLC was not a limited partnership interest for purposes of Reg. § 1.469-
5T(c)(1). Taxpayer's losses were not passive activity losses because the IRS
conceded that the taxpayer met the "significant participation" test of Temp.
Reg. § 1469-5T(a)(4).
d. The IRS acquiesces. AOD 2010-02, 2010-
14 I.R.B._(4/5/10). The IRS acquiesces in the result in Thompson. See also
AOD 2010-02, 2010 WL 2010483.
2. Reporting self-help slicing, dicing, gluing, and
pasting of passive activities. Tell the IRS about grouping trade or
business activities. Rev. Proc. 2010-13, 2010-4 I.R.B. 329 (1/6/10). This
revenue procedure requires taxpayers to report to the IRS their groupings and
regroupings of activities and the addition of activities within their existing
groupings of activities under Reg. § 1.469-4(c) for purposes of § 469. A
written statement must be filed with the original income tax return for the
first taxable year in which two or more trade or business activities or rental
activities are originally grouped as a single activity. The statement must
contain a declaration that the grouped activities constitute an appropriate
economic unit for the measurement of gain or loss under § 469. A similar
statement must be filed with a return for the first taxable year of a regrouping
or the taxable year in which a new trade or business activity or a rental
activity is added to an existing grouping. A partnership or S corporation must
disclose as required on the entity's tax return and by separately stating the
amounts of income and loss for each grouping, and a partner or shareholder
is not required to make a separate disclosure unless the partner or
shareholder (1) groups together any of the activities that the entity does not
group together, (2) groups the entity's activities with activities conducted
directly by the partner or shareholder, or (3) groups the entity's activities
with activities conducted through other entities.
A taxpayer is not required to file a
report of groupings in existence prior to the 1/25/10 effective date of the
revenue procedure.
a. Contrary to Jackie Gleason, this was not
a "good group." Grouping activities under § 469 requires an explicit
election, not merely a reporting position. Trask v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2010-78 (4/15/10). The taxpayer failed to make an explicit election
2011] 601
Florida Tax Review
on his return to aggregate rental real estate activities as required by Reg.
§ 1.469-9(g). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that merely aggregating real
estate rental activity losses on his returns was not an effective election. Thus,
although the taxpayer established that he was a "real estate professional" as
defined in § 469(c)(7), all of the claimed losses were disallowed because he
failed to prove that he materially participated in any of the rental activities on
an activity-by-activity basis.
b. Elect to aggregate, or be segregated.
Shiekh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-126 (6/10/10). On facts
substantially similar to the facts in Trask, the Tax Court (Judge Wells)
reached a similar result. The taxpayer materially participated in the operation
of rental properties in Miami Beach, Florida, and owned additional
properties including properties in Ventura and Culver City, California. The
taxpayer did not file the election required by § 469(c) which would have
allowed the taxpayer, as a real estate professional, to aggregate all of his real
estate activities into a single activity for purposes of treating all of the real
estate income and losses as active. The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that
aggregating properties on a return filed in the year the taxpayer claimed
ordinary loss on the sale of his Ventura property was not adequate notice of
an election to aggregate properties under Reg. § 1.469-9(g)(3). The taxpayer
was found not to be a material participant with respect to his Ventura and
Culver City properties. The taxpayer was allowed to reduce capital gain in
the year he sold the Ventura property by expenses incurred in the year of
sale.
3. A song and a dance doesn't make the law
practice a professional real estate business, but renting your building to
the law practice is active. Langille v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-49
(3/18/10). The taxpayer Deanna Langille, formerly known as Deanna
Birdsong, worked long hours in her law practice and devoted somewhat less
of her time to her rental real estate activities. Unfortunately for the taxpayer
she resigned from her law practice in lieu of disciplinary proceedings
implemented for misappropriation of funds from her firm's client trust
accounts. To make matters worse, after an unsuccessful negotiation for the
sale of her law practice, the potential buyer reported to the IRS that the
taxpayer maintained two sets of books for the practice, which resulted in a
criminal investigation and a guilty plea to one count of a tax fraud
indictment. In the civil tax matter the Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) found
that the taxpayer willfully failed to report income from her law practice and
residential real estate rental activities (from which she had no profit). The
taxpayer was unable to establish the number of hours she worked on her
residential real estate activities, and thus was unable to establish herself as a
real estate professional under the 50 percent of all personal services
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requirement of § 469(c)(7)(B)(i), or to prove that she satisfied the 750 hour
requirement of § 469(c)(7)(B)(ii). In addition, the court held that income
from the taxpayer's rental of office space to her law practice in which she
was a material participant was not passive activity income under Reg.
§ 1.469-2(f)(6).
4. An activity log that reflects work days in excess
of 24 hours isn't very credible (unless you were on an airplane to the
West Coast). Goolsby v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-64 (4/1/10). The
taxpayers owned several rental real estate properties with respect to which
they claimed net losses. The IRS disallowed the losses as passive activity
losses, and the taxpayers claimed that one of them spent more than 750 hours
a year managing the properties and that under the § 469(c)(7)(B) real estate
professional rule, the losses were treated as active business losses. Judge
Wells rejected the taxpayers' arguments. He found that the activity log
purporting to document the hours of management activity was not credible. It
was created after the taxpayers' return was selected for audit and solely for
purposes of the case in controversy. The taxpayers "presented no evidence of
contemporaneous records, such as appointment books, calendars, or narrative
summaries, that would credibly support the ... activity log. Incredibly, the ...
activity log lists days during which [the taxpayer] allegedly logged more than
24 hours of work."
5. New market tax credits are not treated as passive
activity credits. Rev. Rul. 2010-16, 2010-26 I.R.B. 769 (6/8/10). Section
45D provides a new market credit for an equity investment in a qualified
community development entity, an entity that invests in or loans money to a
qualified active low-income community business, purchases loans from
another qualified community development entity, provides financial
counseling to residents of low-income communities, or loans money or
makes an equity investment in a qualified community development entity. A
qualified community development entity does not itself need to be engaged
in a trade or business. Thus, the Ruling concludes that when an individual
acquires an equity investment in a qualified community development entity
that is not in connection with the conduct of a trade or business by the
individual, § 45D credits are not passive activity credits under § 469(d)(2)
because a passive activity is defined in § 469(c) as an activity that is a trade
or business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. The ruling
also concludes that new market credits derived from acquisition of an equity
interest in a qualified community development entity by a partnership that is
not in connection with the partnership's conduct of a trade or business are
not passive activity credits.
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6. Here's an example of why Tax Court Summary
Opinions aren't and shouldn't be precedential. Ajah v Commissioner,
T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-90 (7/8/10). This otherwise unremarkable summary
opinion, denying the taxpayers' claim that he rental real estate losses from
two properties were not subject to the § 469 passive activity loss rules
because Mrs. Ajah was real estate professional under § 469(c)(7) is notable
only for a glaring error of law that likely did not affect the outcome, but
demonstrates that some decided cases contain statements that are just flat out
wrong and should be ignored. The taxpayers were held not to qualify because
Mrs. Ajah's "method of calculating her time spent participating in the rental
activities constitutes an impermissible 'ballpark guesstimate' that under
Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(f)(4) was not an acceptable method of establishing
her participation. She had no records and simply testified that she worked at
least 20 hours a week for 52 weeks on the two rental properties. Not content
to stop there, the judge continued by finding that the taxpayer had failed to
properly aggregate the two rental properties into a single activity because
merely aggregating items on Schedule E is insufficient - a point on which he
was correct - and then concluded that because the taxpayers had not
aggregated the activities, to qualify as a real estate professional under
§ 469(c)(7)(B) Mrs. Ajah "would need to perform 750 hours of service for
each rental real estate interest for a total of 1,500 hours to meet the test" - a
conclusion that every kindergartner knows is not what is required by the
statute.
Section 469(c)(7)(B)(ii) requires that
"such taxpayer performs more than 750 hours of services during the taxable
year in real property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially
participates." This language clearly means that the 750 hours requirement refers
to the aggregate number of hours in all real property trades or businesses in
which the taxpayer materially participates and is not a property-by-property
requirement. Only material participation is determined on a property-by-
property basis, except with respect to those properties that are grouped. Trask v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-78 (4/15/10), which was cited in Ajah as the
basis for the errant holding, did not so hold. A careful reading of Trask
indicates that the taxpayer, who was able to prove that he devoted more than
one-half of his time and more than 750 hours of total time to managing over
thirty rental properties, was held to qualify as a real estate professional under
§ 469(c)(7)(B), but because he failed properly to elect to treat all of his rental
properties as a single activity for purposes of § 469(c)(7)(A) and he "[did] not
contend that he materially participated in each of his rental activities when
viewed separately," he did not qualify for the exception. Section 469(c)(7)
removes from the passive activity basket only those rental activities in which
the real estate professional materially participates.
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7. Estate of Roberts v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2010-156 (7/21/10). The deceased taxpayer was the sole owner of a leasing
LLC organized for the purpose of leasing trucking equipment to the
taxpayer's solely owned S corporation. The taxpayer "lent" the LLC
$425,000 for a promissory note. The LLC issued a cashier's check in the
same amount which was used to fund a portion of the $1.4 million purchase
price of a luxury RV. The court (Judge Goeke) found that the RV was not
used by the LLC in its leasing activity and therefore the taxpayer was not at-
risk under § 465 for the contribution to the LLC because the funds were not
borrowed for use "in an activity" as required by § 465(b)(2).
8. Estate of Stangeland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2010-185 (8/16/10). The deceased taxpayer was an investor in numerous
business enterprises, all of which were independently managed. One of the
businesses, R&L Air, L.L.C., was formed to own and lease two airplanes.
The airplanes were managed by a third party under contract. The taxpayer
also maintained a consulting business as a sole-proprietor to help manage his
businesses. He worked approximately 50 hours per week for the consulting
business. The taxpayer periodically leased the R&L airplanes for use in his
consulting business and also used the airplanes in the course of charitable
activities and in pursuit of private investment activities. The court (Judge
Cohen) first held that the taxpayer's consulting activities did not constitute a
trade or business but described the consulting activities as being engaged to
increase the value of the taxpayer's numerous investments. The court thus
disallowed deductions of expenses incurred in the consulting activities. The
court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that the consulting business
should be combined with the airplane leasing business as a single activity in
which the taxpayer participated for more than 500 hours. To combine the two
activities under Reg. § 1.469-4(c), both must be found to constitute a trade or
business, a test which the consulting activity failed. The court also rejected
the taxpayer's argument that his participation in the two activities qualified
under the significant participation test of Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(4), again
because the consulting activity failed to qualify as a trade or business.
However, for one of the three tax years at issue, the court found that the
taxpayer participated in activities of various businesses for more than 500
hours and in the airplane leasing activity for at least 100 hours, and that the
losses from the airplane leasing activity were not passive activity losses for
that year.
9. Homer Simpson loses in the Tax Court. Time off
from the nuclear power plant is not being a real estate professional.
Moss v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 18 (9/20/10). The taxpayer, who
worked full time as a maintenance planner at a nuclear power plant, owned
several rental real estate properties. The taxpayer recorded the days, but not
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the time worked in maintenance on the rental properties in a daily calendar.
The taxpayer claimed that he worked a total of 645 hours on the rental
properties (including travel time) and attempted to add time that he was "on-
call" anytime he was not working at the power plant in order to satisfy the
minimum 750 hour requirement of § 469(c)(7)(B)(ii) to qualify as a real
estate professional. The court (Judge Wells) held that only time for services
actually performed could be counted towards the 750 hour requirement,
which did not include time while the taxpayer was on call. However, the
court also found that the taxpayer actively participated in the rental real
estate activities and was, therefore, entitled to the § 469(i) $25,000
allowance, but subject to being phased out to the extent the taxpayer's
income exceeded $100,000. The court also held that the taxpayer was subject
to the § 6662 accuracy related penalty.
10. Now here's really bad grouping. Dunn v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-198 (9/13/10). The Tax Court (Judge
Thornton) held that the taxpayer's (1) medical practice conducted as an
employee, (2) property management business conducted through an S
corporation, and (3) airplane leasing conducted through an LLC could not be
grouped for purposes of applying § 469, because they did not constitute an
"appropriate economic unit" within the meaning of Reg. § 1.469-4(c)(2). The
property management business and the airplane leasing activity were found
to be passive activities. Accuracy related penalties were imposed because the
taxpayer, and not his advisors, made the decision to characterize the
activities as passive or active, and the taxpayer acknowledged on brief that
he was "highly educated and sophisticated and possesses extensive business
experience" and conceded, "the standard of care that must have been
exercised by the Petitioner is a high one."
* The taxpayer's tax advisor testified
that "The client would tell us whether or not it was passive or nonpassive. ...
We would have to ask the client. We would have no way of knowing without.
... If the client told us it was passive, fine. It was passive. If the client tells us-
you know, we don't know unless the client tells us."
* Hum! Circular 230 issue?
11. A real estate professional must materially
participate in her real estate rental activities. Perez v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2010-232 (10/25/10). Section 469(c)(2) provides that rental real
estate activities are per se passive activities. However, § 469(c)(7) excludes
rental real estate activities of a real estate professional from the per se rule.
The taxpayer was a real estate sales person and broker who owned three
residential rental properties. The taxpayer stipulated that she did not
materially participate in those activities under the rules of Temp. Reg.
§ 1.469-5T. The court (Judge Haines) rejected the taxpayer's argument that
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because she was a qualified real estate professional all of her real estate
activities were not passive activities. The court pointed out that the
taxpayer's argument ignored the plain language of Reg. § 1.469-9(e)(1),
which provides that "a rental real estate activity of a qualifying [real estate
professional] is a passive activity under section 469 for the taxable year
unless the taxpayer materially participates in the activity." The court also
indicated that the taxpayer's activity as a real estate loan agent and broker
was separate from her activity as an owner of residential real estate
properties, and the activities may not be aggregated. Reg. § 1.469-9(e)(3)(i).
The court also sustained § 6662 penalties.
III. INVESTMENT GAIN AND INCOME
A. Gains and Losses
1. New rules for determining basis in securities. The
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], Act § 403,
amends Code § 1012 to create new rules for determining the basis of
securities acquired after 12/31/10. The FIFO or other conventions for
determining the basis of securities when sold must be applied on an account-
by-account basis. Thus, with respect to a taxpayer who holds the same stock
in more than one account, determining the basis of sold securities from any
account will be determined solely with regard to the basis of securities in that
account. In addition, § 1012(d) provides for averaging the basis of stock
acquired in a dividend reinvestment plan. Stock in a dividend reinvestment
plan is treated as held in a separate account for purposes of determining
basis.
a. No more fooling the IRS about basis. The
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], § 403, added
Code § 6045(g), which requires brokers to report their customers' basis in a
"covered security" and whether gain or loss is long-term or short-term, in
addition to the existing requirement that the broker report gross sales
proceeds. In general, the customer's basis is to be reported on a first-in first-
out method, unless an average basis method is permissible. Covered
securities include securities acquired through an account with the broker or
transferred to the broker from another account on or after an applicable date.
January 1, 2011, is the applicable date for stocks. January 1, 2012, is the
applicable date for stocks under the average basis method. January 1, 2013,
or such later date as specified by the IRS, is the applicable date for any other
security. Under § 6045A, a taxpayer transferring securities to a broker after
1/1/11 is required to report information, as required by regulations, necessary
to permit the broker to meet its reporting requirements. Section 6045B
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requires the issuer of any security to report information describing any
organizational action that affects the basis of the security.
b. And the IRS begins to gear up. REG-
101896-09, Basis Reporting by Securities Brokers and Basis Determination
for Stock, 74 F.R. 67010 (12/17/09). These proposed regulations relate to
reporting sales of securities by brokers (Prop. Reg. § 1.6045-1) and
determining the basis of securities (Prop. Reg. § 1.1012-1). The proposed
regulations reflect changes in the law made by the Energy Improvement and
Extension Act of 2008 that require brokers when reporting the sale of
securities to the IRS to include the customer's adjusted basis in the sold
securities and to classify any gain or loss as long-term or short-term. The
proposed regulations under § 1012 alter how taxpayers compute basis when
averaging the basis of shares acquired at different prices and expand the
ability of taxpayers to compute basis by averaging with respect to RIC shares
and shares specifically held in a dividend reinvestment plan. Brokers must
furnish information statements to customers by February 15th. The proposed
regulations provide for the implementation of new reporting requirements
imposed upon persons that transfer custody of stock and upon issuers of
stock regarding organizational actions that affect the basis of the issued
stock. Other proposed regulations reflect changes in the law that alter how
brokers report short sales of securities.
c. Transitional relief from reporting
requirements. Notice 2010-67, 2010-43 I.R.B. 529 (10/12/10). This notice
provides transitional relief from the information reporting requirements in
§ 6045A that apply beginning in 2011 to transfers of securities by brokers
and other custodians. The notice provides that, solely for transfers of stock in
2011 described in the notice, the IRS will not assert penalties for failure to
furnish a transfer statement under § 6045A and that the transferred stock may
be treated as a noncovered security upon its subsequent sale or transfer. ("A
noncovered security is any security that is not a covered security.") The
notice further provides:
To enable brokers to meet the requirements of
section 6045(g) for securities transferred between accounts,
section 6045A provides that, beginning in 2011, a broker
and any other person specified in Treasury Regulations that
transfers custody of a covered security to a receiving broker
must furnish to the receiving broker a written statement that
allows the receiving broker to satisfy the basis reporting
requirements of section 6045(g). Except as provided by the
[IRS], the statement must be furnished to the receiving
broker within fifteen days after the date of the transfer. A
covered security remains a covered security if transferred,
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but only if the receiving broker receives a transfer statement
for the transfer.
d. Final regulations on basis reporting and
basis determination. T.D. 9504, Basis Reporting by Securities Brokers and
Basis Determination for Stock, 2010-47 I.R.B. 670 (11/22/10). These
regulations adopt, with only minor changes, the regulations proposed in
December 2009. They permit the use of the average basis method by
regulated investment companies and dividend reinvestment plans. Brokers
must use either the specific identification method or the FIFO method for
securities sold from any particular account.
* The final regulations also permit
election of the FIDO method if the securities in any account consist
predominantly of dogs.
* To minimize the possibility of
identification foot-faults, the creation of different accounts to hold securities
acquired at different times is recommended.
2. Question: When is the amount for which you
could sell something much less than its value for determining a bargain
purchase? Answer: When it's a whole life insurance policy sold from a
pension plan to the insured plan participant. Matthies v. Commissioner,
134 T.C. No. 6 (2/22/10). Pursuant to a prearranged plan, the taxpayer rolled
over approximately $1.3 million from an IRA to a profit sharing plan; the
profit sharing plan then purchased a life insurance policy on the taxpayer for
$1.3 million and sold the policy to the taxpayer for approximately $300,000;
and the taxpayer transferred the life insurance policy to a trust for estate
planning purposes. At the time of the sale of the policy from the profit
sharing plan to the taxpayer, the life insurance policy had an "account value"
of approximately $1.3 million, but was subject to a "surrender charge" of
approximately $1 million, thereby reducing its cash surrender value to
approximately $300,000. The surrender charge would diminish over time and
be completely phased out after 20 years. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer
recognized $1 million of income on the bargain purchase because it was not
an arm's length transaction, and Judge Thornton agreed with the IRS. First,
he found that on the facts, the transaction was not arm's length because the
only trustees of the profit sharing plan were the taxpayer and his wife.
Turning to the valuation issue, Judge Thornton rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the value of the insurance policy was its cash surrender value,
which was equal to the amount the taxpayer paid the profit sharing plan for
the policy. He reached the same result as the IRS, but via a slightly different
road. Judge Thornton concluded that under §§ 402 and 72(e), the amount of a
distribution in the form of a life insurance policy is the cash surrender value
determined without any surrender charges, rather than the new surrender
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value. Finally, he concluded that the excess of the cash surrender value
determined without any surrender charges, minus the amount paid by the
taxpayer - approximately $1,000,000 - was gross income under § 61.
3. Ex-post recharacterization is not an option for
taxpayers. United States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 4/16/10), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 297 (10//10). The Fourth Circuit affirmed a summary
judgment for the government in an erroneous refund suit. The taxpayer
exchanged her partnership interest in Ernst & Young for stock of Cap
Gemini, a corporation acquiring E&Y's consulting business, in a transaction
that was not a statutory nonrecognition event; however, the stock was held in
escrow to enforce a forfeiture provision if the seller-taxpayer failed to
perform certain services as an employee of the acquiring corporation. The
taxpayer initially reported that all of the Cap Gemini shares received vested
in the year 2000 (the year of the exchange), but after the stock declined in
value took the position that income was realized in 2000 only to the extent of
cash received in that year and the remainder of the income was recognized in
2003 (when the stock was worth less than one-fifth of its 2000 value). The
court held that if a taxpayer exchanges one property for a different property,
the gain realized on the exchange must be recognized in the year the
exchange occurs, even though the property received in the exchange is
forfeitable if contractual provisions or representations in the contract for
exchange are not subsequently satisfied and even though the property
received in the exchange is held in escrow to assure enforcement of the
forfeitability provisions. Furthermore, the court refused to accept the
taxpayer's argument that the transaction could be recast into a form different
than that which it had taken.
To put it plainly, we have bound taxpayers to "the
'form' of their transaction" when they attempt to
recharacterize an otherwise valid agreement bargained for in
good faith. [citation omitted] We have also refused to
entertain arguments "that the 'substance' of their transaction
triggers different tax consequences." [citation omitted] This
precept not only maintains the vital public policy of
enforcing otherwise valid contracts, but also assures the
reliability of agreed tax consequences to the public fisc. ...
There is no "disparity" in allowing "the
Commissioner alone to pierce formal" agreements as
"taxpayers have it within their own control to choose in the
first place whatever arrangements they care to make."
[citation omitted]
* Earlier cases that reached the same
result for other taxpayers involved in the same transaction include United States
v. Fletcher, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 4/10/09); United States v. Culp, 99
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A.F.T.R.2d 2007-618 (M.D. Tenn. 12/29/06); and United States v. Nackel, 105
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-474 (C.D. Cal. 10/20/09).
4. When does a debt instrument that has in effect
become a proprietary interest because the creditor is insolvent remain a
debt instrument? REG-106750-10, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Notice of Public Hearing, Modifications of Debt Instruments, 75 F.R. 31736
(6/4/10). The Treasury Department has proposed amendments to Reg.
§ 1.1001-3, which deals with when a modification of a debt instrument
results in an exchange for purposes of § 1001 (gain or loss realization by
creditor) and § 61 (a)(12) (realization of COD income by debtor). Under Reg.
§ 1.1001-3(e)(5), a modification of a debt instrument that results in an
instrument or property right that is not debt for tax purposes is a significant
modification. All of the factors relevant to the classification of the modified
instrument as debt or equity immediately after an alteration or modification
must be analyzed. However, Prop. Reg. § 1.1001-3(f)(7) would clarify that
any deterioration in the financial condition of the issuer between the date the
debt instrument was issued and the date it was altered or modified, insofar as
it relates to the issuer's ability to repay the debt instrument, will not be not
taken into account in determining whether the instrument has been converted
to another type of interest, unless there is a substitution of a new obligor or
the addition or deletion of a co-obligor. Thus, any decrease in the fair market
value of a debt instrument (whether or not publicly traded) is not taken into
account to the extent that the decrease in fair market value is attributable to
the deterioration in the financial condition of the issuer, rather than to a
modification of the terms of the instrument, but only for purposes of
determining the nature of the instrument. According to the preamble,
"[c]onsistent with this rule in the proposed regulations, if a debt instrument is
significantly modified and the issue price of the modified debt instrument is
determined under Reg. § 1.1273-2(b) or (c) (relating to a fair market value
issue price for publicly traded debt), then any increased yield on the modified
debt instrument attributable to this issue price generally is not taken into
account to determine whether the modified debt instrument is debt or some
other property right for Federal income tax purposes. However, any portion
of the increased yield that is not attributable to deterioration in the financial
condition of the issuer, such as a change in market interest rates, is taken into
account."
* The provisions of Prop. Reg.
§ 1.1001-3(f)(7) will be effective upon finalization, but taxpayers may rely on
paragraph (f)(7) of this section for alterations of the terms of a debt instrument
occurring before that date. See Prop. Reg. § 1.100 1-3(h)(2).
5. Should the name of the promoter of this tax scam
been "Devious," instead of "Derivium?" Calloway v. Commissioner, 135
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T.C. No. 3 (7/8/10) (reviewed). In 2001 the taxpayer entered into an
agreement with Derivium Capital LLC pursuant to which he transferred 990
shares of IBM common stock to Derivium under its 90-percent-stock-loan
program. The terms of the agreement characterized the transaction as a loan,
with the IBM stock pledged as collateral. (Derivium was not registered with
the New York Stock Exchange or the National Association of Securities
Dealers/Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.) The purported loan was
nonrecourse; interest accrued but was not payable until maturity; all
dividends were applied against interest due; prepayment during the 3-year
term of the purported loan was prohibited. The terms of the agreement
allowed Derivium to sell the stock and retain the proceeds, which it did
immediately upon receipt, receiving $103,918.18. The taxpayer received
$93,586.23 from Derivium, the amount of the payment being determined,
and payment being made, only after Derivium had sold the stock. Upon
maturity of the "loan," the taxpayer had the option of (1) paying the balance
due and having an equivalent amount of IBM stock returned to him,
(2) renewing the purported loan for an additional term, or (3) satisfying the
"loan" by surrendering any right to receive IBM stock. At maturity in August
2004 the balance due was $124,429.09, which was $40,924.57 more than the
then $83,318.40 value of the IBM stock. (Derivium had credited against the
accrued interest the amount of dividends that would have been received had
the stock not been sold, but the taxpayer never received a Form-1099-DIV or
included any dividends in income.) The taxpayer elected to satisfy his
purported loan by surrendering any right to receive IBM stock. The taxpayer
never made any payments toward either principal or interest on the purported
loan. Citing Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), and
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), for the proposition that
substance controls over form, the Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion by Judge
Ruwe (with no dissents but Judges Halpern, Wherry, and Holmes concurring
in result only), held that the 2001 transaction between taxpayer and Derivium
was a sale, not a loan, under the test factors set forth in Grodt & McKay
Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221 (1981). The taxpayer had
transferred all the benefits and burdens of ownership of the stock to
Derivium. Legal and equitable title, as well as possession and control of the
stock were transferred in exchange for $93,586.23 with no obligation to
repay that amount. "At best [the taxpayer] had an option to purchase an
equivalent number of IBM shares after 3 years at a price equivalent to
$93,586.23 plus 'interest."' The transaction was not a true loan because
"[flor a transaction to be a bona fide loan the parties must have actually
intended to establish a debtor-creditor relationship at the time the funds were
advanced." There was no such intent. After the 2001 transaction the taxpayer
never treated the transaction as a loan; in 2004 he did not report either a sale
of the stock or cancellation of debt income, positions which were
inconsistent with treating the transaction as loan. Because Derivium was not
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acting as a broker, the court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that the
transaction was analogous to the securities lending arrangement in Rev. Rul.
57-451, 1957-2 C.B. 295, which held that no sale occurred when the owner
of stock deposited shares with a broker who could lend the securities until
such time as the shareholder received from the broker property other than
identical securities. Nor was the transaction equivalent to a securities lending
arrangement under § 1058, because the agreement did not meet the
requirements of that provision, which under Samueli v. Commissioner, 132
T.C. 37 (2009), requires that the transferor of the stock retain "all of the
benefits and burdens of ownership of the transferred securities" and the right
to "be able to terminate the loan agreement upon demand." Because the
taxpayer could not regain possession of the stock for three years, his
opportunity for gain was diminished.
* Section 6662 accuracy related
penalties were sustained.
* Judge Halpern's concurring opinion
emphasized that the Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. test, while appropriate for
determining whether there had been a sale of property that was not fungible,
was not useful in the case of fungible property, such as corporate stock. It was
enough for him that the taxpayer "gave Derivium the right and authority to sell
the IBM common stock in question for its own account, which Derivium in fact
did."
* Holmes's concurring opinion
emphasized that the majority's test for a sale was too broad and could be
applied to treat too wide a range of collateralized nonrecourse loan
arrangements as sales. He concluded that the majority erred in treating the
taxpayer's transfer of the stock to Derivium and Derivium's subsequent sale of
the stock as one integrated transaction, because Derivium had represented to its
customers that it would hold the stock and never told them of the quick sale.
Instead, he would have treated Derivium's sale of the stock as the event
triggering recognition by the taxpayer, under the Tufts principle that "when a
nonrecourse liability is discharged by sale of collateral, the borrower must
recognize income at that point - the amount realized is the amount of
nonrecourse liability discharged as a result of the sale," since Reg. § 1.1001 -
2(a)(4)(i) provides that "the sale ... of property that secures a nonrecourse
liability discharges the transferor from the liability." He recognized that under
his analysis, "the tax consequences to Calloway would be remarkably similar to
those flowing from the result reached by the majority."
* The Tax Court majority opinion
noted in a footnote that other cases involving Derivium transactions are pending
in the Tax Court. From 1998 to 2002 Derivium engaged in approximately 1,700
similar transactions involving approximately $1 billion. The Government
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estimated the total tax loss associated with Derivium's scheme to be
approximately $235 million.
* Nagy v. United States, 104
A.F.T.R.2d 2009-7789 (D. S.C. 2009), and United States v. Cathcart, 104
A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6625 (N.D. Calif. 2009) held, in § 6700 penalty cases, that the
90-percent stock- loan-program transactions offered by Derivium were sales of
securities, not bona fide loans.
a. District Court had enjoined Derivium
Capital USA from promoting its 90 percent loan program. United States v.
Cathcart, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1293 (N.D. Cal. 3/5/10).
b. Does this case make Monty Python
"substantial authority"? Shao v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-189
(8/26/10). As in Calloway v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 3 (7/8/10), the
taxpayer in this case engaged in a transaction with Derivium Capital under
its "90-percent-stock-loan program." In this case, however, the taxpayer
conceded that she had sold her stock and the only issue was whether the
§ 6662 accuracy related penalty the IRS asserted would be upheld. The
taxpayer asserted a reasonable cause and good faith defense to the penalty,
and the Tax Court (Judge Holmes) agreed with the taxpayer. The court
reasoned as follows.
In Shao's case we don't find the circumstances that led the
Court to penalize Calloway - there is no evidence of a wink-
wink-nudge-nudge-say-no-more arrangement with
Derivium. See Monty Python's Flying Circus: How To
Recognise Different Types of Trees From Quite a Long Way
Away (BBC1 television broadcast Oct. 19, 1969). Shao had
legitimate, nontax motivations for wanting to structure her
deal as a loan instead of a sale-she wanted to reduce risk and
use some of the stocks' value without selling her nest egg.
Her naivete, but not (we expressly find) her negligence, is
especially prominent in her renewal of the loan at a steep
price after three years. Unlike Calloway, Shao treated her
transaction like a loan throughout its existence, proving her
good faith.
6. When all is said and done, the sum of the parts of
the deal was really a current sale of stock. Anschutz Co. v. Commissioner,
135 T.C. No. 5 (7/22/10). An S corporation, through a Q-Sub (TAC) entered
into transactions with Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities (DLJ)
involving appreciated stock that it owned. The agreements were
memorialized by a master stock purchase agreement (MSPA) that included
"Prepaid Variable Forward Contracts" (PVFCs) and share-lending
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agreements (SLAs) with respect to the shares subject to the PVFCs. The
PVFCs required DLJ to make an upfront payment to TAC in exchange for a
promise by TAC to deliver a variable number of shares to DLJ in ten years.
The amount of the payment was 75 percent of the fair market value of the
shares subject to the PVFCs. If the stock subject to the PVFCs appreciated
over the term of the contract, TAC was entitled to retain 50 percent of the
appreciation, and the remainder accrued to DLJ. TAC pledged the shares of
stock at issue in the PVFCs as collateral for the upfront payment and to
guarantee TAC's performance under the PVFC. The pledged shares were
delivered to a trustee. Before each stock transaction DLJ executed short sales
of that stock in the open market. After TAC lent shares to DLJ pursuant to
the SLAs, DLJ used the shares to close out the short sales. TAC received
upfront payments under the PVFCs totaling $350,968,652 and $23,398,050
in prepaid lending fees under the SLAs.
* The taxpayer claimed that TAC
executed two separate transactions- PVFCs and SLAs - and neither
constituted a current sale for tax purposes, relying, in part, on § 1058. The Tax
Court (Judge Goeke) agreed with the IRS that the shares subject to the PVFCs
and lent pursuant to the SLAs were sold for income tax purposes. The
transaction consisted of two integrated legs, one of which called for share
lending, but the two legs were clearly related and interdependent. Analyzing the
MSPA as a whole, in exchange for valuable consideration TAC transferred to
DLJ the benefits and burdens of ownership, including (1) legal title to the
shares; (2) all risk of loss; (3) a major portion of the opportunity for gain;
(4) the right to vote the stock; and (5) possession of the stock. Although the
SLAs provided that TAC could terminate share loans and recall the shares, in
reality any share recalls were really TAC borrowing shares from DLJ. Because
DLJ closed out its original short sales with the lent shares, the shares later
transferred to TAC were in substance DLJ borrowing shares from third parties
and delivering them to TAC. Gain was recognized with respect to the upfront
cash payments received in the transactions. The taxpayer's reliance on § 1058
was rejected because it relied on the argument that the PVFCs were separate
from the SLAs. The MSPA violated the requirement of § 1058(b)(3) that the
agreement not limit the lender's risk of loss or opportunity for gain, because the
agreements eliminated TAC's risk of loss with regard to the lent shares.
* On the bright side D, Judge Goeke
rejected the IRS's alternative argument that the transactions were also either a
constructive short sale by TAC under § 1259(c)(1)(A) or a constructive forward
contract sale under§ 1259(c)(1)(C). TAC did not enter into any short sale
because DLJ was acting as a principal and not as an agent in making the short
sales. The transactions were not constructive forward contract sales because
they were not forward contracts as defined in § 1259(d)(1) in that they did not
provide for delivery of a substantially fixed amount of property for a
substantially fixed price.
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* The transactions in both Calloway
and Anschutz Co. occurred before the issuance of Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-1
C.B. 363, in January 2003. That ruling offered a roadmap to avoidance of gain
recognition although a collar around unrealized appreciation was achieved.
7. The Small Business Act helps small business
stock. Gain realized on a sale or exchange of Qualified Small Business stock
under § 1202, which is acquired after the date of enactment of the 2010
Small Business Jobs Act (9/27/10) and before 1/1/11, is subject to 100
percent exclusion from gross income. The Act also changed the period for
exclusion of 75 percent of such gain from 2/17/09 to the date of enactment
(previously the 75 percent rate would have applied up to 1/1/11). Gain
attributable to Qualified Small Business stock acquired between 9/27/10 and
1/1/11 is not treated as an AMT preference item. The exclusion is applicable
to noncorporate shareholders who acquire stock at original issue and hold the
stock for a minimum of five years. Under the former 50 percent and 75
percent exclusions, included gain was subject to tax at the 28 percent capital
gains rate. The amount of excluded gain attributable to any one corporation
is limited to the greater of ten times the taxpayer's basis in a corporation's
stock sold during the taxable year or $10 million reduced by gain attributable
to the corporation stock excluded in prior years. Qualified Small Business
Stock is stock issued by a C corporation engaged in the active conduct of a
trade or business with gross assets (cash plus adjusted basis of assets) not in
excess of $50 million.
a. So you put off investing in that qualified
business before 2011, fear not ye procrastinators. The Compromise Tax
Relief Act of 2010, § 760, extends the 100% exclusion for gain on qualified
small business stock under Code § 1202 to stock acquired before 1/1/12.
8. Rate extensions. The Compromise Tax Relief Act
of 2010, § 102, extends the 15% rate under Code § 1(h) on adjusted net
capital gain for regular and alternative minimum tax purposes through 2012.
For persons in the 25% or lower brackets, the tax rate on adjusted net capital
gain remains at zero. Unrecaptured § 1250 gain will be taxed at a 25% rate,
and the rate applicable to collectables and § 1202 gain will remain at 28%
through 2012.
9. The return of tax-free basis step-up (or down) at
death - with a very interesting twist for George Steinbrenner and
others who followed the same tax planning technique. The Compromise
Tax Act, § 301(a), reinstated the § 1014 fair-market-value-at-death basis rule
for taxable years after 2010. For estates of decedents dying in 2010, Act §
301(c) provides a special rule that allows the executor to elect between (1)
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applying the rules enacted in 2001, i.e., no estate tax for 2010 coupled with
the § 1022 carryover basis rules, or (2) paying an estate tax (applying the
rates and exemptions provided in Act § 302 for years after 2009) and
applying the § 1014 fair-market-value-at-death basis rules.
B. Interest, Dividends, and other Current Income
1. Shelve the presentations updating the treatment
of redemptions - dividends are taxed the same. The Compromise Tax
Relief Act of 2010, § 101, extends the 15% rate on qualified dividend
income, for both regular and alternative minimum tax purposes, through
2012. Taxpayers in the 10% and 15% brackets pay a zero rate on dividend
income through 2012.
a. Code § 163(d)(4)(B), which allows an
election to treat qualified dividends as investment income but removes the
dividends from the benefit of lower rates, is also extended by the
Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 102, through the end of 2012.
b. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010,§ 102, also extends the rule of Code § 1(h)(1 1)(D)(ii) that loss on the sale or
exchange of stock on which the taxpayer received an extraordinary dividend
(generally more than 10% of basis, or 5% in the case of preferred stock) is
treated as long-term capital loss.
C. Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
1. The IRS still can't figure out Knight. Notice 20 10-
32, 2010-16 I.R.B. 594 (4/1/10). This notice provides that pending further
guidance, taxpayers are not required to determine the portion of a "bundled
fiduciary fee" that is subject to the § 67 two-percent of AGI floor on
miscellaneous itemized deductions for any taxable year beginning before
1/1/10. Taxpayers may deduct the full amount of the bundled fiduciary fee;
payments by the fiduciary to third parties for expenses subject to the two-
percent floor must be treated separately. It modifies and supersedes Notice
2008-116, 2008-11 I.R.B. 593, which provided similar relief for years
beginning before 1/1/09.
D. Section 121
1. "Congress intended the terms 'property' and
'principal residence' to mean a house or other dwelling unit in which the
taxpayer actually resided." Gates v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 1
(7/1/10) (reviewed, 8-5). The married taxpayers had owned and occupied a
house as a principal residence for at least two years. They wanted to enlarge
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and remodel the house but were advised by an architect that more stringent
building and permit restrictions had been enacted since the house was built.
In 1999, rather than remodel the house, they completely demolished it and
constructed a new house on the property. The taxpayers never occupied the
new house, and in 2000 they sold it for $1,100,000, realizing a gain of
$591,406. They claimed that $500,000 of the gain was excludable under
§ 121, but the IRS took the position that they did not qualify for the § 121
exclusion because they had never occupied the new structure and it thus
never was their "principal residence," even though it occupied land on which
had been located their former principal residence. The IRS's argument
interpreted "the term 'property' [in § 121(a)] to mean, or at least include, a
dwelling that was owned and occupied by the taxpayer as his 'principal
residence' for at least 2 of the 5 years immediately preceding the sale." The
taxpayers argued that the term "property" in § 121(a) includes not only the
dwelling but also the land on which the dwelling is situated, and that the
requirements of § 121(a) are satisfied if the taxpayer lived in any dwelling on
the property for the required 2-year period, even if that dwelling is not the
dwelling that was sold. Under this theory, because they used the original
house and the land on which it was situated as their principal residence for
the required term, the land and building that were sold qualified as their
principal residence. Finding that the statute did not define the terms
"property" and "principal residence," the Tax Court in a divided (8-5)
opinion by Judge Marvel looked to dictionaries and the legislative history for
guidance. After examining the background of § 121, including its statutory
predecessors, former § 1034 and its predecessor in the 1939 Code, the
majority held that:
Congress intended the term "principal residence" to
mean the primary dwelling or house that a taxpayer occupied
as his principal residence. ... Although a principal residence
may include land surrounding the dwelling, the legislative
history supports a conclusion that Congress intended the
section 121 exclusion to apply only if the dwelling the
taxpayer sells was actually used as his principal residence
for the period required by section 12 1(a).
* The majority found further support
for its conclusion in the case law under former § 1034.
* In a footnote the court's opinion
noted that Reg. § 1.121 - 1 (b)(3), as currently in effect allows gain from the sale
of land alone to qualify under § 121 if the taxpayer also sells "a 'dwelling unit'
that meets the requirements under sec. 121 within 2 years before or after the
sale of the land."
* A concurring opinion by Judge
Cohen (in which 6 other members of the majority joined) noted that the
taxpayers did not argue in the alternative for a partial exclusion of gain
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attributable to the sale of the land and did not introduce any evidence that
would have permitted the court to allocate gain between the new house and the
land.
* The dissent by Judge Halpern would
have allowed the exclusion, treating the demolition and reconstruction no
differently from a renovation. It expressed concern that distinguishing between
a "remodeling," which presumably would not start the 2-year clock running
anew and a "rebuilding," which under the majority opinion does start the 2-year
clock running anew is a difficult line to draw: "is there some level of
remodeling that does (1) terminate the use of the home as the taxpayer's
principal residence, and (2) set the temporal clock to zero?"
E. Section 1031
1. Don Quixote tilted at the windmill and deflected
only the penalty, not the deficiency. Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. 105 (3/31/09). This opinion by Judge Halpern
applied § 1031(f) to deny tax-free like-kind exchange treatment in the
following situation: (1) The taxpayer transferred appreciated real property
(Wesleyan Station) to a qualified intermediary; (2) an unrelated third party
purchased the Wesleyan Station property from the qualified intermediary for
cash; (3) a partnership related to the taxpayer sold like-kind property (Barnes
& Noble Comer) to the qualified intermediary for cash; and (4) the qualified
intermediary transferred the like-kind Barnes & Noble Comer property to the
taxpayer. But for the application of § 1031(f)(4), the exchange with the
qualified intermediary would have qualified for § 1031 nonrecognition. The
taxpayer, who wanted the replacement property to be in the same general
geographic area, i.e., middle Georgia, as the surrendered property, argued
that the reason for the acquisition of replacement property from a related
person was that it was unable to locate a suitable replacement property
within the time limits imposed on deferred like-kind exchanges by
§ 1031(a)(3) and Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(b). A careful reading of the facts,
however, reveals that the taxpayer entered into the agreement to acquire the
replacement property only five days after the relinquished property was sold
and actually closed the purchase before the 45-day identification period had
even lapsed. As argued by the Commissioner, Judge Halpern held that
§ 1031(f)(4) required recognition because the taxpayer had "structured" the
transaction "to avoid the purposes" of the rule of § 1031(f) denying non
recognition for an exchange to a related person if the transferee sells the
property within two years. Based on the legislative history, he concluded that
the "basis shifting" that resulted from the transaction "suppl[ied] the
principal purpose of tax avoidance." The basis shift effected an
approximately $1.8 million reduction in taxable gain, because if the related
party had acquired Wesleyan Station from the taxpayer in a like-kind
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exchange for Barnes & Noble Corner, the related party's substituted basis in
Wesleyan Station, which in the taxpayer's hands was only around $716,164,
would have been $2,554,901 (equal to the related party's basis in Barnes &
Noble Corner). In addition, if § 1031 applied, the gain on the sale of
Wesleyan Station would have been taxed at only 15 percent, the applicable
rate for capital gains taxed to the partners of the related partnership, instead
of the 34 percent rate that would have applied had the taxpayer sold the
property. Judge Halpern further found the case to be substantially similar to
Teruya Bros., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 45 (2005), in which the
taxpayer transferred properties to a qualified intermediary, who sold them to
unrelated third parties and used the proceeds to purchase like-kind
replacement property from a related party. In Teruya Bros., Judge Thornton
held that the transactions were economically equivalent to direct exchanges
between the taxpayer and related party, followed by the related party's sale
of the properties to unrelated third parties, and that they were structured to
avoid the purposes of § 1031(f). The taxpayer argued that unlike the taxpayer
in Teruya Bros., it did not have a prearranged plan to use property from a
related person to complete a like-kind exchange, but Judge Halpern found
that the presence of the prearranged plan in Teruya Bros. was not a critical
element of the holding in that case. Nevertheless, the taxpayer avoided the
§ 6662 negligence penalty because (1) the return reporting the transaction as
a § 1031 like-kind exchange was prepared by an accountant with extensive
experience in representing real estate developers, (2) the accountant was
aware of all relevant facts, and (3) when the taxpayer filed its return, the Tax
Court had not yet decided Teruya Bros., and while Rev. Rul. 2002-83, 2002-
2 C.B. 927 (presaging the result in Teruya Bros.) had been issued, Judge
Halpern did "not think that the ruling left the result free from doubt."
a. "Congress enacted § 1031(f) because of its
disapproval of taxpayers' use of § 1031 to cash-in on a low-basis
investment property, but to pay taxes as if it were cashing in on the high
basis property; here, Ocmulgee Fields and Treaty Fields cashed in on
the low-basis property, Wesleyan Station, but paid taxes only on the
gains from Treaty Fields' sale of the high-basis property, the Barnes &
Noble Corner." Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Commissioner, 613 F.3d 1360
(11th Cir. 8/13/10). In an opinion by Judge Ebel, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court's decision. The court characterized the taxpayer's
argument as being based on the proposition that neither it nor the related
party "had any intent to circumvent the purposes of § 1031(f)," which it
described as a challenge to the Tax Court's fact finding that the taxpayer
"engaged in a series of transactions structured to avoid the related party
rules, cash in on its investment in Wesleyan Station, and avoid taxation," and
affirmed because the Tax Court's finding was not clearly erroneous. The
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court found evidence of the taxpayer's intent in the use of a qualified
intermediary in a multi-cornered exchange, stating that,
[W]e can look to the unneeded complexity in the
series of transactions to help us in inferring Ocmulgee
Fields' intent. ... Ocmulgee Fields could have achieved the
same result by simply engaging in a direct exchange of
property with Treaty Fields, and Treaty Fields could have
then sold Wesleyan Station ... . If Ocmulgee Fields had
taken this approach, however, § 1031(f)(1) would have
automatically disallowed nonrecognition treatment for the
exchange because Treaty Fields disposed of Wesleyan
Station within two years of the exchange.
* The court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the related party exchange was "merely a fall-back position,"
because that argument was inconsistent with the fact that the taxpayer had
examined only a small number of alternative properties and entered into the
transaction after only six days.
2. I woulda completed my like-kind exchange, but
the QI went belly-up. Can you help me Mr. Commish? No;
unfortunately, there is no relief which would allow the taxpayer to
complete the § 1031 exchange. Rev. Proc. 2010-14, 2010-12 I.R.B. 456
(3/5/10). This revenue procedure provides a safe harbor method for reporting
gain or loss by taxpayers who are unable to complete deferred like-kind
exchanges solely because the QI has defaulted on its obligation to acquire
and transfer replacement property as a result of the QI's bankruptcy or
receivership under federal or state law, provided three additional conditions
have been met. The taxpayer must have: (1) transferred the relinquished
property to a QI in accordance with Reg. § 1.1031(k)-i (g)(4); (2) properly
identified replacement property within the identification period (unless the
QI's default occurs during that period); and (3) not actually or constructively
receive any proceeds from the disposition of the relinquished property
(excluding the QI's assumption of debts on the relinquished property) before
the QI entered bankruptcy or receivership. Under the safe-harbor, the
taxpayer may report gain under a "safe harbor gross profit ratio method"
provided in the revenue procedure, which is essentially the § 453 installment
method. However, unlike normal § 453 installment reporting, § 1245 and
§ 1250 recapture gain may be reported under the "safe harbor gross profit
ratio method;" however, depreciation recapture income is recognized before
any § 1231 or capital gain is recognized. Interest must be imputed under
§ 483 or § 1274, as appropriate. For this purpose, the taxpayer is treated as
selling the relinquished property on the date of the confirmation of the
bankruptcy plan or other court order that resolves the taxpayer's claim
against the QI. Thus, if the only payment in full satisfaction of the taxpayer's
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claim is received by the taxpayer on or before the date that is six months
after the safe harbor sale date, then no interest is imputed. If a loss is
realized, the timing of a loss deduction is governed by normal § 165
principles.
* We think this could result in open
transaction treatment for loss recognition.
3. The April's Fool joke is on the taxpayer. Goolsby
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-64 (4/1/10). A residence acquired in an
exchange was not property held for investment or for use in a trade or
business and the exchange of the surrendered property did not qualify for
nonrecognition under § 1031, even though the taxpayer made minimal efforts
to rent out the property before taking up residence. The taxpayer moved into
the property within months after acquiring it, and the residence was more
than temporary. The contract for purchase was contingent upon the sale of
the taxpayer's prior principal residence. The taxpayer's interaction with the
qualified intermediary evidenced a lack of investment intent at the time of
the exchange. Before purchasing the property, the taxpayer sought advice
regarding whether he could move into the property if renters could not be
found, evidencing contemplation of use of the property as a personal
residence. In addition, the taxpayer began preparations to improve the
property as a personal residence within weeks of purchasing the property.
F. Section 1033
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
G. Section 1035
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
H. Miscellaneous
1. Sorting out derivatives in this "major/minor"
transaction. The treatment turns on the nuances of the definitions.
Summitt v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 248 (5/20/10). An S corporation of
which the taxpayer was a shareholder acquired reciprocal put and call foreign
currency options that exactly offset each other. Subsequently, the corporation
assigned a depreciated major currency (euro) call option and an appreciated
minor currency (Danish krone) call option to a charity pursuant to an
agreement in which the charity was substituted with respect to the
obligations under the call options. The taxpayer took the position that the
depreciated major currency call option was a "foreign currency contract"
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subject to the mark-to-market rules of § 1256, which were triggered by
§ 1256(c) upon the disposition, but that the appreciated minor currency call
option was not so treated. The taxpayer argued that there are no
economically significant differences among foreign currency forwards,
futures, and options. The Tax Court (Judge Haines) held that foreign
currency options are not "foreign currency contracts" as defined in
§ 1256(b)(2) and (g)(2) and the mark-to-market rules of § 1256 thus do not
apply. The only options subject to § 1256 are listed nonequity options, dealer
equity options, and options on dealer securities futures, all of which are
traded on a qualified board or exchange. An interbank market is not a
qualified board or exchange, and because the options in question were
purchased in an interbank market, they could not be "nonequity options"
under § 1256.
IV. COMPENSATION ISSUES
A. Fringe Benefits
1. Involuntarily terminated employees will receive
assistance with their COBRA premiums for a while. The 2009 ARRA
§ 3001 (in Title III - Premium Assistance for COBRA Benefits) provided
premium assistance for COBRA benefits to the extent of 65 percent of the
otherwise applicable COBRA premium. Eligibility for this benefit is more
restrictive than eligibility for COBRA, with elimination of the premium
subsidy for high-income individuals as well as for those eligible for another
form of medical coverage, e.g., retiree medical. The DOL has provided a
model notice to individuals pursuant to ARRA § 3001.
* The premium subsidy is only
provided with respect to involuntary terminations that occur on or after 9/1/08
and before 1/1/10.
a. And for a while longer. H.R. 3326, § 1010,
extended the COBRA subsidy period from nine months to 15 months and
extends the subsidy to terminations occurring in the first two months of
2010. Notification requirements are provided for individuals who may have
previously lost assistance but became eligible for the extended subsidy
period.
b. Another COBRA subsidy extension is
provided, but no more extensions will be needed as President Obama focuses
with "laser-like intensity" on the jobs issue. The Temporary Extension Act of
2010 extended the COBRA subsidy for another month to cover terminations
that took place from 9/1/08 through 3/31/10.
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c. Wrong again, Moosebreath. The
Continuing Extension Act of 2010 extended the COBRA subsidy to 5/31/10.
d. A further extension of the COBRA
subsidy was included in the pending Small Business Jobs Tax Relief Bill of
2010, H.R. 5486, which passed the House on 6/15/10. This provision was not
enacted.
2. New tax Code rules permeate every nook and
cranny of health care reform: American Health Benefit Exchanges can't
work as substitutes for employer-provided health insurance without
special tax rules. Pursuant to § 10108 of the 2010 Health Care Act,
employers offering minimum essential health care coverage through an
eligible employer-sponsored plan and paying a portion of that coverage must
provide "qualified employees" with a voucher whose value can be applied to
purchase a health plan through an American Health Benefit Exchange
established under § 1311 of the Act. (An American Health Benefits
Exchange must be established by each state (the cost of the establishment of
which is subsidized by the U.S. Treasury) to facilitate the purchase of
qualified health insurance plans.) "Qualified employees" are employees
(1) whose (a) required contribution for employer sponsored minimum
essential coverage exceeds 8 percent, but does not exceed 9.5 percent of the
employee's household income for the taxable year, and (b) total household
income does not exceed 400 percent of the poverty line for the family, and
(2) who do not participate in the employer's health plan. The value of a
voucher equals the employer's contribution to the employer's health plan.
Vouchers can be used to purchase a qualified health plan in the Exchange. If
the value of the voucher exceeds the premium, the employee receives cash
for the excess value. Under new § 139D, added to the Code by the 2010
Health Care Act, the value of the voucher is not includable in gross income
to the extent it is used for the purchase of a health plan. But any rebate
received by the employee is includable in the employee's gross income. If an
individual receives a voucher, the individual is disqualified from receiving
any tax credit or cost sharing credit for the purchase of a plan in the
Exchange. New § 162(g) allows the employer a deduction for the amount of
the voucher. This provision is effective after 12/31/13.
3. A little added tax benefit to encourage the kids
not to cut the apron strings. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010 amended § 105(b) of the Code to extend the exclusion for
reimbursement of medical care expenses under an employer-provided
accident or health plan to any child of an employee who has not attained age
27 by the close of the taxable year, without regard to whether the child is the
taxpayer's dependent. A similar amendment to § 162(1 allows self-employed
taxpayers a deduction for any such children. Similar amendments to §§ 401
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and 501 apply to VEBAs and qualified plans providing retiree health
benefits. The new rules are effective as of the date of enactment.
a. With a little leeway for the year the kid
turns 26. Notice 2010-38, 2010-20 I.R.B. 682 (4/27/10). This notice
provides guidance on the exclusion from employees' gross income under
§§ 105 and 106 for employer-provided accident and health plan coverage for
employees' children under age 27, on the employment tax treatment of these
benefits, and on the parallel amendments to § 401(h) for retiree health
accounts in pension plans, § 501(c)(9) for VEBAs, and the deduction under
§ 162(1) for self-employed individuals. The value of any employer-provided
health coverage for an employee's child for the entire taxable year the child
turns 26 may be excluded under § 105 if the coverage continues until the end
of that taxable year. For example, if a child turns 26 in March, but stays on
the plan past December 31st (the end of most individual's taxable year), the
health benefits up to December 31st are a tax-free fringe benefit.
b. Health insurance that covers dependent
children is no longer a tax-free fringe benefit unless all of the employee's
kids under age 27 are covered. T.D. 9482, Interim Final Rules for Group
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Dependent Coverage
of Children to Age 26 Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
75 F.R. 27122 (5/13/10). The Affordable Care Act amended the Public
Health Service Act (PHS Act) to add § 2714, which requires group health
plans and health insurance issuers that provide dependent coverage of
children to continue to make such coverage available for an adult child until
age 26. This requirement is incorporated by § 9815 of the Code. These
interim final regulations, Reg. § 54.9815-2714T, provide that for a health
insurance (or self-insured) plan that makes available dependent coverage of
children to qualify under § 105, the plan may not deny or impose special
requirements for coverage of either minor children or adult children under
age 26. With respect to a child who has not attained age 26, a plan or issuer
may not define dependent for purposes of eligibility for dependent coverage
of children other than in terms of a relationship between a child and the
participant. Thus, for example, a plan or issuer may not deny or restrict
coverage for a child who has not attained age 26 based on the presence or
absence of the child's financial dependency (upon the participant or any
other person), residency with the participant or with any other person,
student status, employment, or any combination of those factors. Nothing in
the regulations requires an employer's plan to cover dependents as a
condition for eligibility to be a tax-free fringe benefit. The regulation applies
for plan years beginning on or after 9/23/10, and the regulation expires "on
or before" 5/13/13. Transition rules are provided.
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4. How about a little consistency in tax-free drug
use? The 2010 Health Care Act added § 106(f), dealing with employer
sponsored Health Flexible Spending Arrangements and Health
Reimbursement Arrangements, and amended § 223(d)(2), dealing with HSAs
(for individuals with high deductible health plans, whether through an
employer or individually) and § 220(d)(2), dealing with individual Archer
MSAs, to disallow reimbursement under any such plan for the cost of over-
the-counter medicines unless the medicine is prescribed by a physician.
Thus, reimbursement is allowed only if the medicine or drug is a prescribed
drug, without regard to whether such drug is available without a prescription,
or is insulin, which is the rule for deductibility of medicine as a medical
expense under § 213. The new provisions are effective after 12/31/10.
a. And the IRS takes steps to make it more
difficult to buy beer and cigs using health FSA and HRA debit cards.
Notice 2010-59, 2010-39 I.R.B. 396 (9/3/10). Current debit card systems are
not capable of substantiating compliance with § 106(f) with respect to over-
the-counter medicines or drugs because the systems are incapable of
recognizing and substantiating that the medicines or drugs were prescribed.
For expenses incurred on and after January 1, 2011, health FSA and HRA
debit cards may not be used to purchase over-the-counter medicines or drugs.
Nevertheless to facilitate the significant changes to existing systems
necessary to reflect the statutory change, the IRS will not challenge the use
of health FSA and HRA debit cards for expenses incurred through January
15, 2011 if the use of the debit cards complies with prior guidance. However,
on and after January 16, 2011, over-the-counter medicine or drug purchases
at all providers and merchants (whether or not they have an inventory
information approval system (HAS)) must be substantiated before
reimbursement may be made. Substantiation is accomplished by submitting
the prescription (or a copy of the prescription or other documentation that a
prescription has been issued) for the over-the-counter medicine or drug, and
other information from an independent third party that satisfies the
requirements under Prop. Reg. § 1.125-6(b)(3)(i).
* Sections 106(f), 220(d)(2) and
§ 223(d)(2)(A) do not apply to items that are not medicines or drugs, including
equipment such as crutches, supplies such as bandages, and diagnostic devices
such as blood sugar test kits; such items may qualify as medical care if they
otherwise meet the definition of medical care in § 213(d)(1).
b. Notice 2010-59, 2010-39 I.R.B. 396
(9/3/10). To reflect the limitations in § 106(f), the IRS has obsoleted Rev.
Rul. 2003-102, 2003-2 C.B. 559, which had held that reimbursements by the
employer of amounts expended for medicines or drugs available without a
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prescription are excludable from gross income under § 105(b). Effective after
1/15/11.
c. Notice 2011-5, 2011-3 I.R.B. 314
(12/23/10), modifying Notice 2010-59, 2010-39 I.R.B. 396. After 1/15/11,
health FSA and HRA debit cards may continue to be used to purchase over-
the-counter medicines or drugs if a prescription is presented to the
pharmacist and an Rx number is assigned and retained in a manner that
meets IRS recordkeeping requirements.
5. No more deduction for spending tax-free
government subsidies on drugs for retirees. However, companies that
made required balance sheet adjustments became subject to
congressional hazing because they made Obama look bad. Section 139A
excludes from gross income federal subsidy payments, made pursuant to 42
USC § 1395w-132, to a sponsor of a qualified retiree prescription drug plan.
The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 139A to provide that for taxable years
beginning after 12/31/12, the amount of any deduction allowable for retiree
prescription drug expenses is reduced by the amount of the excludable
subsidy payments received.
6. Enlisting cafeteria plans in health insurance
reform.
a. Congress forces employees to pay more of
the health care costs with after-tax dollars to fight rising health care
costs. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 125 by adding new § 125(i)
(and renumbering former §§ 125(i) and () as §§ 125() and (k)) to limit
allowable salary reduction contributions to a health flexible spending
arrangement under a cafeteria plan to $2,500. The 2010 Reconciliation Act
extended the effective date until years after 12/31/12. The $2,500 limitation
is indexed for inflation after 2013. A plan that does not include the $2,500
ceiling does not qualify as a cafeteria plan under § 125.
b. Employers can't easily duck the
responsibility to pay a healthy chunk of health insurance premiums by
putting the whole kit and caboodle into a cafeteria plan. Section 125(f
)(3), added by the 2010 Health Care Act, restricts the ability of employers to
provide reimbursement, or direct payment, under a cafeteria plan for the
premiums for coverage under any qualified health plan offered through an
American Health Benefits Exchange. Such a benefit qualifies only if the
employer is a "qualified employer" as defined in § 1312(f)(2) of the Act. A
"qualified employer" is a small employer that elects to make all its full-time
employees eligible for one or more qualified plans offered in the small group
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market through an Exchange. For this purpose, a "small employer" (defined
in § 1304(b)(2) of the Act) is an employer who employed an average of not
more than 100 employees on business days during the preceding calendar
year and who employs at least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year.
Unless it qualifies under § 125(f)(3), reimbursement (or direct payment) for
the premiums for coverage under any qualified health plan offered through
an Exchange is not a qualified benefit under a cafeteria plan. Thus, any
employer that is not a qualified employer cannot offer to reimburse an
employee for the premium for a qualified plan that the employee purchases
through the individual market in an Exchange as a health insurance coverage
option under its cafeteria plan without disqualifying the plan. This provision
applies to taxable years beginning after 12/31/13.
c. To us, the new "Simple Cafeteria Plan"
rules appear to be just as complex as the old, still generally applicable
cafeteria plan rules; others who actually represent small business clients
think they are helpful. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 125 by adding
new § 125(j) (and renumbering former §§ 125(j) and (k) as §§ 125(k) and (1))
to provide for "simple cafeteria plans" for "eligible small employers," to
which the otherwise generally applicable nondiscrimination requirements,
for both the cafeteria plan itself and benefits under the plan (e.g., group term
life insurance, self-insured medical expense reimbursement plan, and
dependent care assistance program), do not apply. Under the safe harbor, a
cafeteria plan and the specified qualified benefits are treated as meeting the
nondiscrimination rules if the cafeteria plan satisfies special (1) minimum
eligibility and participation requirements and (2) minimum employer
contribution requirements. The eligibility requirement is met only if (1) all
employees (other than excludable employees) are eligible to participate, and
(2) each eligible employee may elect any benefit available under the plan
under terms and conditions applicable to all participants. Excludable
employees include employees who (1) have not attained the age of 21 before
the close of a plan year, (2) have fewer than 1,000 hours of service for the
preceding plan year, (3) have not completed one year of service with the
employer as of any day during the plan year, or (4) are covered under a
collective bargaining agreement if there is evidence that the benefits covered
under the cafeteria plan were the subject of good faith bargaining. Shorter
service and younger age requirements can apply only if the shorter service or
younger age applies to all employees. The minimum contribution
requirement requires the employer to make a contribution for each nonhighly
compensated employee (employee who is not a highly compensated
employee (as defined in § 414(q)) or a key employee (as defined in § 416(i))
in addition to any salary reduction contributions made by the employee. The
minimum contribution may be either a matching contribution or a
"nonelective contribution," but the same method must be used for calculating
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the minimum contribution for all nonhighly compensated employees. The
minimum matching contribution is the lesser of (1) 100 percent of the salary
reduction contribution made by the employee for the year or (2) six percent
of the employee's compensation for the year. Matching contributions in
excess of the minimum may be made only if matching contributions with
respect to any highly compensated employee or key employee are not at a
higher percentage than the matching contributions for any nonhighly
compensated employee. Under the nonelective contribution method the
employer must contribute an amount equal to a uniform percentage (not less
than two percent) of each eligible employee's compensation for the year,
whether or not the employee makes any salary reduction contribution.
Generally speaking, an eligible small employer is an employer who
employed an average of 100 or fewer employees on business days during
either of the two preceding years. If an employer was an eligible employer
and maintained a simple cafeteria plan, but subsequently employs more than
100 employees, it remains an eligible small employer until the year after
which it employs an average of 200 or more employees during the year.
There are aggregation rules for controlled groups and special rules treating
leased employees as employees.
* The devil might be in the details that
we have omitted in the name of quasi-brevity.
7. Going green is hard to do. Notice 2010-94, 2010-
52 I.R.B. 927 (12/15/10). The IRS has delayed to 1/1/12 the effective date of
Revenue Ruling 2006-57, which provides guidance to employers regarding
the use of smartcards, debit or credit cards, or other electronic media to
provide qualified transportation fringes under §§ 132(a)(5) and 132(f).
B. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
1. Sacked from his job and socked with a
premature withdrawal penalty. Owusu v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2010-186 (8/23/10). The taxpayer borrowed several thousand dollars from
his qualified defined contribution plan, with repayment to be made through
payroll withholding. As originally structured the loan qualified under Reg.
§ 1.72(p)-i and was not treated as a withdrawal. The loan was evidenced by
a legally enforceable agreement; the amount did not exceed the permissible
amount; the loan was to be repaid within 5 years and the loan had
substantially level amortization over its term, with payments not less
frequently than quarterly. When the taxpayer was suspended by his employer
without pay, loan payment stopped. Pursuant to the regulations, which
provide that a deemed distribution will occur at the first time those
requirements are not satisfied, either in form or in operation, cessation of
loan repayment resulted in the entire outstanding loan balance being treated
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as a distribution. Because the taxpayer had not attained age 55, the 10
percent § 72(t) penalty applied.
C. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and
Stock Options
1. Section 409A added a new layer of rules for
nonqualified deferred compensation. Section 885 of the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 added new § 409A, which modifies the taxation of
nonqualified deferred compensation plans for amounts deferred after 2004.
Section 409A has changed the tax law governing nonqualified deferred
compensation by making it more difficult to avoid current inclusion in gross
income of unfunded deferred compensation. Nevertheless, § 409A has not
completely supplanted prior law. The fundamental principles of prior law
continue in force but have been modified in certain respects.
a. Notice 2008-113, 2008-2 C.B. 1305
(12/5/08) This Notice provides procedures to obtain relief from the full
application of the income inclusion and additional taxes requirements of
§ 409A with respect to certain operational failures to comply with the
requirements of § 409A. Comments were also requested on whether
procedures for the correction of a failure of a plan to comply with the plan
document requirements of § 1.409A- 1(c) should be adopted.
b. Notice 2010-6, 2010-3 I.R.B. 275 (1/5/10).
This Notice provides relief and guidance on corrections of failures to comply
with plan documentation requirements of § 409A.
c. Notice 2010-80, 2010-51 I.R.B. 853
(11/30/10). This notice expands the relief for nonqualified deferred
compensation plans covered by § 409A by reason of both failure to comply
with operational requirements and failure to comply with plan documentation
requirements.
D. Individual Retirement Accounts
1. An employment tax penalty injury leads to an
income tax insult. Swanton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-140
(6/24/10). The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that $289,017 seized from
taxpayer's IRA by the IRS in satisfaction of a § 6672 penalty tax liability
constituted a distribution from the IRA includable in gross income.
2. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 725,
extended the Code § 408 exclusion for tax-free distributions from IRAs for
charitable purposes to years 2010 and 2011.
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V. PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Rates
1. The government isn't mandating anybody have
health insurance, it's just raising your taxes if you don't. Beginning in
January of 2014, new § 5000A (which all by itself constitutes new Chapter
48 of the Code), added by the 2010 Health Care Act, imposes a penalty -
that's exactly the concise and elegant statutory language - on any individual
who does not maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage, unless
the individual is exempt. Minimum essential health insurance coverage
includes government sponsored programs, eligible employer-sponsored
plans, plans in the individual market, grandfathered group health plans and
other coverage as recognized by HHS in coordination with the Treasury. The
penalty is phased in over the period 2014-2016 and becomes fully effective
in 2016. The penalty applies month-by-month, but there is a once a year
exception for a coverage gap of less than three consecutive months. The
monthly penalty is 1/12 of an annualized penalty amount. Starting in 2016,
the annualized penalty is the greater of: (1) 2.5 percent of the amount by
which the taxpayer's household income for the taxable year exceeds the
threshold amount of income requiring an income tax return to be filed for
that taxpayer, or (2) $695 per uninsured adult in the household (indexed for
inflation after 2016). (Household income is the sum of gross income
(including all foreign earned income) and tax-exempt interest, minus trade
and business deductions, allowable losses from sales of property, deductions
attributable to rent and royalty income, and alimony. Note that deductions for
contributions to IRAs, Archer MSAs, etc., are not allowed for this purpose.)
The penalty for an uninsured individual under age 18 is one-half of the
penalty for an adult. (If an individual without minimum essential health
insurance coverage is a dependent of another taxpayer, the other taxpayer is
liable for the penalty with respect to the individual.) During the phase-in, the
flat sum adult penalty is $95 for 2014, and $325 for 2015; the household
income penalty percentage is 1 percent for 2014 and 2 percent for 2015. The
total household penalty may not exceed the lesser of (1) three times the adult
penalty, or (2) the national average annual premium for bronze level health
plans - exactly what is a bronze level health plan is way too difficult to
explain here - offered through an American Health Benefits Exchange that
year for the taxpayer's household size. (An American Health Benefits
Exchange must be established by each state (the cost of the establishment of
which is subsidized by the U.S. Treasury) to facilitate the purchase of
qualified health insurance plans.) Individuals who cannot afford coverage
because their required contribution for employer sponsored coverage or the
lowest cost bronze plan in the local American Health Benefits Exchange
exceeds eight percent (indexed after 2014 for increases in health insurance
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premium costs) of household income for the year are exempt from the
penalty. In years after 2014, the eight percent exemption is increased by the
amount by which premium growth exceeds income growth. (Members of a
recognized religious sect exempt from self-employment taxes and members
of Indian tribes also are exempt, as are prisoners.) The penalty is due upon
notice and demand, and is subject to normal assessment procedures.
However, it cannot be collected by lien and levy. There are no criminal or
civil penalties for failure to pay, and interest does not run on late payment.
2. Even though it's domiciled in new Chapter 2A,
and titled "Unearned Medicare Contribution," it feels like an income tax
surtax on investment income. New Code § 1411 of the Code, added by the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, imposes a 3.8
percent tax on investment income of individuals, estates, and trusts in taxable
years beginning after 12/31/12. For individuals (except nonresident aliens),
the tax applies only to the lesser of (1) net investment income or (2) the
excess of modified adjusted gross income (increased by net foreign earned
income excluded under § 911 (a)(1)) over a threshold amount. The threshold
amount is $250,000 for spouses filing a joint return or a surviving spouse,
$125,000 for married individuals filing separate returns, and $200,000 for
single taxpayers (including heads of household). Modified adjusted gross
income is adjusted gross income increased by the amount excluded under
§ 911 (a)(1) (net of the deductions and exclusions disallowed with respect to
the foreign earned income). For estates and trusts, the tax is levied on the
lesser of (1) undistributed net investment income, or (2) the excess of
adjusted gross income (as defined in § 67(e)) over the dollar amount at which
the highest income tax bracket applicable to an estate or trust begins. The tax
does not apply to a trust that is tax-exempt under § 501, is a charitable
remainder trust tax-exempt under § 664, or all of the interests of which are
devoted to charitable purposes. Net investment income is investment income
reduced by the deductions allocable to that income. Investment income is the
sum of (1) gross income from interest, dividends, annuities, royalties, and
rents (other than income derived from any trade or business to which the tax
does not apply), (2) other gross income derived from any business to which
the tax applies, and (3) net gain (to the extent taken into account in
computing taxable income) attributable to the disposition of property other
than property held in a trade or business to which the tax does not apply. The
§ 1411 tax applies to trade or business income from (1) a passive activity,
and (2) trading financial instruments or commodities (as defined in
§ 475(e)(2)). It does not apply to any other trade or business income. Gain or
loss from the disposition of a partnership interest or stock in an S corporation
is taken into account only to the extent gain or loss would be taken into
account by the partner or shareholder if the entity had sold all its properties
for fair market value immediately before the disposition. Thus, there is a
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deemed basis adjustment that results in taking into account only the net gain
or loss attributable to the entity's property that is not attributable to an active
trade or business. However, all income, gain, or loss on working capital is
subject to the tax. Investment income does not include any distributions from
a qualified retirement plan or any income subject to self-employment tax.
Unlike self-employment taxes, no part of the § 1411 tax is deductible in
computing taxable income under Chapter 1.
3. Domestic partners = one; breeders = zero. PLR
201021048 (5/5/10). Registered California domestic partners must each
report one-half of the combined income earned from the performance of
personal services and one-half of the combined income derived from their
community property assets. The resulting income is then taxed to each of the
domestic partners at the more favorable § 1(c) single rates, as opposed to the
higher rates paid by married couples. Also, no federal gift tax is payable on
the vesting of earnings of one partner in the other partner under California
law.
See also, ELM 201021049 (5/6/10)
(holding that the IRS could consider the assets of taxpayer's registered domestic
partner when determining whether to accept an Offer in Compromise); and
ELM 201021050 (5/5/10) (the treatment of a registered domestic partner who
reported earned income in accordance with CCA 200608038 in years beginning
before 6/1/10).
4. Tax rates stay low in anticipation of the next
nationwide election cycle. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 101:
* Retains through 2012 the 10%, 15%,
25%, 28%, 33% and 35% tax rates scheduled to expire at the end of 2010. In
addition, the size of the 15% bracket for joint returns and surviving spouses will
continue to be 200% of the size of the bracket for unmarried individuals
(marriage penalty relief) through 2012.
* The tax relief extension also
maintains the 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35% rate brackets applicable to estates and
trusts through 2012.
* Under the Compromise Tax Relief
Act of 2010 the withholding rate on gambling winnings will remain at 25%
instead of rising to 28%.
* The minimum withholding rate on
supplemental wages under § 3402 will remain at 25%, and 35% for
supplemental wages in excess of $1 million.
* Rates for voluntary withholding of
federal payments such as social security under § 3402 remain at 7%, 10%, 15%,
or 25%, instead of rising to 7%, 15%, 28%, or 31%.
2011] 633
Florida Tax Review
* The standard deduction for married
couples filing a joint return will be twice the standard deduction for single filers
through 2012.
* No Pease. Elimination of the overall
limitation on itemized deductions of Code § 68 (reducing itemized deductions
by 3% of the amount of AGI over a threshold amount, but allowing at least
80% of itemized deductions) was to sunset at the end of 2010, but was extended
through 2012.
* No PEP. The phase-out of the
personal exemption for taxpayers under Code § 151(d)(3) of 2% for each
$2,500 of adjusted gross income above a threshold amount is eliminated
through 2012.
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. Police arrest procedures did not result in
"physical injury." Stadnyk v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-289
(12/22/08). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that damages received on
account of false imprisonment were not excludable under § 104(a)(2), even
though the taxpayer was detained, handcuffed and searched, because she
suffered no physical harm. The damages, received from the taxpayer's bank
in a settlement, compensated her for "the ordeal ... suffered as a result of her
arrest, detention, and indictment" after her bank erroneously stamped a check
"NSF," when it had been stopped for "dissatisfied purchase." The damages
were "stated in terms of recovery for nonphysical personal injuries:
Emotional distress, mortification, humiliation, mental anguish, and damage
to reputation." Judge Goeke also rejected summarily the taxpayer's claim
that damages received for personal injuries are not gross income within the
meaning of § 61(a) and that "section 104(a)(2) conflicts with section 61(a)
and violates the Sixteenth Amendment to the extent that it taxes
compensatory damages received for personal injuries."
a. The Sixth Circuit agrees that police
arrest procedures did not result in "physical injury." Stadnyk v.
Commissioner, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1130 (6th Cir. 2/26/10), aff'g T.C.
Memo. 2008-289 (12/22/08). In an nonprecedential opinion, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court opinion (Judge Goeke) holding that damages
received on account of false imprisonment were not excludable under
§ 104(a)(2), even though the taxpayer was detained, handcuffed and
searched, because she suffered no physical harm. The Tax Court found that
the damages received in the settlement compensated the taxpayer for "the
ordeal ... suffered as a result of her arrest, detention, and indictment"
resulting from her bank erroneously stamping a check "NSF," when it had
been stopped for "dissatisfied purchase." The damages were "stated in terms
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of recovery for nonphysical personal injuries: Emotional distress,
mortification, humiliation, mental anguish, and damage to reputation." The
Court of Appeals declined "to create a per se rule that every false
imprisonment claim necessarily involves a physical injury," stating as
follows:
To be sure, a false imprisonment claim may cause a
physical injury, such as an injured wrist as a result of being
handcuffed. But the mere fact that false imprisonment
involves a physical act-restraining the victim's freedom-
does not mean that the victim is necessarily physically
injured as a result of that physical act.
* Section 104(a)(2) did not apply,
because the taxpayer "unequivocally testified that she suffered no physical
injuries as a result of her physical restraint." Thus, she had not suffered personal
physical injuries or physical sickness.
* The Court of Appeals also rejected as
meritless the taxpayer's claim that damages received for personal injuries are
not gross income within the meaning of § 61(a) and that "§ 104(a)(2), as
amended by Congress in 1996, violates the Sixteenth Amendment to any extent
that it purports to subject compensation for personal injuries to income tax."
* Apparently the government did not
cross appeal the Tax Court's failure to impose penalties. In the Tax Court Judge
Goeke had refused to uphold the penalties asserted by the IRS because
taxpayers had received "disinterested advice" that the damages were not
includable in income. The advice came from taxpayer's lawyer, the defendant's
lawyer, and the mediator who negotiated the settlement. He concluded that the
taxpayers "acted reasonably and in good faith when following their advice and
preparing their own return as they have done for over 40 years," because
"[a]lthough none of those individuals had specialized knowledge in tax law,
they were experienced in personal injury lawsuits and settlements."
2. It looks like damages for physical sickness caused
by emotional distress can be excluded if they go beyond mere
symptomatic manifestations of the underlying emotional distress.
Domeny v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-9 (1/13/10). The taxpayer
received approximately $33,000 in settlement of claims for wrongful
termination of employment and violations of various civil rights statutes. The
taxpayer's former employer paid approximately $8,000 to her that was
reflected on a Form W-2 as employee compensation, $8,000 to the
taxpayer's lawyer, for which no information return was filed, and $17,000 to
the taxpayer that was reflected on a Form 1099-MISC as "nonemployee
compensation." The Tax Court (Judge Gerber) held that the $8,000 paid
directly to the taxpayer was includable wage compensation, and the
remaining amount was excludable under § 104(a)(2) as damages for physical
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injuries attributable to exacerbation of multiple sclerosis caused by a hostile
work environment. The payor-former employer's intent in settlement of the
claim was evidenced by the issuance of separate checks and different
information returns; these facts indicated that the former employer intended
the amount in excess of wages due to be in settlement of tort claims for
physical injuries attributable to the exacerbation of multiple sclerosis.
* The legislative history indicates that
physical manifestations of emotional distress, such as insomnia, headaches, and
stomach disorders, are not to be treated as physical injuries. H.R. Rep. No. 737,
104th Cong., 2d Sess. 143, n.56 (1996).
3. Having a heart attack can improve your tax
health. Parkinson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-142 (6/28/10). The
Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held that one-half of the amount received by the
taxpayer in settlement of suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress
was excludable under § 104(a)(2), because the payor intended it to be
compensation for a heart attack suffered as a result of the emotional distress.
He reasoned that "a heart attack and its physical aftereffects constitute
physical injury or sickness rather than mere subjective sensations or
symptoms of emotional distress." The other one-half of the settlement was
not excludable because it was compensation for the emotional distress itself.
4. The IRS will treat innocent ex-cons better than
innocent victims of sexual harassment. ILM 201045023, Tax Treatment of
Compensation to Exonerated Prisoners (11/4/10, released 11/12/10). An
individual who was wrongfully convicted of a crime and was wrongfully
incarcerated for several years may exclude from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2) the compensation he receives from the state where "[t]he
individual suffered physical injuries and physical sickness while
incarcerated." It may have helped the result that one of the individuals
involved, while meeting with IRS officials, suffered a seizure and had to be
carried out of the room by paramedics - apparently the result of head injuries
sustained while in prison.
* But see PLR 200041022 (7/17/00),
which required that a damage award for sexual harassment be allocated
between (a) punitive damages and compensatory damages allocable to period
before the first physical injury, and (b) damages allocable to the period after the
first physical injury.
5. When the taxpayer lives in Florida, the gross
income tax a/k/a the AMT doesn't bite as hard. Campbell v.
Commissioner, 134 T.C. 20 (1/21/10). The taxpayer recovered a gross award
of $8.75 million as a relator in a qui tam action on behalf of the United States
government against a military contractor, and paid $3.5 million of attorney's
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fees, which amount was retained by the taxpayer's attorney to whom the
$8.75 million had been remitted; the taxpayer received only $5.25 million
from his attorney. The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that the entire gross
award of $8.75 million was includable in gross income, and the $3.5 million
of attorney's fees was deductible as a miscellaneous itemized deduction.
* "Qui tam" is an abbreviation of the
Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitor,"
which means "who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as
his own."
* The tax year involved in this case
(2003) pre-dates the effective date of 2004 amendments to § 62(a), which now
permits attorney's fees in a False Claims Act case to be an above-the-line
deduction.
6. Protecting the tax-free treatment of Indian
medical care provided from casino profits. The 2010 Health Care Act
added new § 139D, which expressly excludes from gross income the value of
certain Indian tribe health care benefits.
* These benefits might have been
excludable in any event under the "common law" general welfare exclusion,
but Congress was concerned by statements of some IRS officials to the effect
that the general welfare exclusion might not apply universally to Indian tribe
health care benefits. Although the exclusion extends only to specified benefits,
it broadly covers most health insurance, medical benefits, and accident
coverage.
7. BP is gonna have to send out a whole lot of Form
1099s. This will result in some claimants having to file tax returns for
the first time in their lives. IR-2010-078 (6/25/10),
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=224886,00.html. The IRS has
published guidance for individuals and businesses affected by the oil spill in
the Gulf of Mexico. (1) Taxpayers must include in gross income payments
received for lost business income, lost wages, and lost profits. (2) Self-
employed individuals who receive a payment that represents compensation
for lost income of the individual's trade or business must include the amount
of the payment in calculating the self-employment tax. (3) A payment to an
individual to compensate for lost wages is subject to the social security tax
and Medicare taxes, but generally is not subject to income tax withholding,
unless backup withholding applies. (4) A person making payments to an
individual or partnership (including an LLC) for lost business income, lost
wages, or lost profits must report the payments on a Form 1099-MISC,
Miscellaneous Income, if the payments aggregate $600 or more. The
document also describes the standard rules regarding casualty loss
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deductions and involuntary conversions, and the inclusion in gross income of
damages for emotional distress.
* The obvious remedy is for BP to
gross up its payments for the taxes claimants would not have paid absent the oil
spill.
8. It pays really big tax benefits to run your own
church and give yourself two parsonage allowances. Driscoll v.
Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 27 (12/14/10) (reviewed). The taxpayer (Phillip
Driscoll) received a parsonage allowance from Mighty Horn Ministries, Inc.,
later known as Phil Driscoll Ministries, Inc., that was applied to the
acquisition and maintenance of not only a principal residence but also a
second home - a vacation residence. The IRS disallowed a § 107 exclusion
for the portion of the parsonage allowance received with respect to the
second home - for four years amounts totaled over $400,000 - on the
grounds that § 107(a) refers to "a home" and that the legislative history
limited the § 107 exclusion to only one home. The Tax Court majority, in an
opinion by Judge Chiechi (in which four judges joined and with which two
concurred), rejected the IRS's argument, stating "[w]e find nothing in section
107, its legislative history, or the regulations under section 107, which, as
respondent points out, all use the phrase 'a home,' that allows, let alone
requires, respondent, or us, to rewrite that phrase in section 107." The
opinion pointed to § 7701(p)(1) [(m)(1) for the years at issue], which refers
to the definition in 1 U.S.C. § 1 that provides that in interpreting the United
States Code, the singular includes the plural, unless the context indicates
otherwise.
* Judge Gustafson, joined by five other
judges, dissented, on the grounds that exclusions should be interpreted
narrowly, and "[T]he chance that Congress in 1954 thought it was permitting
the exclusion of multiple parsonage allowances seems remote."
C. Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation
Homes
1. She bet that the ball wouldn't stop on § 183 and
won the right to deduct gambling losses on Schedule C instead of on
Schedule A. Chow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-48 (3/18/10). Judge
Cohen applied Reg. § 1.183-2(b) to determine that the taxpayer's gambling
activity was engaged in for profit. Accordingly, the taxpayer was a
professional gambler, and her losses were deductible on Schedule C, rather
than as itemized deductions. Nevertheless, pursuant to § 165(d), her losses
were not deductible to the extent they exceeded her gambling winnings.
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2. Really going broke helps prove that it wasn't a
hobby after all. Dennis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-216 (10/5/10).
Judge Paris held that a horse breeding activity conducted by the husband,
who had no other source of income, was conducted for a profit even though
the losses from the horse breeding activity were applied against his wife's
income from her cosmetology business on their joint return. The income
from the cosmetology business would not have been enough to pay their
living costs along with the expenses of the horse breeding activity, and the
income from the wife's business could not have absorbed the losses the
husband's horse breeding activity incurred while paying their living costs.
Thus, the taxpayer's faced economic hardship because the losses were actual,
not merely attributable to depreciation deductions, and depleted their
available cash and savings.
D. Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses
1. Helping entry-level homebuyers invest in the
bear housing market. Code § 36, added by the Housing Assistance Tax Act
of 2008, provides a refundable credit for a "first-time homebuyer" who
purchases a principal residence on or after 4/9/08, and before 1/1/09. The
amount of the credit is the lesser of 10 percent of the purchase price or
$7,500 ($3,750 in the case of a married individual filing a separate return). If
two or more unmarried persons purchase a principal residence together, the
total amount of the credit will be allocated among them as prescribed by the
IRS. The credit is phased out over the modified adjusted income range of
$75,000 to $95,000 ($150,000 to $170,000 in the case of a joint return). A
person qualifies as a "first-time homebuyer" if neither the person nor the
person's spouse (if any) owned a principal residence at any time during the
three-year period ending on the date of purchase of the credit-generating
residence. The credit is not available if the taxpayer purchased the property
from a related person or acquired it by gift, or if the taxpayer's basis in the
property is determined under § 1014. (Persons are related for this purpose if
they are related for purposes of § 267 or § 707, except that the family of an
individual under § 267(c)(4) is limited for this purpose to his spouse,
ancestors, and lineal descendants.) The credit is also not available: (1) if a
credit under § 1400C (relating to first-time homebuyers in the District of
Columbia) has ever been allowed to the taxpayer; (2) if the taxpayer's
financing is from tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds; (3) if the taxpayer is
a nonresident alien; or (4) if the taxpayer disposes of the residence or ceases
to use it as his principal residence before the close of the taxable year.
* The amount of the credit is
recaptured ratably over the 15-year period beginning with the second taxable
year following the taxable year in which the credit-generating purchase was
made. For example, if a taxpayer properly claimed a credit of $7,500 for a
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purchase in 2008, the recapture amount would be $500 in 2010, with another
$500 recapture amount in each of the next 14 years. Thus, the credit actually
functions as an interest-free loan from the government to the taxpayer. If, prior
to the end of the 15-year recapture period, a taxpayer disposes of the credit-
generating residence or ceases to use it as his principal residence, the recapture
of any previously unrecaptured credit is accelerated. In the case of a sale of the
principal residence to an unrelated person, the recapture amount is limited to the
amount of gain (if any) on the sale. There is no recapture (either regular or
accelerated) after the death of a taxpayer, and there is no accelerated recapture
following an involuntary conversion of a residence if the taxpayer acquires a
new principal residence within the next two years. If a credit-generating
residence is transferred between spouses or incident to a divorce, in a
transaction subject to § 1041, any remaining recapture obligation is imposed
solely on the transferee.
* Although the credit is ordinarily
allowed with respect to the year in which the credit-generating purchase
occurred, a taxpayer purchasing a home in 2009 (before July 1) may elect to
treat the purchase as having been made in 2008, for the purpose of claiming the
credit on his 2008 tax return. If the election is made, the first year of the
recapture period will be 2010, rather than 2011.
a. The homebuyer credit started out as an
interest-free loan, but now it's outright free money from the federal
government. Section 1006 of the 2009 ARRA amended Code § 36(h) to
extend the life of the first-time homebuyer credit through November 30,
2009, and to increase the amount of the credit to $8,000 for 2009. It also
amended § 36(f) to eliminate the recapture of the credit for a home purchased
in 2009, unless the home is sold or ceases to be the taxpayer's principal
residence within 36 months of the date of purchase.
b. The credit is extended and modified in
the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009.
Section 11 of the WHABA of 2009 amends Code § 36 to extend the credit
for homes purchased before 5/1/10 (before 7/1/10, if subject to a binding
contract before 5/1/10).
* An individual (and, if married, the
individual's spouse) who has maintained the same principal residence for any
five-consecutive year period during the eight-year period ending on the date of
the purchase of a subsequent principal residence is treated as a first-time
homebuyer. The maximum allowable credit for such taxpayers is $6,500. This
provision applies to residences purchased after 11/30/09.
* There are, of course, income
limitations for the credit, with phaseouts between $225,000 and $245,000 of
AGI, as well as a purchase price limit of $800,000.
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c. Closing deadline extended to give banks
(and Congress) time to do the paperwork. The Homebuyer Assistance and
Improvement Act of 2010 extended the closing deadline for the § 36
homebuyer's credit from 6/30/10 to 9/30/10 for any eligible homebuyer who
entered into a binding purchase contract on or before 4/30/10 to close on the
purchase of the home on or before 6/30/10. The new law addresses concerns
that many homebuyers might be unable to meet the original 6/30/10 closing
deadline because of circumstances beyond their control. One of these
circumstances is the failure of Congress to provide for the extension of
federal flood insurance after the former program expired.
2. The IRS recedes from Tax Court victories on the
scope of "home equity indebtedness." ELM 200940030 (8/7/09). Home
mortgage indebtedness in excess of $1,000,000 may qualify as home equity
indebtedness under § 163(h)(3)(C). The position taken in the memo is
inconsistent with Pau v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 199743, and Catalano
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-82, but it is consistent with the
instructions in IRS Pub. No. 936, Home Mortgage Interest Deduction.
Shouldn't this position be stated in a
published revenue ruling since Tax Court decisions are the law and instructions
in IRS Publications are not the law?
a. And the position is stated in a published
revenue ruling. Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 201044 I.R.B. 571 (10/14/10).
Indebtedness that is incurred by a taxpayer to acquire, construct, or
substantially improve a qualified residence can constitute "home equity
indebtedness" (within the meaning of § 163(h)(3)(C)) to the extent it exceeds
$1 million.
3. Sex reassignment surgery is not nondeductible
cosmetic surgery, but the boob job is. O'Donnabhain v. Commissioner,
134 T.C. No. 4 (2/2/10). The taxpayer was a genetic male who suffered from
gender identity disorder, which is a condition recognized in medical
reference texts, in which an individual experiences persistent psychological
discomfort concerning his or her anatomical gender. Pursuant to medical
advice the taxpayer underwent sex reassignment surgery, including breast
augmentation surgery, and claimed a § 213 medical expense deduction for
the cost of the surgeries, feminizing hormones, and other related expenses.
The IRS disallowed the deductions. In a reviewed opinion by Judge Gale the
majority (8 judges) held as follows: (1) Gender identity disorder is a
"disease" within the meaning § 213(d)(1)(A) and (9)(B); (2) the taxpayer's
hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery were "for the ... treatment ...
of" and "[treated]" disease within the meaning of § 213(d)(1)(A) and (9)(B);
and (3) because they were for the treatment of disease, the procedures were
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not "cosmetic surgery" that is excluded from the definition of "medical care"
by § 213(d)(9)(A). However, the taxpayer's breast augmentation surgery was
"directed at improving ... [her] appearance," because the taxpayer failed to
prove that the breast augmentation surgery either "meaningfully [promoted]
the proper function of the body" or "[treated] ... disease" within the meaning
of § 213(d)(9)(B). Thus, the breast augmentation surgery was "cosmetic
surgery" that is excluded from the definition of deductible "medical care."
* Judges Halpern, Goeke, and Holmes
concurred.
* Judge Foley, joined by Judges Wells,
Vasquez, Kroupa, and Gustafson, concurred in disallowance of the deduction
for the breast augmentation surgery and dissented with respect to allowing
deductions for hormone therapy and sex reassignment. He reasoned that "the
fact that a procedure treats a disease is not sufficient to exclude the procedure
from the definition of 'cosmetic surgery,"' because § 213(d)(9)(A) provides
that the term "medical care" includes "cosmetic surgery or other similar
procedures" only if the "surgery or procedure is necessary to ameliorate a
deformity arising from, or directly related to," a disfiguring disease. "To yield a
deduction, an appearance-improving procedure must treat 'disease' (as opposed
to treating a patient or a symptom)."
* Judge Gustafson, joined by Judges
Foley, Wells, Vasquez, and Kroupa, concurred in disallowance of the deduction
for the breast augmentation surgery and dissented with respect to allowing
deductions for hormone therapy and sex reassignment. He reasoned as follows:
A procedure that changes the patient's healthy male
body (in fact, that disables his healthy male body) and leaves
his mind unchanged (i.e., with the continuing misperception
that he is female) has not treated his mental disease. On the
contrary, that procedure has given up on the mental disease,
has capitulated to the mental disease, has arguably even
changed sides and joined forces with the mental disease. In
any event, the procedure did not (in the words of Havey v.
Commissioner, 12 T.C. at 412) "bear directly on the ***
condition in question," did not "deal with" the disease (per
Webster's), did not "treat" the mental disease that the
therapist diagnosed. Rather, the procedure changed only
petitioner's healthy body and undertook to "mitigat[e]" the
effects of the mental disease.
4. The sun will never set on increased adoption
credits, and the day gets permanently longer, unlike mere daylight
savings time. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 23(b), now § 36C, to
raise the ceiling on the adoption credit from $10,000 to $13,170 (and
adjusting the inflation adjustment rules) and to make the credit refundable for
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taxable years after 12/31/09. The Act also exempted all changes in § 23
adoption credit from the EGTRRA sunset rules.
5. Reducing health care costs by discouraging
health care spending. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 213 to
increase the 7.5 percent of AGI threshold for deducting unreimbursed
medical expenses to 10 percent of AGI for taxable years beginning after
12/31/12. However, the increased threshold does not apply for the years 2013
through 2016, if either the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse turns 65 before
the end of the year. The 10 percent of AGI threshold for deducting medical
expenses under the AMT remains unchanged.
6. How about a little consistency in tax-free drug
use? The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 220(d)(2), dealing with
individual Archer MSAs, to disallow reimbursement from an Archer MSA
for the cost of over-the-counter medicines unless the medicine is prescribed
by a physician. Reimbursement is allowed only if the medicine or drug is a
prescribed drug, without regard to whether such drug is available without a
prescription, or is insulin, which is the rule for deductibility of medicine as a
medical expense under § 213. The new rule is effective after 12/31/10.
a. Notice 2010-59 2010-39 I.R.B. 396
(9/3/10). Section 220(d)(2) does not apply to disallow items that are not
medicines or drugs, including equipment such as crutches, supplies such as
bandages, and diagnostic devices such as blood sugar test kits; such items
may qualify as medical care if they otherwise meet the definition of medical
care in § 213(d)(1).
7. Making it little bit more difficult to use an
Archer MSA to save for that vacation trip of a lifetime you dreamed is
in your future. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 220(f)(4)(A), dealing
with individual Archer MSAs, and § 223(f)(4)(A), dealing with HSAs (for
individuals with high deductible health plans, whether through an employer
or individually) to increase additional tax on distributions from an HSA or an
Archer MSA that are not used for qualified medical expenses from 10
percent to 20 percent of the distribution. The new rule is effective after
12/31/10.
8. And now for the piice de r6sistance - the tax
Code pays for health insurance for poor, and much of the middle class,'
1. Some amount of the health insurance premium credit probably will be
available to over one-half of all households, because the credit is not fully phased out
until median household income is 400 percent of the federal poverty level, which in
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but only as long as they are not getting abortions. Section 36B, added by
the 2010 Health Care Act, provides a "premium assistance" credit for
eligible individuals and families who purchase health insurance through an
American Health Benefits Exchange established under § 1311 of the Act.
(An American Health Benefits Exchange must be established by each state
(the cost of the establishment of which is subsidized by the U.S. Treasury) to
facilitate the purchase of qualified health insurance plans.) The credit is
payable in advance directly to the insurer to subsidize the purchase of health
insurance through an Exchange. The individual then pays the difference
between the premium tax credit amount and the total premium charged for
the plan. (Alternatively, an individual may elect to purchase health insurance
out-of-pocket and apply to the IRS for the credit at the end of the taxable
year.) The amount of the reduction in premium is required to be included
with each bill sent to the individual. For employed individuals who purchase
health insurance through an Exchange, the premiums are paid through
payroll deductions. The premium assistance credit is available for individuals
(single or joint filers) whose household income (as defined in the statute) is
less than 400 percent of the Federal poverty level for the family size involved
and who do not received health insurance through an employer. The exact
amount of the premium depends on household income, based on the
percentage of income the cost of premiums represents. The baseline for the
credit equals the full premium for a "second lowest cost silver plan" -
whatever that might provide - but may be used to purchase any plan,
including bronze, silver, gold and platinum level plans, through an
Exchange. (We will not pretend to understand the details of the different
plans; we don't even understand our own health insurance plans.) The credit
is phased out on a sliding scale for households whose income is above the
poverty level and is completely phased out at 400 percent of the poverty
level. We will not attempt to amuse you with the details of the complicated
phase-out formula, except to note that it is linear. Married taxpayers must file
a joint return to be eligible, and dependants are ineligible. An employee who
is offered minimum essential coverage through an employer-provided health
insurance plan is not eligible for the premium tax credit for health insurance
purchased through an Exchange. But an employee for whom offered
coverage is unaffordable is eligible for the credit. An employee also is
eligible for the credit if the employer's plan benefits are less than 60 percent
of the cost of insurance, and the employee declines the employee coverage
and satisfies the other conditions for receiving the credit. (An employer will
be notified if an employee is eligible for a premium assistance credit because
the employer does not provide minimal essential coverage, or the employer
does offer minimum essential coverage but it is not affordable; the notice
many states, for many different size households, is an amount that exceeds median
household income.
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will explain the employer may be liable for an "assessable payment" - Q: Is
it an excise tax, a penalty, or merely an exaction? A: It's an excise tax -
under § 4980H.) Individuals who apply for the credit must provide massive
amounts of personal information to the American Health Benefits Exchange,
including copies of their last two tax returns. If the credit received through an
advance payment exceeds the amount of credit to which the taxpayer is
entitled, the excess is treated as an increased tax liability. For individuals
whose household income is below 400% of the federal poverty level, the
increased tax cannot exceed $400. If the advance payment credit is less than
the amount of the credit to which the taxpayer is entitled, the shortfall
reduces tax liability. Premium assistance credits are not available for months
in which an individual has a free choice voucher. Premium assistance credits,
or any amounts that are attributable to them, cannot be used to pay for
abortions for which federal funding is prohibited. The provision is effective
for taxable years ending after 12/31/13.
* There's oh so much more that could
be explained, but we ran out of time and space and, most of all, patience to
explain the mind-numbing complexity of it all.
9. Finality safety. Rev. Proc. 2010-31, 2010-40 I.R.B.
413 (9/29/10). Section 36C(e) provides that in the case of an adoption of a
foreign child, no credit for qualified adoption expenses is allowed unless and
until the adoption becomes final. This Revenue Procedure provides safe
harbors for determining the finality of foreign adoptions governed by the
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption for purposes of the § 36C credit for qualified adoption
expenses.
10. This revenue procedure refers to Chinese
drywall, but is too politically correct to call it by name. Rev. Proc. 2010-
36, 2010-42 I.R.B. 439 (9/30/10). This revenue procedure provides guidance
regarding the tax treatment of amounts paid to repair damages to personal
residences resulting from "corrosive" drywall building materials (sometimes
referred to as "certain imported drywall installed in homes between 2001 and
2008"). The reported consequences include the presence of "sulfur gas
odors" that corrode copper electrical wiring. The procedure does not mention
any alternative possibilities for the presence of "sulfur gas odors" in the
home.
* This revenue procedure permits the
deduction of 100 percent of repair costs for damage to the residence and to
household appliances as a casualty loss in the year of repayment provided that
the taxpayer does not pursue reimbursement through property insurance,
litigation, or otherwise; the loss deduction is 75 percent if the taxpayer makes a
claim for reimbursement. Both deductions are limited by the $100 floor
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imposed by § 165(h)(1) and by the 10-percent-of-AGI limitation imposed by
§ 165(h)(2).
Contrast the so-called "Chinese
Wall," now permitted by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule
1.10; there it is referred to as a "screen."
11. Tax stimulus for procreation. The Code § 24
$1,000 child tax credit (scheduled to drop to $500 after 2010) is extended
through 2012 under the Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, §§ 101, 103.
* The credit remains available against
both regular and alternative minimum taxable income. The credit is phased out
by $50 for each $1,000 of modified AGI above $110,000 for joint returns,
$75,000 for unmarried individuals, and $55,000 for married filing separately.
The credit remains refundable to the greater of 15% of taxable earned income
above $3,000 or, for a taxpayer with three or more qualified children, the excess
of social security taxes over the earned income credit for the taxable year.
12. Earned Income Tax Credits remain simplified, at
least Congress so thinks. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 103,
extends through 2012 certain simplification provisions, originally enacted in
the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and
scheduled to sunset after 2010, in calculating the refundable earned income
tax credit of Code § 32.
* The definition of earned income
includes only amounts includible in gross income for the taxable year.
* The phase out of the earned income
credit is based on adjusted gross income (rather than modified AGI).
* A child, to be a qualified child, must
reside with the taxpayer for more than six months, descendants of step children
are qualified children, and siblings, or step siblings are eligible children if the
taxpayer cared for them.
* A child is the qualifying child of the
taxpayer under the rules of § 152(c) with respect to the dependency exemption
except for the support requirement and the § 152(e) rules allowing a non-
custodial parent to claim the dependency exemption. A qualifying child must
have the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for at least one-half of
the year, and be under age 19, age 24 if a student, or permanently disabled.
* The increased phase-out threshold for
joint filers, $5,000 more than the threshold for other filers (plus inflation
adjustments), is extended through 2012.
13. Multiple individual credits are extended through
2012 by the Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010 through 2012:
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a. The Code § 21 dependent care credit
remains at 35% of qualified expenses up to $3,000 for one qualifying
dependent and up to $6,000 for two or more qualifying dependents. The 35%
credit phases out by one percentage, going down to 20%, for each $2,000 of
AGI above $15,000. Act § 101.
b. Expanded adoption credits, but not
refundability, are extended. Act § 101.
c. The nonbusiness energy property credit of
Code § 25C is extended to property placed in service before 1/1/12, but at
pre-2009 rates, 10% of the cost of energy efficient building envelope
components plus $50 for each advanced main air circulating fan, $150 for
each qualified heater, and $300 for each item of energy efficient building
property. The lifetime limit for the credit is $500, or $200 for windows. Also,
standards for furnaces and boilers were returned to pre-2009 higher levels.
Act § 710.
d. The $5,000 credit for a first time home
buyer in the District of Columbia, Code § 1400C, is extended to homes
purchased before 1/1/12. The credit phases out beginning at $70,000 of
modified AGI for single filers and at $110,000 of AGI for a joint return. Act
§ 754.
14. Sales tax deductions extended to 2010 and 2011.
The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, Act § 722, extends the election
under Code § 164 to deduct State and local sales taxes in lieu of State and
local income taxes to the years 2010 and 2011.
15. Singing .0 "Yankee Doodle Dandy"I supports
some of the claimed deductions for which no records were available.
Zilberberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-005 (1/5/11). Judge Wherry
applied the Cohan rule [Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930)]
with respect to deductible personal expenses. The taxpayer was allowing
$3,000 of a claimed $5,000 § 217 moving expense deduction, even though he
had inadequate records, because he established that he had moved for
employment purposes and that he had incurred some expenses. He was also
allowed $15,500 of a claimed $36,250 § 165(c)(3) casualty loss deduction
with respect to his residence, where his records were destroyed in the
hurricane that gave rise to the casualty.
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E. Divorce Tax Issues
1. Did the court really understand the regs? Maes v.
United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-6752 (D. Mont. 10/13/10). Section
71 (c)(2) provides that an amount is considered to be fixed for child support,
and thus is not alimony, if the period over which it is payable is determined
with reference to an event relating to a child. Temp Reg. § 1.71-1 T(c), Q&A-
18, provides that a date is presumed to be clearly associated with an event
relating to a child only if (1) the date is within six months on either side of
the child's eighteenth or twenty-first birthday (or the age of majority under
local law) or (2) payments are to be reduced on two or more dates that are
within a year either side of the attaining of a certain age, between eighteen
and twenty-four, by two or more children. Notwithstanding these provisions,
the court held that no part of payments the divorce agreement designated as
alimony, but which were reduced from $109,000 to $91,000, and then to
$25,000 in the same years that the two children attained age 20, respectively,
was characterized as child support. The court found any presumption that the
payments were not alimony was overcome by the facts that (1) the divorce
decree made separate provision for child support, (2) the decree did not
expressly link reduction of alimony to children attaining age 20; and
(3) evidence established that the amount of the payments to the taxpayer
were grossed-up in anticipation of taxpayer reporting the full amount as
alimony and paying taxes thereon. Under the relevant state law, the payments
would have terminated upon the payee's death.
F. Education
1. Tax subsidies continue to help higher education
increase tuition. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, Act §§ 101, 103,
extend multiple education tax expenditures through 2012.
* The American Opportunity Tax
Credit, Code § 25A, provides a tax credit of 100% of education expenses up to
$2,000, plus 25% of the next $2,000, for a maximum credit of $2,500 per year
for an eligible student. The credit phases out for taxpayers with a modified AGI
of $80,000 to $90,000 for single filers and $160,000 to $180,000 for joint
returns. The alternative HOPE credit for the first two years of higher education
provides a 100% credit for the first $1,200 of education expenses, plus 50% of
the next $1,200 of education expenses, including tuition and related expenses.
Both are extended through 2012.
* Excludable scholarships under Code
§ 117 include amounts paid for services by the National Health Service Corps
Scholarship Program and the F. Edward Gebert Armed Forces Health
Professions Scholarship and Financial Assistance Program (Armed Forces
Scholarship program).
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* Employer provided educational
assistance is excluded under Code § 127, even if the education is not job
related.
* Higher phase-out ranges remain for
above the line student loan interest deductions, between $60,000 and $75,000
for single filers and $120,000 to $150,000 for joint returns.
* Enhanced contributions to Cloverdale
Education Savings Accounts remain at $2,000 per year through 2012 for
beneficiaries under age 18 with phase out amounts based on modified AGI
between $95,000 and $110,000 for single filers and $190,000 to $220,000 for
joint returns.
2. K-12 teacher deductions. The Compromise Tax
Relief Act of 2010, § 721, extends the Code § 62 deduction of up to $250 of
"eligible educator expenses" for K- 12 teachers to the years 2010 and 2011.
G. Alternative Minimum Tax
1. Once again band-aids are applied to the
individual AMT. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 201(a), adopts
perennial patches to the AMT exemption for 2010 and 2011. The exemption
amount under Code § 55(d) for 2010 is $72,450 for joint returns and
surviving spouses. The exemption phases out by 25% of AMTI exceeding
$150,000, eliminating the exemption when AMTI is $439,800. For
unmarried individuals in 2010 the exemption is $47,450, with a phase out of
25% of AMTI in excess $112,500 eliminating the exemption when AMTI is
$302,300. The exemption amount for 2011 for joint returns and surviving
spouses will be $74,450, with the 25% phase out beginning when AMTI
exceeds $150,000, eliminating the exemption when AMTI is $447,800. For
unmarried filers, the exemption will be $37,225 with the 25% phase-out
beginning when AMTI exceeds $75,000 eliminating the exemption when
AMTI is $223,900.
* The exemption amounts for married
individuals filing separately are 50% of the exemption for joint filers.
* The Code § 1(g) kiddie tax
exemption for 2010 is the child's earned income plus $6,700, and for 2011,
earned income plus $6,800, but not more than the unmarried individual
exemption amount.
2. Individual nonrefundable personal credits offset
AMT. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 202, allows
nonrefundable personal credits to offset both regular tax liability and AMT
liability. These include the credits listed in Code §§ 21 through 25D.
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VI. CORPORATIONS
A. Entity and Formation
There were no significant developments regarding this top
during 2010.
B. Distributions and Redemptions
1. Section 162(k)'s bite is as loud as its bark. Ralston
Purina Co. v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 29 (9/10/08). Ralston Purina claimed
a deduction under § 404(k) for payments made to its ESOP in redemption of
Ralston Purina preferred stock owned by the ESOP to fund distributions to
employees terminating participation in the ESOP. The Commissioner argued
the redemption payments were not deductible under either § 404(k)(1) or (5),
or alternatively that the deduction was barred by § 162(k). The Tax Court, in
a unanimous reviewed opinion by Judge Nims, held that because Ralston
Purina's payments were "in connection with the redemption of its own
stock," § 162(k) applied to disallow the deduction. The Tax Court refused to
follow the contrary opinion on almost identical facts in Boise Cascade Corp.
v. United States, 329 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2003). In Boise Cascade the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the phrase "in connection with" to include only expenses
that have their origin in a stock redemption transaction, excluding expenses
that have their origin in a "separate, although related, transaction." The Tax
Court previously had rejected the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the
phrase "in connection with" in Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner, 103
T.C. 345 (1994), and did so again in Ralston Purina. The court rejected
Ralston Purina's argument that because the payments were an applicable
dividend under § 404(k), the transaction was excepted from the application
of § 162(k) under § 162(k)(2)(A)(ii). The Tax Court reasoned that the entire
transaction potentially deductible as an applicable dividend under § 404(k)
- payment from the corporation to the ESOP and the distribution to the
ESOP participants - must also pass muster under § 162(k), and that the
'otherwise allowable' deduction was disallowed because the payment was 'in
connection with' a repurchase of stock.
a. And the Third Circuit agrees with the
Tax Court, not with the Ninth Circuit. Conopco, Inc. v. United States, 572
F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 7/13/09), aff'g 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5296 (D. N.J.
7/18/07). The court held that assuming that Conopco's payments were
applicable dividends under § 404(k)(1) - an issue that it did not reach -
"where a corporation makes payment to an ESOP trust in redemption of its
stock, the otherwise allowable § 404(k)(1) deduction for an applicable
dividend inevitably involves an 'amount paid or incurred by a corporation in
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connection with the reacquisition of its stock' and is therefore barred by
§ 162(k)(1)."
b. The dog food corporation precedent
wasn't the people's food corporation's best friend. General Mills, Inc. v.
United States, 554 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1/26/09). General Mills claimed a
deduction under § 404(k) for payments made to its ESOP in redemption of
General Mills stock owned by the ESOP to fund distributions to employees
terminating participation in the ESOP. In a very brief opinion, the court
(Judge Benton) held that §162(k) barred the deduction for the "applicable
dividend" otherwise allowable under § 404(k). The court followed the Tax
Court's decision in Ralston Purina Co. v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 29
(9/10/08), and refused to follow the contrary opinion in Boise Cascade Corp.
v. United States, 329 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2003), because it disagreed with the
reasoning of Boise Cascade.
c. And the people food precedent comes
around to bite the dog's tail. Nestle Purina Petcare Co. v. Commissioner,
594 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2/9/10). Following its holding in General Mills the
court affirmed the Tax Court holding in Ralston Purina Co. v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. 29 (9/10/08), that § 162(k)(1) barred a dividends
paid deduction under § 404(k) where payments are made to redeem stock
from the distributors ESOP. In the Eighth Circuit the taxpayer asserted, in an
argument not extensively considered by the Tax Court, that its distribution
constituted a dividend under § 561 (dividends paid in determining
accumulated taxable income, undistributed personal holding company
income, investment company taxable income and REIT taxable income) that
was subject to an exception from the limitation provided in
§ 162(k)(2)(A)(ii), allowing deductions for dividends paid within the
meaning of § 561. The court rejected the argument pointing out that § 404(k)
does not reference dividends paid under § 561 and that the plain language of
the statute does not incorporate § 404(k) distributions within the meaning of
dividends paid under § 561.
2. Fool me once, fool me twice, but you're not gonna
fool me three times in a row. Media Space, Inc. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C.
No. 21 (10/18/10). The taxpayer's corporate charter granted its preferred
shareholders the right to compel redemption of their stock on or after 9/30/03
if a majority of the holders of the specific series elected redemption. Because
state law could prohibit the redemption if it would impair the corporation's
capital or the corporation might otherwise fail to redeem the shares upon
proper demand, the charter required it to pay interest, which increased from 4
percent per annum by 0.5 percent at the end of each 6-month period until
paid in full, subject to a maximum rate of 9 percent. The corporation was
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also required to continue paying the dividends on any shares it did not
redeem. On 9/30/03, the taxpayer and the preferred shareholders entered into
a forbearance agreement, under which the shareholders agreed to forbear
from exercising their redemption rights until 9/30/04, and the corporation
agreed to pay the shareholders a "forbearance amount" computed under an
interest-like formula. The forbearance agreement was extended several
times, with the latest one extending into 2010. The taxpayer deducted the
forbearance amount payments as interest and the shareholders reported them
as interest. The IRS disallowed the deduction on the ground that the
payments were not interest because they were not paid on any indebtedness.
Judge Goeke upheld the IRS's determination that the payments were not
interest, but allowed deductions under § 162 for the payments in all but one
year.
Regarding the reason the payments
were not interest, Judge Goeke concluded as follows:
The redemption right itself does not create the
obligation to pay a principal sum (the redemption amount);
rather the exercising of the redemption right by the
shareholders' written election creates the obligation to pay.
Without a written election, no obligation for payment
existed. No redemption election was made during the years
at issue.
* He rejected the taxpayer's argument
that the IRS elevated form over substance, reasoning as follows:
Comparing the results of the forbearance agreement
and the results that would have occurred had a redemption
election been made reveals a glaring difference: petitioner
would not be legally bound to redeem the investors' shares
as a result of the forbearance agreement. If the investors had
made a redemption election, petitioner would have been
bound to redeem the shares pro rata as petitioner became
financially able to redeem them. Under the redemption
election scenario the investors are entitled to redemption, but
under the forbearance agreement the investors retain the
choice of whether or not to have their shares redeemed.
* He rejected the IRS's arguments that
the payments were not deductible under § 162 as ordinary and necessary
business expenses, or that if they were ordinary and necessary business
expenses, § 162(k) applied to disallow the deduction on the theory that the
expenses were incurred in connection with a redemption. The corporation
probably could not have redeemed the stock even if the shareholders exercised
the redemption right, and the shareholders had a previously agreed upon right to
be paid compensation if they made a redemption election and the corporation
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was unable to redeem; the forbearance agreement was not in form or in
substance a reacquisition of stock.
* The IRS's argument that the
payments were § 301 distributions was summarily rejected, because the
corporation received valuable deferral rights in exchange therefor.
* Finally, the IRS argued that the
payments were required to be capitalized under Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(2)(i)
because a financial interest was created or modified. Judge Goeke agreed with
the IRS that because the payments were made to modify the corporate charter
with respect to the rights of the preferred stock, the payments were required to
be capitalized under Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(2)(i). However, he also concluded
that the exception to capitalization in Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f)(1) for payments the
benefit of which does not extend beyond the earlier of (1) twelve months, or
(2) the end of the following taxable year applied to the initial and first renewal
payments, but that an exception to the exception, and thus § 263, applied to the
renewal payments under the third extension. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f)(5)(i) provides
that "the duration of a right includes any renewal period if all of the facts and
circumstances in existence during the taxable year in which the right is created
indicate a reasonable expectancy of renewal." Because any two deferral periods
considered together lasted longer than 12 months, if there was a reasonable
expectancy of renewal (extension) of the forbearance agreement, the 12-month
rule would not apply. Applying the five-factor test of Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f)(5)(ii)
to determine if there was a reasonable expectation of renewal - (1) renewal
history, (2) economics of the transaction, (3) likelihood of renewal by the other
party, (4) terms of renewal, and (5) terminations - in light of the corporation's
financial condition, Judge Goeke concluded that there was no reasonable
expectation of renewal for the initial agreement and first renewal, but that there
was such an expectation at the time of the second renewal agreement and the at
the payments made under the second renewal agreement had to be capitalized.
C. Liquidations
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
D. S Corporations
1. Disregarded QSub is still a bank subject to
reduced interest deductions for interest incurred to carry tax-exempt
obligations. Vainisi v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 1 (1/15/09). Sections
291(a)(3), (e)(1)(B), and 265(b)(3) disallow interest deductions of a financial
institution incurred to carry tax-exempt obligations, but allow an 80 percent
deduction for interest on tax-exempts acquired after 12/31/82, and before
8/7/86, and for certain qualified tax exempt obligations as defined in
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§ 265(b)(3)(B). Section 1361 allows certain financial institutions to elect to
be treated as an S corporation, and further allows an S corporation to treat a
financial institution as a qualified S corporation subsidiary (QSub). Under
§ 1361(b)(3)(A), a QSub is not treated as a separate corporation except as
provided in regulations. Reg. § 1.1361-4(a)(3) provides that in the case of a
bank that is an S corporation or a QSub of an S corporation, any special rules
applicable to banks will apply to an S corporation or a QSub that is a bank.
The court (Judge Foley) held that under these provisions the limitations of
§ 291(a)(3) are applicable to interest deductions claimed by a parent S
corporation for interest expense generated by the S corporation's QSub bank.
The court also held that Reg. § 1.1361-4(a)(3) is consistent with the
enactment of § 1361(b)(3)(A) and its legislative history.
a. But in the Seventh Circuit Judge Posner
sees things differently, as he often does, and S corporation banks in
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin gain a competitive advantage over C
corporation banks. Vainisi v. Commissioner, 599 F.3d 567 (7th Cir.
3/17/10). The Tax Court's decision was reversed on appeal. Judge Posner
noted that by virtue of § 1363(b)(4), § 291 applies to an S corporation only if
it had been a C corporation within three years preceding the taxable year in
question. Because the taxpayer's S corporation had not been a C corporation
within the preceding three taxable years, § 291 could not apply. Nothing in
Reg. § 1.1361-4(a)(3) could change that result. He rejected the government's
argument that because § 291 was enacted before a bank could elect to be an
S corporation or a QSub, Congress did not intend § 1363(b)(4) to prevent the
application of § 291 to a bank and that the Treasury thus was authorized to
rescind that application by regulation. Instead, he concluded that the
regulation "merely requires that the special banking rules be applied to banks
that are S corporations or QSubs at the corporate level so that a bank's S
corporation status will not emasculate the rules. ... But nothing ... suggests
that section 1363(b)(4) is to be overridden with regard to banks." He went on
to reject the government's argument as follows:
Missing from the government's analysis is
recognition that the only S corporations to which section
291, the source of the special banking rule at issue in this
case (the 80 percent rule), applies are S corporations that
were C corporations in one of the three immediately
preceding years. Nothing in the regulation suggests a
purpose to change that rule. ...
Of course, unless abrogated, the privilege conferred
by section 1363(b)(4) will perpetuate a competitive
advantage enjoyed by S or QSub banks that have never been
C corporations or that converted from C to S earlier rather
than later. Later converters - not to mention all existing C
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corporation banks (the majority of all banks) - may be
gnashing their teeth in fury at the additional interest
deduction that many of their S or QSub bank competitors
can take. But the difference in treatment, and whatever
consequences flow from it, are built into section 1363(b)(4).
* Finally, Judge Posner concluded:
The regulation was promulgated a decade ago and
the Treasury Department has thus had ample time in which
to decide whether the favored treatment of S and QSub
banks is a bad idea. The Internal Revenue Service thinks it a
bad idea, the Tax Court thinks it a bad idea, but the
institutions authorized to correct the favored treatment of
these banks - Congress by statute, and the Treasury
Department (we are assuming without deciding), as
Congress's delegate, by regulation - have thus far left it
intact.
* On the reasoning, its game, set, and
match, we think.
2. A Solomon-like valuation by Judge Wells. The
Ringgold Telephone Company v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-103
(5/10/10). This case involved valuation of the taxpayer's assets on the date it
converted from C corporation status to S corporation status, for the purpose
of computing the built-in gain tax under § 1374 upon the subsequent sale of
its assets within 10 years of electing S corporation status. The only asset in
question was a minority partnership interest in a partnership that itself held a
minority interest in a lower tier partnership. The taxpayer valued the
partnership interest at $2,600,000 on the effective date of its election, but it
sold the partnership interest less than a year later for $5,220,423 to Bell
South, which indirectly controlled the lower tier partnership. Judge Wells
found that the taxpayer's expert witness's testimony, which valued the
interest at $2,980,000, based on averaging $3,243,000 using a "distribution
yield analysis" and $2,718,000 using a business enterprise analysis with a
5% minority discount, to be more persuasive than the IRS's expert witness's
valuation of $5,155,000. However, he also concluded that while Bell South
had not paid a control premium for the partnership interest, the price paid by
Bell South was "probative, but not conclusive, evidence of the value of the
[partnership] interest on the valuation date." Accordingly, he valued the
partnership interest at $3,727,141, by weighing equally - that means
averaging - (1) the $3,243,000 value using a "distribution yield analysis,"
(2) the $2,718,000 value using a business enterprise analysis, and (3) the
$5,220,423 paid by Bell South.
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3. Gitlitz by analogy? "Not," says the Tax Court.
Nathel v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 262 (12/17/08). Prior to 2001, the
taxpayer had claimed losses passed-through from an S corporation in an
amount that exceeded his stock basis but which were properly allowable
under § 1366(d)(1)(B) because there were outstanding loans to the
corporation from the taxpayer-shareholder. The taxpayer's basis in the loans
to the corporation was reduced under § 1367(a)(2)(A) to $112,547. In 2001
the corporation paid $649,775 on the loan, which exceeded the taxpayer's
$112,547 basis in the loan by $537,228. Later in 2001, pursuant to a
restructuring of the ownership of the S corporation and two other
corporations owned by the taxpayer, his brother, and a third party (which left
the taxpayer with no ownership in the corporation), the taxpayer made a
capital contribution of $537,228 to the S corporation, which equaled the
amount by which the loan repayment exceeded the taxpayer's basis in the
debt. The consideration for the contribution was the assumption by another
shareholder of the taxpayer's obligation on guarantees of loans from banks to
the corporation. In calculating the gain realized upon receipt of the loan
repayment, the taxpayer treated the capital contribution as income under
§ 1366(a)(1) to the S corporation, although excludable income under § 118,
and therefore as restoring or increasing under § 1367(b)(2)(B) his bases in
the outstanding loans before repayment (rather than increasing his stock
basis), thus eliminating any gain. Relying on Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531
U.S. 206, 216 (2001), the taxpayer argued that because § 118 excludes
capital contributions from the gross income of an S corporation, capital
contributions are "permanently excludible" and are thus "tax-exempt
income" under Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii), and that as such it is included as
an item of the S corporation's income to for purposes of § 1366(a)(1) and the
resulting § 1367 basis adjustments. The Tax Court (Judge Swift) rejected the
taxpayer's argument and upheld the deficiency.
By attempting to treat petitioners' capital
contributions to [the corporation] as income to [the
corporation], [taxpayers] in effect seek to undermine three
cardinal and longstanding principles of the tax law: First,
that a shareholder's contributions to the capital of a
corporation increase the basis of the shareholder's stock in
the corporation; ... sec. 1. 118-1, Income Tax Regs.; second,
that equity (i.e., a shareholder's contribution to the capital of
a corporation) and debt (i.e., a shareholder's loan to the
corporation) are distinguishable and are treated differently
by both the Code and the courts; ... and third, that
contributions to the capital of a corporation do not constitute
income to the corporation; sec. 118; ... sec. 1.118-1, Income
Tax Regs.
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We do not believe that the Gitlitz holding or the
provisions of subchapter S, namely sections 1366(a)(1),
1367(a)(1)(A), and 1367(b)(2)(B), should be interpreted to
override these three longstanding principles of tax law.
* Reg. § 1.118-1 provides that "if a
corporation requires additional funds for conducting its business and obtains
such funds through *** payments by its shareholders *** such amounts do not
constitute income." Thus, shareholder capital contributions are not treated as
items of income to an S corporation under § 1366(a)(1) and are not taken into
account in calculating the "net increase" under § 1367(b)(2)(B) for the purpose
of restoring or increasing a shareholder's tax basis in loans a shareholder made
to an S corporation. Such capital contributions are not "tax-exempt income"
under § 1366(a)(1) nor under Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii) and do not restore or
increase the bases in shareholder loans under § 1367(b)(2)(B).
a. Affirmed, after a trip down memory lane
reviewing classic Supreme Court decisions on the parameters of gross
income. Nathel v. Commissioner, 615 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 6/2/10). After a
lengthy review of the classic case law dealing with the parameters of gross
income, ranging from Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), through
Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628 (1925), to Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Second Circuit (Judge Koeltl)
held that capital contributions traditionally are not considered to be "income"
and, therefore, should not be considered "items of income" under
§ 1366(a)(1)(A). Furthermore, in enacting § 118, Congress "has specifically
recognized that capital contributions are not income" in that "the legislative
history of § 118(a) indicates that the purpose of that section was to codify
pre-1954 court decisions holding that certain payments to corporations by
nonshareholders should be treated as capital contributions and not as income
to the corporations, just as shareholder contributions were not treated as
income to the corporations." Furthermore, Reg. § 118-1, which provides that
"'voluntary pro rata payments' to a corporation from its shareholders for the
purposes of providing "'additional funds for conducting [the corporation's]
business ... do not constitute income' to the corporation," is entitled to
deference and "is fatal to the [taxpayer's] position."
* The court rejected the taxpayers'
argument that based on the reasoning of Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206
(2001), there would be no reason for § 118 to exclude contributions to capital
from gross income if they were not already included in gross income by § 118,
concluding that the taxpayer's view of § 118 was belied by its legislative
history. The court also rejected other variations of the same argument. Finally,
the court rejected the taxpayers' alternative argument that they should have
been allowed to deduct their capital contributions to the S Corporation under
§ 165(c)(2) as losses incurred in a transaction entered into for profit. The Tax
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Court had found that the taxpayers had not made the contributions for the 'sole
purpose of being released from their guarantees on the bank loans' and, as a
result, it found that the contributions were not deductible pursuant to
§ 165(c)(2). The Second Circuit concluded that the Tax Court's test was too
stringent, holding instead that to be deductible as losses incurred in a
transaction entered into for profit the capital contributions needed only to have
been made for the primary purpose of obtaining the releases. Nevertheless, the
Tax Court's error was harmless because the taxpayers failed to prove that the
primary purpose of the contributions was to obtain the releases from the
guarantees.
4. The lifetime of built-in gain gets shorter every
year. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 shortened the holding period
under § 1374 for recognizing unrealized built-in gain on conversion from a C
corporation to an S corporation to five years preceding the corporation's tax
year beginning in 2011. Before the change the holding period was ten years
for sales or exchanges in tax years beginning before 2009, and seven years
for tax years beginning in 2009 or 2010.
E. Mergers, Acquisitions and Reorganizations
1. Q: What does the IRS do when Temporary
Regulations expire? A: Allow taxpayers to rely on the identical proposed
regulations. Notice 2010-25, 2010-14 I.R.B. 527 (3/18/10). Temp. Reg.
§ 1.368-1T(e)(2), T.D. 9316, Corporate Reorganizations; Guidance on the
Measurement of Continuity of Interest, 72 F.R. 12974 (3/20/07), dealing
with continuity of interest in corporate reorganizations, expired on March 19,
2010, pursuant to § 7805(e)(2). This notice permits taxpayers to rely on Prop.
Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2) until new regulations are promulgated. However, "the
target corporation, the issuing corporation, the controlling corporation of the
acquiring corporation if stock thereof is provided as consideration in the
transaction, and any direct or indirect transferee of transferred basis property
from any of the foregoing, may not apply the provisions of the proposed
regulations unless all such taxpayers elect to apply the provisions of such
regulations. This requirement will be satisfied if none of the specified parties
adopts treatment inconsistent with this election."
a. REG-146247-06, Corporate Reorganiza-
tions; Guidance on the Measurement of Continuity of Interest, 72 F.R. 13058
(3/20/07). Prop. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2) would amend Reg. § 1.368-1(e), as
promulgated in 2005. (The proposed regulations are identical to now expired
Temp. Reg. § 1.368-iT.) Under the 2005 regulations, the value of
consideration received in a reorganization for purposes of determining
whether shareholders received a sufficient proprietary interest in the
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acquiring corporation was to be determined as of the last business day before
the contract is binding. The proposed regulations apply the signing date
value only where the contract provides for a fixed consideration. The
definition of fixed consideration is modified to provide that consideration is
fixed where the contract specifies the number of shares of the issuing
corporation to be exchanged for all or each proprietary interest in the target
corporation. Definitions referring to the percentage of proprietary interests
are deleted. The regulations treat transactions that allow for shareholder
elections as providing for fixed consideration regardless of whether the
agreement specifies a maximum amount of money or a minimum amount of
stock of the issuing corporation. (In any event the shareholders are subject to
the economic fortunes of the issuing corporation as of the signing date.) The
rule that modifications of the contract that increase the number of shares to
be issued does not change the signing date is broadened to also state that a
modification that decreases the amount of cash or other property to be issued
also does not change the signing date. The regulations also tighten the
contingent consideration rules by providing that a contract will not be treated
as providing a fixed consideration if provisions for contingent consideration
prevent the target shareholders from being subject to the economic benefits
and burdens of ownership of the issuing corporation as of the signing date.
Finally the regulations provide that the signing date value must be adjusted
to take into account the effect of any anti-dilution clause adjustments to
reflect changes in the issuing corporation capital structure.
2. Prepaid income is not recognized built-in gain.
T.D. 9487, Built-in Gains and Losses Under Section 382(h), 75 F.R. 33990
(6/16/10). Reg. § 1.382-7 provides that for purposes of computing § 382
limitations following an ownership change, prepaid income is not recognized
built-in gain. Prepaid income is defined as "any amount received prior to the
change date that is attributable to performance occurring on or after the
change date." Examples include, but are not limited to, income received prior
to the change date that is deferred under § 455, Reg. § 1.451-5, or Rev. Proc.
2004-34, 2004-1 C.B. 991 (or any successor revenue procedure). This
regulation applies to corporations that have undergone an ownership change
on or after 6/11/10, but it merely mirrors former Temp. Reg. § 1.382-7T,
which it replaced.
3. Measuring owner shifts of loss corporations
under § 382. Notice 2010-50, 2010-27 I.R.B. 12 (6/11/10). This notice
provides guidance under § 382 for measuring owner shifts of loss
corporations that have more than one class of stock outstanding when the
value of one class of stock fluctuates relative to another class of stock. The
IRS will accept use of the "full value methodology," under which all shares
are "marked to market" on each testing date. Under this method, the
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percentage of stock owned by any person is determined with reference to
"the relative fair market value of the stock owned by such person to the total
fair market value of the outstanding stock of the corporation. ... [C]hanges in
percentage ownership as a result of fluctuations in value are taken into
account if a testing date occurs, regardless of whether a particular
shareholder actively participates or is otherwise party to the transaction that
causes the testing date to occur ... ." The IRS also will accept use of the
"hold constant principle." Under this methodology, "the value of a share,
relative to the value of all other stock of the corporation, is established on the
date that share is acquired by a particular shareholder. On subsequent testing
dates, the percentage interest represented by that share (the 'tested share') is
then determined by factoring out fluctuations in the relative values of the loss
corporation's share classes that have occurred since the acquisition date of
the tested share. Thus, as applied, the HCP is individualized for each
acquisition of stock by each shareholder." The "hold constant principle" has
several variations that the notice identifies as acceptable. An acquisition is
not an event upon which the acquiring shareholder marks to fair market
value other shares that it holds under any HCP variation. To be acceptable,
whichever methodology is selected must measure the increased percentage
ownership represented by a stock acquisition by dividing the fair market
value of that stock on the acquisition date by the fair market value of all of
the outstanding stock of the loss corporation on that date. Any alternative
treatment of an acquisition is inconsistent with §382(l)(3)(C) and is not
acceptable. Any method selected, whether the "full value methodology" or a
particular variation of the "hold constant principle," must be applied
consistently to all testing dates in a "consistency period." With respect to any
testing date, the consistency period includes all prior testing dates, beginning
with the latest of: (1) the first date on which the taxpayer had more than one
class of stock; (2) the first day following an ownership change; or (3) the
date six years before that testing date.
4. This District Court decision, if followed, makes it
much much more difficult ever to have personal goodwill as an
employee-shareholder. Howard v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-
5533 (E.D. Wash. 7/30/10). The taxpayer was a dentist who practiced
through a solely owned (before taking into account community property law)
professional corporation until the practice was sold to a third party. He had
an employment agreement with the corporation with a noncompetition clause
that survived for three years after the termination of his stock ownership. The
purchase and sale agreement allocated $47,100 to the corporation's assets,
$549,900 for the taxpayer-shareholder's personal goodwill, and $16,000 in
consideration of his covenant not to compete with the purchaser. The
corporation did not "dissolve" until the end of the year following the sale.
The taxpayer reported $320,358 as long-term capital gain income resulting
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from the sale of goodwill (the opinion does not explain how the remainder of
the sales price was reported), but the IRS recharacterized the goodwill as a
corporate asset and treated the amount received by the taxpayer from the sale
to the third party as a dividend from the taxpayer's professional service
corporation. Because the sale occurred in 2002, when dividends were taxed
at a higher rate than capital gains, a deficiency resulted. The government
advanced three arguments in support of its position: (1) the goodwill was a
corporate asset, because the taxpayer was a corporate employee with a
covenant not to compete for three years after he no longer owned any stock;
(2) the corporation earned the income, and correspondingly earned the
goodwill; and (3) attributing the goodwill to the taxpayer-shareholder did not
comport with the economic reality of his relationship with the corporation.
After reviewing the principles of Norwalk v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1998-279 and Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189 (1998),
the court held that because the taxpayer was the corporation's employee with
a covenant not to compete with it, any goodwill generated during that time
period was the corporation's goodwill. The court also rested its holding that
the goodwill was a corporate asset on its conclusions that (1) the income
associated with the practice was earned by the corporation and (2) the
covenant not to compete, which extended for three years after the taxpayer
no longer owned stock in the corporation, rendered any personal goodwill
"likely [of] little value."
* See Solomon v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2008-102, for an extended discussion of the issues underlying an
attempted sale of individual goodwill.
F. Corporate Divisions
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
G. Affiliated Corporations and Consolidated Returns
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
H. Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
1. Timing is everything to budget windows. Under
the Corporate Estimated Tax Shift Act of 2009, as amended by the HIRE Act
and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, for
corporations with at least $1 billion in assets, in determining the estimated
tax otherwise due after 12/31/09, the percentages of estimated tax liability
required by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 for
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the third quarters of 2010 through 2013 do not apply. Prior to enactment of
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, payments due in
July, August, or September, 2014, were increased to 157.75 percent of the
payment otherwise due, and the next required payment was to be reduced
accordingly. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010
increases the required payment of estimated tax otherwise due in July,
August, or September, 2014, by 15.75 percentage points.
2. They were "engineers" under the IRC, even if not
under state law. Kraatz & Craig Surveying Inc. v. Commissioner, 134 T.C.
No. 8 (4/13/10). The Tax Court (Judge Dawson) upheld the validity of Temp.
Reg. § 1.448-1T(e)(4)(i), under which "engineering" includes surveying and
mapping, even though the services were not required by state law to be
performed by licensed engineers and were not performed by licensed
engineers. Whether a corporation is a qualified personal services corporation,
as defined in § 448(d)(2), and thus subject to a flat 35 percent tax rate under
§ 11 (b)(2), is determined under all of the facts and circumstances and is not
controlled by state licensing laws.
3. Textron, Schmextron - the IRS is going to just
require taxpayers to rat out their uncertain positions on the return itself
via Schedule "COME AUDIT ME." This would even permit the IRS to
send a statutory notice without having to perform an audit.
Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (1/26/10). The IRS announced
that it was developing a new schedule to be filed with Form 1120, which
would require corporations with more than $10 million in assets and one or
more uncertain tax positions to disclose those positions. The schedule would
require both (a) a concise description of each uncertain position for which
the taxpayer has recorded a reserve in its financial statement [defined broadly
to include some positions for which the taxpayer has not recorded a reserve
because it expects to litigate the position or because the taxpayer has
determined that the IRS has a general administrative practice not to examine
the position] and (b) the maximum amount of potential federal tax liability
attributable to each uncertain position if it were disallowed in its entirety.
* The taxpayer will not be required to
disclose the taxpayer's risk assessment or tax reserve amounts, although in the
Announcement the IRS states that under United States v. Arthur Young, 465
U.S. 805 (1984), it can compel the production of that information through a
summons. To be sufficient, the description must contain:
1. The Code sections potentially implicated by the
position;
2. A description of the taxable year or years to which
the position relates;
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3. A statement that the position involves an item of
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit against tax;
4. A statement that the position involves a permanent
inclusion or exclusion of any item, the timing of that
item, or both;
5. A statement whether the position involves a
determination of the value of any property or right;
and
6. A statement whether the position involves a
computation of basis.
* A number of the above requirements
were eliminated from the final Schedule UTP.
a. Draft Schedule UTP is released.
Announcement 2010-30, 2010-19 I.R.B. 668 (4/19/10). This announcement
released draft Schedule UTP to Form 1120, together with draft instructions.
It requires that, beginning with returns filed for years beginning in 2010 and
thereafter, the following taxpayers with both uncertain tax positions and
assets equal to or exceeding $10 million will be required to file Schedule
UTP if they or a related party issued audited financial statements:
(1) Corporations who are required to file a Form 1120, U.S. Corporation
Income Tax Return; (2) Insurance companies who are required to file a Form
1120 L, U.S. Life Insurance Company Income Tax Return or Form 1120 PC,
U.S. Property and Casualty Insurance Company Income Tax Return; and
(3) Foreign corporations who are required to file Form 1120 F, U.S. Income
Tax Return of a Foreign Corporation.
* For 2010 tax years, the IRS will not
require a Schedule UTP from Form 1120 series filers other than those identified
above (such as real estate investment trusts or regulated investment companies),
pass-through entities, or tax-exempt organizations. The IRS stated that it will
determine the timing of the requirement to file Schedule UTP for these entities
after comments have been received and considered.
* Query whether disclosures on
Schedule UTP can serve as substitutes for disclosures made on Forms 8275 and
8275R? Yes, the instructions so provide.
b. Proposed regulations authorizing
Schedule UTP, requiring corporations to rat themselves out. REG-
119046-10, Requirement of a Statement Disclosing Uncertain Tax Positions,
75 F.R. 54802 (9/9/10). The Treasury has published proposed amendments to
Reg. § 1.6012-2 to require corporations to attach a Schedule UTP, Uncertain
Tax Position Statement (or any successor form) to their income tax returns in
accordance with forms, instructions, or other appropriate guidance provided
by the IRS. According to the preamble, "[t]he IRS intends to implement the
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authority provided in this regulation initially by issuing a schedule and
explanatory publication that require those corporations that prepare audited
financial statements to file a schedule identifying and describing the
uncertain tax positions, as described in FIN 48 and other generally accepted
accounting standards, that relate to the tax liability reported on the return."
When adopted as a final regulation, this rule will apply to returns filed for tax
years beginning after December 15, 2009, and ending after the date of
publication of these rules as final regulations.
c. Read all about it! Schedule UTP will be
less onerous than originally proposed. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41
I.R.B. 428 (9/24/10). The IRS announced changes to the proposed Schedule
UTP and delayed implementation for all but the largest taxpayers. The major
changes include the following: (1) For corporations with total assets under
$100 million, there will be a phase-in of the reporting requirement based on a
corporation's asset size. Corporations that have total assets equal to or
exceeding $100 million must file Schedule UTP starting with 2010 tax years.
The threshold will be reduced to $50 million starting with 2012 tax years and
to $10 million starting with 2014 tax years. (The IRS will consider whether
to extend all or a portion of Schedule UTP reporting to other taxpayers for
2011 or later tax years, such as pass-through entities and tax-exempt
entities.). (2) The proposed reporting of a maximum tax adjustment has been
eliminated. Instead, a corporation must rank all of the reported tax positions
(including valuation positions) based on the federal income tax reserve
(including interest and penalties) recorded for the position taken in the
return, and must designate those tax positions for which the reserve exceeds
10 percent of the aggregate amount of the reserves for all of the tax positions
reported on the schedule. (3) Taxpayers will not be required to report the
rationale and nature of uncertainty in the concise description of the position.
Instead, the Schedule UTP must provide a concise description of the tax
position, including a description of the relevant facts affecting the tax
treatment of the position and information that reasonably can be expected to
inform the IRS of the identity of the tax position and the nature of the issue.
(4) The proposed requirement that a corporation report tax positions for
which no reserve was recorded because the corporation determined it was the
IRS's administrative practice not to raise the issue during an examination has
been eliminated.
d. IRS modifies "policy of restraint" in
connection with Schedule UTP preparation. Announcement 2010-76,
2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (9/24/10). The IRS modified its "policy of restraint,"
which provides that, with certain exceptions, the IRS will not assert during
an examination that privilege has been waived by a disclosure when a
document that was otherwise privileged under the attorney-client privilege,
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the tax advice privilege in § 7525, or the work product doctrine, was
provided to an independent auditor as part of an audit of the taxpayer's
financial statements. See Announcement 2002-63, 2002-2 C.B. 72; IRM
4.10.20. Under the revisions, taxpayers may redact certain information from
any copies of tax reconciliation workpapers relating to the preparation of
Schedule UTP it is asked to produce during examination: (a) working drafts,
revisions, or comments concerning the concise description of tax positions
reported on Schedule UTP; (b) the amount of any reserve related to a tax
position reported on Schedule UTP; and (c) computations determining the
ranking of tax positions to be reported on Schedule UTP or the designation
of a tax position as a Major Tax Position. Other than requiring the disclosure
of the information on the schedule, the requirement to file Schedule UTP
does not affect the policy of restraint.
e. Final regulations authorizing Schedule
UTP. T.D. 9510, Requirement of a Statement Disclosing Uncertain Tax
Positions, 75 F.R. 78160 (12/15/10). The final regulations authorize the
requirement of filing Schedule UTP, generally following the proposed
regulations. They are silent as to the availability of any provision relating to
the disclosure of privileged information.
* The final regulations apply to tax
returns filed only for years beginning after 12/15/09.
4. ARRA funds nonshareholder contributions? Rev.
Proc. 2010-34, 2010-41 I.R.B. 426 (9/23/10). The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) appropriated $2.5 billion to the Rural
Utilities Service of the Department of Agriculture under the Broadband
Initiatives Program (BIP) and the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce under
the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP) to expand
broadband capabilities. Grants under the various programs will be treated as
nonshareholder contributions to capital under § 118(a) subject to the basis
reduction requirements of § 362(c)(2).
5. Miscellaneous and generally obsolete corporate
tax rates are extended. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 102,
which extended the 15% rate on dividends also extended through 2012 the
15% rate applicable to the accumulated earnings tax and the undistributed
personal holding company income tax. Otherwise the rates would have
increased to 39.6%. See Joint Committee Technical Explanation, JCX-55-10
(12/10/10), at 26 fn. 29.
6. Collapsibles remain collapsed for two more
years. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 102, extends the repeal of
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the collapsible corporation provisions through 2012. The collapsible
corporation rules were originally repealed in 2002 but the repeal was
scheduled to expire at the end of 2010. See Joint Committee Technical
Explanation, JCX-55-10 (12/10/10), at 26 fn. 29.
VII. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Formation and Taxable Years
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
B. Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and
Outside Basis
1. Expanded anti-abuse rules look at the tax
attributes of indirect owners to test allocations of built-in gain or loss.
T.D. 9485, Contributed Property, 75 F.R. 32659 (6/9/10). Reg. § 1.704-
3(a)(10) provides that an allocation with respect to contributed built-in gain
or loss property under § 704(c) (or a reverse allocation in the case of a book-
up) is not reasonable if the contribution of property and the allocation is
made with a view of shifting built-in gain or loss among partners in a manner
that substantially reduces the present value of the partners' aggregate tax
liability. The Treasury has finalized amendments to Reg. § 1.704-3 that
adopt without substantial change the proposed regulations in REG-100798-
06, Contributed Property, 73 F.R. 28765 (5/19/08). As amended, the
regulations provide that in testing for a reduction in aggregate tax liability,
the tax consequence to both direct and indirect partners must be considered.
Indirect partners include the owners of an entity that is a partner and is a
partnership, S corporation, estate, trust, or controlled foreign corporation that
is a ten percent partner. Indirect partners include the members of a
consolidated group in which the partner is a member. Furthermore, as
amended, Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1) provides that the use of allocation methods
with respect to built-in gain or loss property only apply to contributions to a
partnership that "are otherwise respected." Even though an allocation may
comply with the literal language of Reg. § 1.704-3(b), (c), or (d) (traditional
method, curative allocations, or remedial allocations), "the Commissioner
can recast the contribution as appropriate to avoid tax results inconsistent
with the intent of subchapter K." The regulations identify remedial
allocations among related partners as one factor that may be considered.
* Effective date. The amendments to
the regulations apply to taxable years beginning after 6/9/10, but the preamble
specifically notes that "[n]o inference should be drawn from this effective date
with respect to prior law."
666 [Vol. 10:9
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
2. Family farm is a partnership. Holdner v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-175 (8/4/10). When his son Randal
expressed little interest in going to college, William Holder, an accountant,
invested in developing a small family farm for his son to operate with an
agreement to divide the profits with an undefined equity interest in the
property. As the farming operation expanded, father and son took title to
property as tenants in common. On his returns William reported one-half of
the income and claimed deductions for all operating expenses. The court
(Judge Marvel) held that the arrangement was a partnership, rejecting the
taxpayer's arguments that they each operated as independent sole-
proprietors. The court noted that both William and Randal contributed
properties and labor to the venture which conducted business activities. The
court also found that the taxpayers failed to rebut a presumption that the
partners shared equal per capita interests in the partnership that applied to all
items of income and expenditure and that differing capital contributions did
not justify an allocation of all expenditures to William. The court sustained
an accuracy related penalty under § 6662 finding that William failed to make
a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of his reporting positions.
C. Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership
and Partners
1. Forfeitable for decades and thus not guaranteed
payments as annually accrued, but 100 percent a guaranteed payment
when received. Wallis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-243 (10/27/09).
The taxpayer (a tax lawyer) retired as an equity partner in Holland & Knight,
and among other amounts received $240,000 in twelve $20,000 payments
over four taxable years. The $240,000 represented accumulated amounts that
had been awarded to him as an equity partner over many years, but which
were neither currently distributable as awarded nor recorded in the partner's
capital account; rather, the amounts, which were determined annually
without regard to partnership income, were payable over a period of time
after the partner reached age 68, but were forfeitable if the partner left the
firm before that date. The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that the payments
were a guaranteed payment under § 707(c) and § 736(a), taxable as ordinary
income, and were not received as distributions under § 731.
a. Affirmed. Tax lawyers have a high
standard of "good faith" and "reasonable cause." Wallis v.
Commissioner, 391 Fed. Appx. 826 (11th Cir. 8/11/10). The Tax Court was
affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. There was sufficient
evidence to support the Tax Court's conclusion that the payments' were
§ 707(c) guaranteed payments. The court also affirmed the imposition of a
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§ 6662(a) negligence penalty, rejecting the taxpayer's "good faith" and
"reasonable cause" argument, stating as follows: "Given that Donald Wallis
has 35 years of experience as a tax lawyer, the Tax Court reasonably could
conclude that Wallis should have been aware there were inconsistencies
between (1) his not reporting the Schedule C payments at all to the IRS and
(2) the income Form 1099 he received from H&K."
D. Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
E. Inside Basis Adjustments
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
F. Partnership Audit Rules
1. Partner's outside basis in a tax-shelter
partnership is a partner item. Napoliello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2009-104 (5/18/09). The taxpayer invested in a Son-of-Boss transaction
involving digital foreign currency items. The IRS issued an FPAA to the
taxpayer as a notice partner. In the uncontested partnership proceeding it was
determined that the partnership was a sham that lacked economic substance,
that transactions entered into by the partnership should be treated as
transacted directly by the partners, and that purported losses claimed on
disposition of distributed property with an enhanced basis should be
disallowed. The IRS assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer based on the
partnership items. The Tax Court previously had held in Petaluma FX
Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 84 (2008), that the determination
of whether a partnership was a sham that will be disregarded for Federal tax
purposes is a partnership item. In the instant case, the court (Judge Kroupa)
agreed with the IRS that the partner's basis in distributed securities from the
sham partnership is an affected item subject to determination in the
partnership proceeding, and not subject to re-determination in the partner-
level deficiency proceeding. Because the amount of any loss with respect to
the partner's disposition of securities distributed from the partnership
required a factual determination at the partner level, the court held that it had
jurisdiction in the partner deficiency proceeding to proceed under normal
deficiency procedures. The court thus proceeded to determine that the
taxpayer claimed loss on the sale of the distributed securities was disallowed,
that the taxpayer's basis in the securities was their direct cost rather than an
exchange basis from the partnership interest, and that the taxpayer was not
allowed to deduct transaction costs attributable to the investment. The Tax
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Court also held that the FPAA gave the taxpayer fair notice of the IRS
claims.
a. Part of the Tax Court's holding in
Petaluma FX Partners retains its vitality, but not the part the Tax Court
relied upon in Napoliello. Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner,
591 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1/12/10). The Tax Court in this Son-of-Boss tax
shelter case determined that it had jurisdiction in a TEFRA partnership
proceeding to determine that the partnership lacked economic substance and
was a sham. Since the partnership was disregarded, the Tax Court concluded
that it had jurisdiction to determine that the partners' outside basis in the
partnership was zero. The Tax Court reasoned that a partner could not have a
basis in a partnership interest that did not exist. (131 T.C. 84 (2008).) The
Court of Appeals agreed that the Tax Court had jurisdiction in the
partnership proceeding to determine that the partnership was a sham. Temp.
Reg. § 301.6223-1T(a) expressly provides that, "[a]ny final partnership
administrative adjustment or judicial determination ... may include a
determination that the entity is not a partnership for such taxable year." The
Court of Appeals held that the regulation was explicitly authorized by
§ 6233. A partnership item is defined in § 6231(a)(3) as an item required to
be taken into account in determining the partnership's income under Subtitle
A of the Code that is identified in regulations as an item more appropriately
taken into account at the partnership level. The court indicated that,
"Logically, it makes perfect sense to determine whether a partnership is a
sham at the partnership level. A partnership cannot be a sham with respect to
one partner, but valid with respect to another." However, the Appeals Court
concluded that the partners' bases were affected items, not partnership items,
and that the Tax Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the partners'
bases in the partnership proceeding. The court rejected the IRS argument that
the Tax Court had jurisdiction in the partnership proceeding to determine the
partners' outside basis as an affected item whose elements are mainly
determined from partnership items. The court held that resolution of the
affected item requires a separate determination at the partner level even
though the affected item could easily be determined in the partnership
proceeding. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that accuracy related penalties
under § 6662(a) could not be determined without a determination of the
partners' outside basis in a partner level proceeding and vacated and
remanded the Tax Court's determination of penalty issues.
b. On remand, the Tax Court disavowed
jurisdiction over penalties in the partnership-level proceeding. Petaluma
FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 135 T. C. No. 29 (12/15/10). The court
(Judge Goeke) held that in light of the Court of Appeals holding that
determination of adjustments attributable to the partner's outside basis is an
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affected item properly addressed in individual partner level proceedings, any
§ 6662 penalties must also be determined at the partner-level proceeding and
that the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to assess the penalties. The court
rejected the IRS argument that the penalties proceeded from the partner-level
determination that the partnership was a sham, thereby providing jurisdiction
for the Tax Court to determine the negligence penalty. The Tax Court held
that if a penalty "does not relate directly to a numerical adjustment to a
partnership item, it is beyond our jurisdiction. In this case there are no such
adjustments to which a penalty can apply." Judge Halpern dissented,
asserting that the Tax Court could reconsider the penalty on grounds other
than the partners' outside bases under the court's initial findings that the
partnership was a sham and did not provide the basis increase claimed by the
partners. A dissent by Judge Marvel (joined by three others) argued that the
Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine the imposition of a penalty for
negligence related to adjustment of a partnership item in the partnership level
proceeding, but the amount of the individual penalty depends upon a
computation at the partner level.
2. Partnership audit rules extend the statute of
limitations. Curr-Spec Partners, L.P. v. Commissioner, 579 F.3d 391 (5th
Cir. 8/11/09). Section 6501(a) provides a three-year statute of limitations for
assessing tax deficiencies. Section 6229(a) provides that the period for
assessing a deficiency attributable to a partnership item does not expire until
three years after the later of the date of a partnership return or the due date
for the partnership return. The IRS issued an FPAA disallowing claimed
partnership losses four years after the partnership return was filed, and
assessed deficiencies against the partners for years into which the losses were
carried forward. The assessment to individual losses disallowing the loss
carryforwards were within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to
the partners' returns. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court holding that
§ 6229(a) does not establish an independent three-year statute of limitations
with respect to partnership items, but merely extends the limitations period
of § 6501(a). Thus, assessment of a deficiency against partner's whose
individual return remains open is not barred by any limitation period in
§ 6229(a).
a. The Tax Court agrees. LVI Investors, LLC
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-254 (11/9/09). The court (Judge Nims)
followed its holding in Curr-Spec Partners as affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.
Section 6501(a) provides a three year assessment period after an individual's
return is filed. Section 6229(a) provides that the period for assessing any tax
attributable to a partnership item or an affected item expires three years after
the latter of the due date of the partnership return or the date the partnership
return was filed.. The court held that § 6229 does not override § 6501 and
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instead sets a minimum limitations period that may extend the § 6501(a)
period.
b. As does the Eastern District of Texas.
Bemont Investments, LLC v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R2d 2010-1256 (E.D.
Tex. 3/5/10). On taxpayer's motion for partial summary judgment on the
statute of limitations, Magistrate Judge Bush held that Curr-Spec Partners
required that the motion be denied.
(1) In another motion decided on the
same day, Magistrate Judge Bush decided that taxpayer's expert witness
David Weisbach may testify as to whether the tax opinions received
complied with applicable tax opinion standards and whether they complied
with Circular 230, but not as to whether taxpayer's actions were reasonable
(which is a matter for the court).
3. Krause v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1899
(W.D. Tex. 1/22/10). Partners who didn't contest an FPAA were not
permitted to raise partnership level defenses to § 6662(h) valuation
misstatement penalties in a separate refund action. The taxpayer's claim that
a valuation misstatement penalty is not allowable with respect to a
disallowed partnership deduction is a substantive defense that must be raised
in the partnership proceeding. The assertion does not constitute a
computational error or partner-level defense permitted in a refund action
under § 6230(c).
a. Affirmed. Krause v. United States, 106
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-6736 (5th Cir. 10/12/10). The court held in a per curiam
opinion that the penalties assessed in the FPAA were attributable to the
"fraudulent" loss the partnership alleged it incurred when it sold high basis
Canadian currency, which passed thought to the taxpayer. Thus, the penalties
"related to basis, basis adjustments, and losses, all of which are considered
partnership items under § 6231."
4. The applicable statute of limitations is a
partnership item, even on the second try. Prati v. United States, 603 F.3d
1301 (Fed. Cir. 5/5/10). The taxpayers invested in tax shelters promoted by
AMCOR in the mid-1980s. In a partnership audit procedure, following
issuance of an FPAA, the Tax Court held rejected partnership assertions that
the FPAA was barred by the statute of limitations. Agri-Cal Venture
Associates v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-271. Some of the 43
partnerships entered into a settlement agreement with the IRS that allowed a
percentage of ordinary deductions, but provided that the IRS may assert
additional tax liability against individual partners plus interest. Subsequently
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the IRS assessed additional tax plus penalties against the taxpayers, which
they paid in full. Seventy-seven of 129 AMCOR partnership tax refund cases
filed in the Court of Federal Claims were identified as being factually similar
raising claims that the statute of limitations had expired and that assessments
of additional interest under § 6621(c) were improper because the transactions
were not tax-motivated transactions. Prati was selected as a representative
case. The trial court dismissed the action accepting the IRS assertion that the
court lacked jurisdiction to consider the claims that represented partnership
items that should have been challenged in the partnership level proceeding.
Ultimately 57 cases were appealed but stayed pending the court's decision in
Keener v. United States, 551 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1/8/09), which held that
the statute of limitations is a partnership item as defined in § 6231(a), and
that whether a partnership transaction is a sham is a partnership item for
purposes of the additional interest provision. In Keener the court rejected a
claim that the FPAA was untimely under § 6229 (three years after the date a
partnership return is filed or the last day for filing the partnership return), but
did not address a separate assertion that the claim was barred by the general
three year limitation of § 6501 (three years from the date an individual's
return is filed). Notwithstanding representations by the taxpayers before
Keener was decided that the case would be determinative, the Federal Circuit
considered the § 6501 argument, but reached the same result. The court
concluded that the reasoning in Keener was directed to statutes of limitation
in general and was not limited to § 6229. The court also applied the
reasoning of Keener to the taxpayers' § 6621(c) interest claim to hold that
the characterization of partnership transactions is a partnership item. The
court rejected the assertion that the taxpayers' settlement agreements
converted the items into non-partnership items.
a. Kercher v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2D
2010-7097 (E.D. Tex. 11/16/10). In a proceeding involving a representative
seven partnership level proceedings against tax shelter investors in 43 deals
promoted by American Agri-Corp (AMCOR), the Tax Court rejected statute
of limitations defenses raised by the partnerships in Agri-Cal Venture
Associates v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-271. Each of the 43
partnerships stipulated it would be bound by the decision. In separate actions
by individual partners, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Mazzant) held
that under Prati, the statute of limitations argument had been decided in
partner level proceedings and that the individual partners were barred from
asserting the argument in individual refund claims. The court also rejected
the taxpayer's argument that they were barred from raising the statute of
limitations issue in the partnership proceeding.
5. TMP's sole shareholder doesn't get to file a
separate Tax Court petition. Devonian Program v. Commissioner, T.C.
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Memo 2010-153 (7/19/10). The taxpayer was the sole shareholder of Basin
Gas Corp. which was designated as the tax matters partner in Devonian
Program, a partnership. The Devonian subscription agreement indicated that
Basin would receive a flat fee for its services and contribute $3,000 to
Devonian for a 17 percent interest in Devonian's revenues. After the IRS
issued an FPPA to Devonian, Basin filed a petition with the Tax Court as the
tax matters partner. Subsequently, the taxpayer, the sole shareholder of
Basin, filed a second petition claiming that Basin was only an agent and not a
partner in Devonian. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the second petition, finding that Basin was a partner
in the partnership and the designated tax matters partner. The court rejected
the taxpayer's argument that Basin held only a contingent interest in the
partnership, finding that Basin could assign the interest and that Basin's
interest in revenues was a partnership share rather than payment for services.
The opinion does not indicate why Basin's sole shareholder independently
sought to file a petition with the Tax Court.
6. Son-of-Boss - the shelter that keeps on taking.
Legal fees for creating a Son-of-Boss transaction are affected items.
Domulewicz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-177 (8/5/10). The
taxpayers entered into a BDO Seidman / Jenkens & Gilchrist Son-of-Boss
transaction by creating a subchapter S corporation that held an interest in a
partnership. The S corporation was owned by a grantor trust. The S
corporation paid $1,053,400 of legal fees related to the transaction. Under an
FPAA issued to the partnership the IRS determined that the partnership was
a sham whose existence was disregarded. After the FPAA became final, the
IRS issued an affected item notice of deficiency to the individual investors
disallowing deduction of the legal fees passed-through from the S
corporation. The court (Judge Laro) rejected the taxpayers' argument that the
deficiency was barred by the statute of limitations because the fees, incurred
by the S corporation, were not affected partnership items. Citing Thomas v.
United States, 166 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 1999), the court held that the fees and
the S corporation deduction were affected by the partnership item
determination in that the fees were nondeductible given the lack of a profit or
business motive flowing from the partnership level determination. The fact
that the fees were not incurred or deducted by the partnership did not remove
the fees from being treated as affected items. The court pointed out further
that the relationship between the partnership, the fees, the S corporation, and
the taxpayers could not have been determined at the partnership level but had
to be determined at a partner level proceeding. Therefore, the running of the
statute of limitations was suspended under § 6229(d) until 60 days after the
decision in the partnership proceeding became final. The fees were affected
items because they were related to the transaction and were related to the
partnership in that they were paid, at least in part, to form the partnership and
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to effect the transaction as it related to the partnership. The fees were the
type of affected item assessable only through the deficiency procedures,
because they required partner-level determinations to ascertain the portion (if
not all) of the fees related to the partnership and to the transaction and which
were thus nondeductible.
7. The IRS gets a second bite at this TEFRA apple
even if the in-house rules were not followed. NPR Investments, LLC v.
United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5788 (E.D. Tex. 8/10/10). NPR was a
partnership formed to execute a R.J. Ruble, Sidley Austin, Son of Boss
abusive tax shelter deal. The three partners were partners in a plaintiffs
contingency fee law firm, and two of them were the taxpayers in Klamath
Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir.
5/21/09). When the partners withdrew from NPR, they transferred the
inflated basis foreign currency from NPR to their law firm partnership. On its
tax return, NPR indicated that it was not a partnership subject to TEFRA
audit procedures, when in fact it was a TEFRA partnership. In the initial
audit of NPR's returns, the IRS applied normal partnership audit procedures
and issued a final no adjustment notice to the partnership. Rather than
proposing adjustments to the NPR return, the IRS determined that it would
deny loss deductions through the issue of notices of deficiency directly to the
NPR partners. In a higher level review, the IRS determined that NPR was a
TEFRA partnership and that the deficiency action required issue of an FPAA
to the NPR partners adjusting NPR partnership items. Section 6223(f)
provides that if the IRS mails a final partnership administrative adjustment, it
may not mail another notice in the absence of a showing of fraud,
malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material fact. The taxpayers argued
that the second notice was invalid. The court (Judge Ward) found that the
initial notice to NPR met the statutory criteria for an FPPA, even though it
was sent through the normal audit process. The court indicated that there is
nothing in statute or case law that affects the validity of an FPPA by whether
the IRS followed proper internal procedures in issuing the notice. However,
the court also found that the taxpayer's misrepresentation of the TEFRA
audit status on NPR's partnership return by failing to check the box
indicating it was subject to the TEFRA provisions was a "misrepresentation
of a material fact" invoking the exception in § 6223(f) that allows a second
notice.
The court also held that the taxpayers
reasonably relied on their tax advisors and declined to impose penalties under
§§ 6662(b) and 6664(c)(1).
8. The $9,500 deposited was only $2.9 million short;
that's a reasonable mistake. Kislev Partners, L.P. v. United States, 84 Fed.
Cl. 385 (8/13/08). The taxpayer, a non-tax matters partner, filed an action
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seeking review of a final partnership administrative adjustment for Kislev
Partners, which claimed $140 million of losses in an abusive tax shelter
known as a distressed asset/debt transaction (DAD). In order to invoke
jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims, a filing partner is required under
§ 6226(e)(1) to make a deposit of the amount by which the taxpayer's tax
liability would be increased if the partner's return were filed consistent with
the treatment of partnership items in the FPAA. In this case the taxpayer
made a deposit of $9,500 reflecting the taxpayer's potential tax liability for
the year in which the claimed losses were passed through from the
partnership. The taxpayer did not calculate the deposit based on the
taxpayer's liability for years to which he carried over the losses. The correct
amount of the deposit, including claimed tax reductions in the carryover
years was $2,905,046, exclusive of penalties and interest. The court held that
the deposit amount is to be calculated over multiple taxable years. However,
the court was satisfied that the taxpayer made a good faith effort to determine
the deposit under the statute and denied the government's motion to dismiss,
as long as the taxpayer has made the additional deposit within 60 days of the
date of the opinion.
a. Go figure the deposit and come back.
Russian Recovery Fund Ltd. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 698 (12/14/09).
Section 6226(a) requires that in order to petition for a readjustment of a
partnership item in the Court of Federal Claims, the petitioning partner must
provide a deposit of the amount by which the tax liability of the petitioning
partner would be increased if the treatment of partnership items on the
partner's return were consistent with the FPAA. Reg. § 301.6226(e)-l(a)(1)
requires that if the petitioning partners is itself a partnership, the deposit must
include the potential liability of each indirect partner. In an arrangement with
losses flowing to partners through multiple partnerships, the court held that
the deposit must be calculated by any downstream partner to include losses
flowing through the chain of partnerships, and not just losses passing through
a single filing partnership. The filing partner's $50,000 actual deposit was
increased to a required deposit of $8 million under this interpretation. Rather
than dismiss the case, however, the court allowed the taxpayer to show that
she made a good faith effort to calculate the required deposit.
b. Different judge, the Court of Federal
Claims reaches a different result opening the jurisdictional door to
easier entry. Prestop Holdings, LLC v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-
7246 (Fed. Cl. 12/07/10). In both Russian Recovery Fund, Ltd. v. United
States, 90 Fed. Cl. 698 (12/14/09) and Kislev Partners, L.P. v. United States,
84 Fed. Cl. 385 (8/13/08), the court interpreted § 6226(e)(1) as requiring a
deposit based on the partner's entire multi-year increase in tax liability. The
taxpayer in Prestop was a grantor trust partner that claimed losses from
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partnership short sale transactions of approximately $2.6 million, most of
which were carried over to later taxable years. Rejecting the analysis of both
Russian Recovery and Kislev Partners, the court (Judge Allegra) concluded
that the specific language of § 6226 along with multiple indications
throughout the TEFRA provisions indicated that the provisions applied to a
single tax year under the annual accounting system. Thus, the court held that
the full payment requirement of § 6226(e)(1) applied only to the tax years for
which the taxpayer was seeking a refund. As a result, the taxpayer's $100
deposit was adequate to establish jurisdiction in the court to consider the
taxpayer's challenge to administrative adjustments in the partnership return
for the year in which the full loss was passed to the taxpayer trust.
G. Miscellaneous
1. Oops. No, no, I'm OK after all. Rev. Proc. 2010-
32, 2010-36 I.R.B. 320. (9/7/10). This procedure provides that if a foreign
entity makes a check the box election to be a partnership, under the
reasonable assumption that it has more than one owner, but then determines
that it only had one owner, the original check the box election will be treated
as an election to be a disregarded entity provided the requirements in the
revenue procedure are satisfied. Similarly, it also provides that if a foreign
entity makes a check the box election to be disregarded entity, under the
reasonable assumption that it has only one owner, but then determines it only
had more than one owner, the original check the box election will be treated
as an election to be a partnership provided the requirements in the revenue
procedure are satisfied.
2. The IRS gets serious about series. REG-119921-
09, Series LLCs and Cell Companies, 75 F.R. 55699 (9/14/10). Proposed
regulations would determine the entity status of series LLCs with reference
to current rules. Several states have enacted statutes providing that LLCs
may establish "series," which are generally not treated as separate entities for
state law purposes and which do not generally cannot have members,
although each series may have associated with it specified members, assets,
obligations and investment purpose or business objectives. The state statutes
provide a significant degree of separateness for individual series within a
series LLC but not all of the attributes of a typical state law entity. Other
statutes provide for chartering of a legal entity known as a protected cell
company that establishes multiple accounts or cells, each with its own name
and identified with a specific participant. The assets of each series or cell
generally are protected from creditors of any other series or cell and from
creditors of the series LLC or cell company. A series organization would be
defined as a juridical entity that establishes and maintains a series, including
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a series limited liability company, series partnership, series trust, protected
cell company, segregated cell company, segregated portfolio company, or
segregated account company. A series would be defined as a segregated
group of assets and liabilities that is established pursuant to a series statute
by agreement of a series organization.
The proposed regulations would
recognize a series as an entity formed under local law and would provide that
whether a series is a separate entity is determined under Reg. § 301.7701-1 and
general tax principles.
* The proposed regulations would
provide that a series would not cease to be treated as a separate entity if the
series assets were not protected from creditors.
* A series that is recognized as a
separate entity would be classified under the rules of Reg. § 301.7701-2. Thus a
series that meets the corporation definition under Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1)
through (8) would be treated as a corporation for Federal tax purposes
regardless of the classification of the series organization.
* Identity of the owners of a series
would be determined under general tax principles that look to who bears the
economic benefits and burdens of ownership.
* Generally, domestic series would be
classified as separate local law entities based on the characteristics granted to
them under the various series statutes.
* The proposed regulations would not
apply to a series formed under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction except that an
entity that would be treated as an insurance business if it were a domestic
insurance entity, would be treated as a separate entity under the proposed
regulations.
* If local law permits creditors to
collect a liability attributable to a series from the series organization or other
series of the organization, then the series organization will be considered the
taxpayer from which taxes assessed against the series may be collected.
* The proposed regulations do not
address the application of employment taxes to employees of a series or the
series organization.
* The proposed regulations would be
effective on the date of publication in the Federal Register, and may require
reclassification of some series as of that date with the tax consequences of
conversion determined under general tax principles. The proposed regulations
include an exception for series established prior to publication of the proposed
regulations that treat all series and the series organization as one entity.
* The preamble requests comments on
a list of specified questions.
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VIII. TAX SHELTERS
A. Tax Shelter Cases and Rulings
1. Sala. District Court holds for the taxpayer on the
merits in an options transaction for which R.J. Ruble provided the tax
opinion. Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 4/22/08). The
District Court (Judge Babcock) held that taxpayer was entitled to a $60
million ordinary loss on 24 long and short currency options entered into in
November 2000 as part of a Deerhurst Program, in which the options were
contributed to a partnership. The basis of that partnership interest was
increased by the cost of the long options but was not reduced by the
contingent liability on the short options under Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1975-160 (1975). This was based upon Judge Babcock's finding of
fact that the long and short options were separate instruments for tax
purposes. The court found that the regulations issued in 2003, Reg. § 1.752-
6, retroactive to October 1999, which contained an "exception to the
exception" for transactions described in Notice 2000-44, exceeded
Treasury's authority. Judge Babcock held that the regulations were not
legislative because the "exception to the exception" was not comparable to
the rules for corporations described in § 358(h). Judge Babcock concluded
that the corporate rules were only "to prevent acceleration or duplication of
losses," which were not involved in the transactions described in Notice
2000-44. He refused to follow Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515
F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008).
* Judge Babcock analyzed the complex
transaction under the step transaction doctrine and found the doctrine
inapplicable.
* He found the losses deductible under
§ 165(c)(2) because they were incurred in a transaction entered into for profit,
which was to be determined at the time taxpayer entered into the transaction,
and not in hindsight. In this, Judge Babcock credited Sala's testimony that "he
expected his investment in Deerhurst to be profitable above and beyond the
expected tax loss . ... "
* He found the taxpayer was "an
extremely cautious investor who invested a great deal of time and energy
carefully researching and choosing his investments" and that he had a business
purpose other than tax avoidance for structuring his investment as he did.
* Judge Babcock further held that
Sala's amended return filed on 11/18/03 was a "qualified amended return"
because KPMG had not been contacted regarding Deerhurst prior to that date,
although it had been previously contacted regarding transactions similar to
Deerhurst.
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a. Government motion on 6/10/08 for new trial
based upon affidavit given in connection with decision not to prosecute
investment manager. Andrew J. Krieger, a key witness for the taxpayer,
stated in an affidavit dated 5/22/08 that a portion of the testimony he gave at
deposition was false, in that there was no "test period" for an "investment
program" but merely an effort to obtain tax savings. 2008 TNT 114-15. The
motion was opposed by the taxpayer because Krieger gave his affidavit only
after the government granted him immunity from prosecution by executing a
non-prosecution cooperation agreement in connection with a criminal
investigation unrelated to this case, i.e., the Coplan criminal case pending in
the Southern District of New York. 2008 TNT 130-62, 7/1/08.
b. Government motion for new trial denied.
251 F.R.D. 614, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5292 (7/18/08). Judge Babcock
denied the motion, holding that the evidence submitted by the government
was not new. He stated, "Rather than implying diligence, the timing of this
'new' evidence instead implies a deliberate attempt on the part of the
Government to further delay and derail this case for tactical gain."
c. Tenth Circuit reverses Judge Babcock for
his Sala'd days. Sala v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5406 (10th Cir.
7/23/10). The Tenth Circuit (Judge Murphy) reverses Judge Babcock's ruling
in favor of Sala on all issues by severing the year-2000 tax loss from the
post-2000 Deerhurst Program and finding that the 2000 transaction lacked
economic substance because "the economic substance doctrine requires
'disregarding, for tax purposes, transactions that comply with the literal
terms of the tax code but lack economic reality."'
* Judge Murphy observed:
Indeed, rather than suffering any actual financial loss
through Deerhurst GP, Sala actually profited from the
transaction. Sala does not contest that the loss is fictional,
but rather protests that the rule from Helmer should control.
This argument does not, however, address the claimed loss's
absence of economic reality. The absence of economic
reality is the hallmark of a transaction lacking economic
substance. ...
Additionally, while the district court found the long
and short options had a potential to earn profits of $550,000
over the course of one year, the expected tax benefit was
nearly $24 million. That expected tax benefit dwarfs any
potential gain from his participation in Deerhurst GP such
that "the economic realities of [the] transaction are
insignificant in relation to the tax benefits of the
transaction." ... The existence of some potential profit is
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"insufficient to impute substance into an otherwise sham
transaction" where a "common-sense examination of the
evidence as a whole" indicates the transaction lacked
economic substance.
2. Wells Fargo. "The SILO transactions here are
offensive to the Court on many levels." Wells Fargo & Co. v. United
States, 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (1/8/10). Wells Fargo engaged in 26 SILO
transactions, five of which were tried in this refund case in the Court of
Federal Claims. Seventeen of the SILOs involved domestic transit agencies
and nine involved qualified technological equipment. The trial dealt with
four SILOs involving public transit agencies, and one involving cellular
telecommunications equipment. The parties agreed that the court's ruling
with respect to the five transactions would guide the resolution of the
remainder. The court's fact findings are synopsized in the following passage
from the opinion by Judge Wheeler:
In each transaction, the parties employed equity and debt
"defeasance accounts," which are types of escrow accounts
intended to minimize the risks of non-payment. During the
lease-back period, a return is generated from the equity
defeasance account investments. The value of the equity
defeasance account is expected to grow so that the tax-
exempt entity can exercise the buy-out option at the end of
the lease-back period without using any of its own funds.
However, the equity defeasance account return is more than
offset by the other costs of the transaction, including Wells
Fargo's cost of funds to engage in the transaction. The end
result is that the trial transactions produce an overall loss
without the tax benefits, and no rational person would
engage in these transactions absent the tax benefits. This
conclusion is borne out by Wells Fargo's cessation of SILO
transactions after the IRS began disallowing SILO tax
deductions. Moreover, the profitable portion of the
transactions could be realized simply by investing in the
same portfolio as the equity defeasance account. The only
reason to create the elaborate array of agreements
comprising a SILO transaction is for Wells Fargo to obtain
the tax benefits at minimal risk, and with complete assurance
of the desired long-term outcome.
* The essence the court's ultimate
holding is captured in the following passages from the opinion:
The Court finds that Wells Fargo is not entitled to the
claimed tax deductions on the five trial transactions. The
SILO transactions did not grant to Wells Fargo the burdens
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and benefits of property ownership. The transactions lack
economic substance, and were intended only to reduce Wells
Fargo's federal taxes by millions of dollars. Although well
disguised in a sea of paper and complexity, the SILO
transactions essentially amount to Wells Fargo's purchase of
tax benefits for a fee from a tax-exempt entity that cannot
use the deductions. The transactions are designed to
minimize risk and assure a desired outcome to Wells Fargo,
regardless of how the value of the property may fluctuate
during the term of the transactions. Indeed, nothing of any
substance changes in the tax-exempt entity's operation and
ownership of the assets. The only money that changes hands
is Wells Fargo's up-front fee to the tax-exempt entity, and
Wells Fargo's payments to those who have participated in or
created the intricate agreements. The equity and debt "loop"
transactions simply are offsetting accounting entries not
involving actual payments, or pools of money eventually
returned to the original holder. If the Court were to approve
of these SILO schemes, the big losers would be the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS"), deprived of millions in taxes
rightfully due from a financial giant, and the taxpaying
public, forced to bear the burden of the taxes avoided by
Wells Fargo.
... The heart of these transactions is that Wells Fargo
paid a fee to tax-exempt entities to acquire valuable tax
deductions that the tax-exempt entities could not use. Wells
Fargo also invested an amount with an equity undertaker that
it could have done directly, without involving any tax-
exempt entities or their equipment. Aside from these two
elements, the circular flow of funds adds nothing to the
transaction, except to eliminate any risk to Wells Fargo and
to produce more claimed tax deductions. The involvement of
lenders like AIG, appraisers like Ernst & Young, and law
firms like King & Spalding is "window dressing" serving
only to generate fees and lengthy documents to give the
SILOs an appearance of validity. The Indiana district court
hit the mark when it described the SILO as a "blatantly
abusive tax shelter" that is "rotten to the core." Hoosier
Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins.
Co., 588 F.Supp.2d 919, 921, 928 (S.D. Ind. 2008), aff'd
582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009).
* After first holding that Wells Fargo
was not entitled to depreciation deductions because it never obtained the
benefits and burdens of ownership, and was not entitled to interest deductions,
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because the loop nonrecourse debt was not genuine indebtedness - "the
lenders did not relinquish the use of the money except for the brief one-day
loop ... [and neither] Wells Fargo nor the tax-exempt entity ever had the use of
the funds" - the court held alternatively that the transactions lacked economic
substance under the standards of Coltec Industries v. United States, 454 F.3d
1340 (F3d. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206 (2007). The transactions
lacked objective economic substance because the source of the non-tax
economic benefit to Wells Fargo, when the SILOs terminated, was merely the
return of its investment, plus the interest earned.
... Wells Fargo could have realized this same return simply
by investing in the portfolio of the equity defeasance
arrangement, without involving the [counter-parties] .... in
any way. ...
... Though the mountains of paper defy comprehension
without careful study, the bottom line is that the SILOs
provide no reasonable possibility of profit at all, absent a
claim for the tax deductions.
Wells Fargo's cost of funds alone turns the SILOs into a
losing proposition. Wells Fargo's witness ... agreed that the
cash-on-cash, non-tax return calculated is less than Wells
Fargo's cost of funds for its leasing business. ...
... [W]hen all transactional and funding costs are considered,
the non-tax return is negative. Thus, if not for the tax
deductions, no rational business entity would seriously
contemplate a SILO transaction.
* The transactions failed the subjective
branch of the economic substance test because they had no non-tax business
purpose.
... Without the claimed tax benefits, and without the
company's tax capacity to use the claimed tax benefits,
Wells Fargo would not have entered into the SILO
transactions. ... The motivating reason for the Wells Fargo
SILOs was the desire to reduce the company's taxes as much
as possible. There were no non-tax reasons that would
justify Wells Fargo's entering into these transactions.
The lack of any arms' length negotiations of many
substantive terms is a further indication of a questionable
transaction. The key terms of the SILOs were determined by
tax considerations, and Wells Fargo's constraints to
eliminate risk. The transaction terms were more the product
of a software model, than any negotiations or commercial
realities.
* The court distinguished Consolidated
Edison Co. of New York v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228, 104 A.F.T.R.2d
682 [Vol. 10:9
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
2009-6966 (2009), as a "distinctly unique" case, and found the transactions in
Wells Fargo to be like those in A WG Leasing Trust v. United States, 592 F.
Supp. 2d (N.D. Ohio 2008), and BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461
(4th Cir. 2008), af'ig 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-376 (M.D. N.C. 2007), in which
deductions from LILO transactions were disallowed.
3. Confining the Frank Lyon Co. Result to its facts
as understood by the Supreme Court. "The Court [in Frank Lyon Co.]
also emphasized, in contrast to this case the transaction did not create
any tax deductions, because Lyon and Worthen paid taxes at the same
rate." Altria Group, Inc. v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 2d. 259 (S.D. N.Y.
3/16/10). In a refund suit involving several SILO and LILO tax shelters with
respect to infrastructure originally owned by tax indifferent parties, a jury
rendered a verdict for the government, finding that the transactions lacked
economic substance. On the taxpayer's motion for judgment as a matter of
law and, alternatively, for a new trial, Judge Holwell ruled in favor of the
government. He generically described the four transactions as follows:
In each transaction, Altria immediately leased the asset back
to its original owner using agreements with a number of
unusual features, including complete defeasance
(prepayment, in essence) of the lessee's rent and an owner's
option to repurchase the asset. Altria then claimed
depreciation, amortization, interest expense, and transaction
expense deductions on its 1996 and 1997 corporate tax
return based on its newly acquired assets, even though (i) its
purchase money immediately was invested in securities that
the nominal lessees could not access without providing
substitute collateral, and (ii) the lessees could reacquire the
assets without incurring any out-of-pocket costs.
* In the course of extensive discussion
of the import of Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), Judge
Holwell deftly confined that case to its facts as understood by the Supreme
Court, stating, "The Court also emphasized, in contrast to this case the
transaction did not create any tax deductions, because Lyon and Worthen paid
taxes at the same rate." Referring again to the Supreme Court's Frank Lyon
decision, he observed: "The Supreme Court, however, has expressly indicated
that a transaction's effect on the U.S. Treasury must inform a federal court's
analysis of whether a transactional form chosen selected by a taxpayer should
be respected for federal tax purposes." Judge Holwell went on to discuss of the
application of a flexible economic substance doctrine test under Second Circuit
precedent, but he described it all as "dicta" in light of the jury's verdict. He
described Second Circuit law as requiring "an analysis under which the fact
finder must consider both aspects of the economic substance inquiry, and may
(but need not) find against the taxpayer if a transaction lacks either a legitimate
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business purpose or an economic effect." On this basis, the court rejected
Altria's argument that because the facts established that it expected to receive a
nontax-based return of 2.5% to 3.8% from the transactions it was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. "[T]he jury's finding that Altria lacked a
legitimate business purpose for entering the transactions, even if at the limits of
what present doctrine allows, was sufficient to support its economic substance
verdict."
* Note that under new § 7701(o), if a
court applies the economic substance doctrine to transactions entered into after
3/30/10, it must apply a conjunctive test under which the claimed tax benefits
must be disallowed unless (1) the transaction changes the taxpayer's economic
position in a meaningful way apart from Federal income tax effects and (2) the
taxpayer has a substantial business purpose, apart from Federal income tax
effects, for entering into such transaction.
4. Partnership anti-abuse rules are applied to
eliminate losses in a transaction that lacked economic substance. Did
this court initiate the use of Reg. § 1.701-2? Nevada Partners Fund, LLC v.
United States, 714 F. Supp. 2d. 598 (S.D. Miss. 4/30/10). The District Court
upheld the IRS recharacterization of a tax shelter strategy involving KPMG,
called the Family Office Customized Strategy (FOCus) in eleven separate
actions challenging final partnership administrative adjustments (FPAAs).
The court agreed with the IRS that the transactions were subject to
recharacterization under the anti abuse rules of Reg. § 1.701-2. The tax
matters partner in all of the proceedings was James Kelly Williams who had
substantial gains in tax years 2001 and 2002. The transaction developed by
KPMG utilized a multiple tier structure, the creation of a fund of funds LLC,
an alternative investment fund LLC and a third tier LLC that invested in
collared long and short currency futures with Credit Suisse First Boston.
Gains on long positions were invested in CDs with Credit Suisse, suspended
losses on short positions remained in the investment funds. The tax shelter
investor then purchased the funds to acquire the suspended losses with a
capital contribution, in the form of debt guarantees with Credit Suisse, to
establish basis. The transaction was blessed with opinions from the Arnold &
Porter firm. The court recognized these transactions as artificial high basis
transactions described in Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255 (BOSS and
Son of Boss type transactions). While noting that the BOSS type transactions
had been challenged by the IRS, the court also indicated that KPMG hoped
that the FOCus strategy was structured in a way that would avoid IRS
scrutiny and did not register the deal as an abusive tax shelter. The court
found that "the central point in 2001 of following the strategy being
promoted by KPMG was to ameliorate Williams' tax situation, regardless of
Williams' investment activity." After a lengthy analysis of economic
substance cases, the court stated that "the FOCus steps were a series of
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transactions lacking economic substance and comprising an abusive tax
shelter designed to permit an investor such as James Kelley Williams to
purchase losses embedded in a tiered partnership structure and to reduce
substantially, if not entirely, his federal tax liability for the 2001 tax year in a
manner inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K." The court also refused
to conflate the FOCus generated losses with subsequent successful
investments with the hedge fund, the NCR Bricolage companies, that
managed the investments. Thus, the court held that the IRS appropriately
recast the transaction under Reg. § 1.701-2 to deny the losses. With regard to
the IRS assertion of penalties, the court held that James Kelly Williams was
required to raise any reasonable cause and good faith defenses in a separate
partner level refund action. The court sustained imposition of 20 percent
understatement of income and 20 percent negligence penalties (which are not
stacked) on the partnerships and rejected the partnerships' assertions that the
FOCus positions were supported by substantial authority and that the
partnerships could have reasonably relied on the advice of professionals.
a. Different District Court, same result.
Fidelity International Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC v. United States, 105
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2403 (D. Mass. 5/17/10). Richard Egan (a former
ambassador to Ireland) was one of the founders of EMC Corporation, a large
publically traded entity that developed computer storage devices. In order to
avoid tax on $200 million capital gain resulting from sales of EMC stock,
Egan entered into paired options arrangements through partnership
investments devised by KPMG, with opinions from Sidley, Austin, Brown &
Wood, with Fidelity International Currency Advisors and Fidelity High Tech
Advisor A Fund as general partners (Son-of Boss type transactions), and a
separate transaction designed to offset ordinary gains described as a financial
derivatives strategy designed to generate U.S. losses offset with offshore
gains attributed to a non-US taxpayer. In an opinion in excess of 350 pages,
finding that the transactions were shams lacking economic substance the
court (Judge Saylor) described the transactions as "entirely irrational; they
were unnecessarily and extravagantly expensive, and did not hedge the
purported risks effectively (or at all). . . . the transactions were designed and
intended to lose money, and in fact did so." With respect to the taxpayer's
argument that § 752 allowed a basis increase for the long option positions
while not treating the short positions as liabilities, the court stated that, "If
the tax system depended entirely on form over substance, the argument
might well pass muster. But tax liabilities are not so easy to dodge. It would
be absurd to consider offsetting options - purchased and sold at the same
time, and with the same counterparties - as separate items, and to act as if the
one item existed and the other did not. That is particularly true where (as
here) the individual option positions were gigantic, and might bankrupt the
taxpayer or the options dealer if no offset were in place." Rejecting the
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taxpayers' claim of reasonable reliance on tax opinions, the court described
the opinions as "fraudulent" and indicated that "[t]he Egans knew that the
opinion letters were simply part of the tax shelter scheme, and did not for a
moment believe that they were receiving independent legal advice after a full
disclosure of all underlying facts." The court ultimately held, among other
things, that neither transaction had business purpose and both lacked
economic substance, that the intermediate steps of the transactions should be
disregarded under the step transaction doctrines and that the transaction
should be treated as a single integrated transaction, and that the partnerships
would be disregarded under the anti-abuse regulation § 1.701-2. Although
the court found that there were no grounds to assert reasonable reliance
defenses to penalties, the court indicated that it lacked jurisdiction to
determine whether specific penalties, determined in individual partners'
proceedings, should be assessed against members or partners.
5. The Court of Federal Claims denied retroactive
application of the regulations, but slammed the door on the digital
options strategy on economic substance grounds and upholds penalties.
Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (7/31/08).
The Welles family recognized substantial capital gain on disposition of 50
percent of the family residential entry door business for $455 million. Prior
to sale the family transferred their stock holdings in the family corporation,
Therma-Tru, to a family investment partnership, Stobie Creek. The
partnership, through single member LLCs, participated in the Jenkens &
Gilchrist digital options strategy, to no avail according to the Court of
Federal Claims. In an extraordinarily detailed and lengthy opinion, the court
held:
* Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1975-160, establishes that the contingent nature of the short sold
position in foreign currency prevents a reduction in basis for a reduction in
partnership liabilities on distribution of property from the partnership. Thus the
potential liability on the open currency option did not reduce the taxpayers'
basis in distributed Therma-Tru stock, whose basis was increased by the
purchase price of the short options.
* Retroactive application of Reg. §
1.752-6 is not justified by § 309 of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 309, 114 Stat. 2763A-587, -638. That provision
was aimed at corporate transactions and is focused on the use of contingent
liabilities to accelerate or duplicate losses. The court opined that, "The transfers
of the contingent liabilities in the cases at bar resulted in increasing each
partner's outside basis, but did not cause any acceleration or duplication of
losses."
* Judge Miller held that the long and
short digital options were two options, not one as contended by the government.
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* Judge Miller dismissed Notice 2000-
44, which was issued in August 2000, after the transactions occurred but before
they were reported by taxpayers in 2001, as follows:
[The government's] argument misunderstands the import of
IRS notices. As a general proposition, IRS notices are press
releases stating the IRS's position on a particular issue and
informing the public of its intentions; such notices do not
constitute legal authority. .... Whether [taxpayers] had
"notice" that their transactions would be subject to scrutiny
has no bearing on whether a Treasury regulation, seeking
retroactively to effect a change in the law, can serve to
disallow [taxpayers'] reporting position.
* Nonetheless, under Coltec Industries,
Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the partnership
transaction in options lacked economic substance. The court indicated that in
Coltec, "The Federal Circuit thus adopted a disjunctive test for determining
whether a transaction should be disregarded as an economic sham: the doctrine
should apply and a transaction should be disregarded either if the transaction
lacks objective economic substance or if it is subjectively shaped solely by tax
avoidance motivations." After an exhaustive analysis of conflicting expert
opinions, the court found that, "the weight of the evidence overwhelms
plaintiffs' claim that the transactions were investments motivated by a business
purpose to return a profit." The court also interpreted Coltec as holding that, "if
a transaction was shaped solely by a tax-avoidance purpose, the fact that the
transaction may have some objective economic reality cannot save it from
being disregarded as an economic sham." As to the taxpayers' subjective
purpose, the court found that, "Plaintiffs' limited evidence of non-tax avoidance
subjective motivation does not imbue the transactions with economic
substance."
* The court also applied the step
transaction doctrine to deny the claimed tax benefits. The court stated, "Trial
established that, under either the interdependence test or the end result test, the
step transaction doctrine applies to plaintiffs' transactions. Accordingly, the tax
consequences must turn on the substance of the transaction and not on the form
by which plaintiffs engaged in it. In disregarding the predetermined steps of the
J&G strategy, Stobie Creek is unable to claim a basis increase in the Therma-
Tru stock, and the capital gains must be taxed according to the reality of the
transaction."
* The court upheld accuracy and
negligence penalties and rejected the taxpayers' claims that they reasonably
relied on the advice of counsel. The court concluded that because of the built-in
conflict of interest of the lawyers promoting the transaction that was known to
the taxpayers, reliance on the legal opinions was not reasonable.
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a. Affirmed, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2848 (Fed.
Cir. 6/11/10). The Federal Circuit (Judge Prost) affirmed the Court of
Federal Claims on both the merits and on the penalty issue. The court found
that the offsetting options, while separate transactions for tax purposes
(under "a literal application of the tax code at that time"), were to be
"properly treated as a single, unified transaction" for economic substance
("economic reality") purposes. This led to the conclusion that "they similarly
should not be separate for the purpose of calculating the taxpayers' basis in
Stobie Creek," and the taxpayers' claimed basis of $204,575,000 was
disregarded "as lacking economic reality."
* The key paragraphs of the opinion
relating to penalties are:
Similarly, the evidence supports the trial court's
conclusion that Jeffrey Welles knew or should have known
that SLK was an agent of J & G, and thus could not
reasonably rely on SLK's advice. SLK's agency relation-
ship was apparent from the beginning. Waterman referred
the Welleses to J & G, presented the strategy at the Vero
Beach meeting, and recommended the strategy. As was true
for J & G, SLK's fee agreement made clear that SLK had a
financial stake in the outcome, again tying compensation to
the sheltered gain. SLK also helped implement the strategy
by drafting and backdating documents for the different
corporate entities. In-deed, SLK openly acknowledged its
role in a letter to the Welleses. The letter stated that the
lower taxable gain that would be reported on Stobie Creek's
return was "produced by the tax strategy that was developed
by [J & G] and implemented with our [SLK's] help earlier
this year." The trial court found that Jeffrey Welles received
this letter. Based on that and other evidence presented at
trial, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that Jeffrey
Welles (and thus Stobie Creek) knew or should have known
about the conflicts of interest for J & G and SLK. It was not
objectively reasonable for Jeffrey Welles to ignore evidence
of these conflicts and continue to rely on the advice,
regardless of the Welleses' longstanding relationship with
SLK or the reputations of both firms.
Even if Jeffrey Welles had not known about the
conflicts of interest, his reliance on the advice of SLK and J
& G was still unreasonable. Based on Jeffrey Welles's
education and experience, as well as the reason the Welleses
pursued the J & G strategy, the trial court found that Jeffrey
Welles should have known that the J & G strategy was "too
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good to be true." Cf Neonatology, 299 F.3d at 234. This
determination is not clearly erroneous. Jeffrey Welles was a
highly educated professional with extensive experience in
finance, having worked as an investment banker and as the
manager of his family's complex finances. Stobie Creek, 82
Fed. Cl. at 715. In that managerial role, he had helped
implement a number of sophisticated tax-planning strategies,
giving him sufficient knowledge and experience to know
when a tax-planning strategy was likely "too good to be
true." Jeffrey Welles knew that the J & G strategy was
marketed as a "Basis Enhancing Derivatives Structure" and
that the purpose of the strategy was to boost the basis in
capital assets, "generating a reduced gain for tax purposes."
Moreover, Jeffrey Welles sought out and selected the J & G
strategy because of a desire to avoid taxes that would
otherwise be owed on the Therma-Tru deal, not because he
wanted to structure the deal itself to minimize taxes.
6. Even this Tax Court Judge's gullibility has limits.
A "should" opinion by PWC that the transaction was not a disguised
sale isn't worth the paper it was printed on, which resulted in a penalty
of $36,691,796. Reliance on an opinion issued by an advisor who was
actively involved in developing and structuring a transaction was
unreasonable because the advisor faced an inherent conflict of interest.
Canal Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 9 (8/5/10). In 1999, a member of
the taxpayer's consolidated group that manufactured tissues, WISCO,
contributed substantially all of its assets to an LLC in exchange for a 5-
percent interest in the LLC, which assumed most of WISCO's liabilities and
which simultaneously distributed $755 million of cash to WISCO. The
remaining 95 percent interest in the LLC was owned by Georgia Pacific. The
$755 million was obtained through a bank loan to the LLC guaranteed by
Georgia Pacific, for which WISCO provided a circumscribed indemnity
regarding the principal, but not the interest (which required Georgia Pacific
first to look to the LLC's assets and which also provided WISCO an
increased interest in the LLC if it paid the indemnity). WISCO used the cash
to pay a $151 million dividend to Canal and repay intercompany loans.
WISCO's only assets thereafter were a $151 note from Canal and a $6
million corporate jet. Subsequently, the LLC borrowed funds from a
subsidiary of Georgia Pacific to retire the bank loan. The taxpayer received a
"should" opinion from PWC that the 1999 transaction would not be treated
as an asset sale and gain would be deferred, for which it paid flat fee of
$800,000. The fee was due only if the opinion was a "should" opinion, and
only upon the closing of the joint venture transaction. In 2001, WISCO sold
its LLC interest to Georgia Pacific for $1 million, and Georgia Pacific then
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sold the entire interest in the LLC to an unrelated party. The taxpayer treated
the 1999 transaction as a contribution to the LLC and the receipt of a "debt-
financed transfer of consideration," for which Reg. § 1.707-5(b) provides an
exception to the disguised sale rules to the extent the distribution does not
exceed the distributee partner's share of the partnership liabilities under
§ 752. (However, for financial accounting purposes taxpayer reported the
transaction as a sale.) The IRS asserted that the 1999 transaction was a
disguised sale under § 707(a)(2)(B), because WISCO did not have any
allocable share of the liability. The taxpayer argued that WISCO's indemnity
of Georgia Pacific's guaranty imposed the economic risk of loss for the LLC
debt on WISCO, and thus WISCO's share of the debt equaled the
distribution. The IRS asserted that WISCO's indemnity agreement should be
disregarded under the anti-abuse rule for allocation of partnership debt: Reg.
§ 1.752-2(j)(1) and (3) provides that a partner's obligation to make a
payment may be disregarded if (1) the facts and circumstances indicate that a
principal purpose of the arrangement between the parties is to eliminate the
partner's risk of loss or to create a facade of the partner's bearing the
economic risk of loss with respect to the obligation, or (2) the facts and
circumstances of the transaction evidence a plan to circumvent or avoid the
obligation. The Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) agreed with the IRS that the
transactions had to be viewed together and they constituted a disguised sale
under § 707(a)(2)(B) rather than a tax-free contribution to a partnership
under § 721. Taking into account all of the facts, including the facts that
(1) Georgia Pacific did not require the indemnity, but it was included
because the taxpayer's tax advisor concluded that it was necessary in order to
avoid the disguised sale rules, (2) the indemnity's provisions minimized the
likelihood that it would ever be invoked, and (3) the taxpayer's
representations to Moody's and Standard & Poor's that the only risk
associated with the transaction was the tax risk, Judge Kroupa found that the
indemnity agreement was crafted to limit any potential liability to WISCO's
assets, which were insufficient to cover more than a small fraction of the
indemnity. Accordingly, the indemnity agreement was disregarded, and the
distribution of cash to WISCO was not protected by the debt-financed
transfer exception to the disguised sale rules. The 1999 transaction was a sale
of WISCO's assets. The court said, "Chesapeake [taxpayer's predecessor]
used the indemnity to create the appearance that WISCO bore the economic
risk of loss for the LLC debt when in substance the risk was borne by GP."
Among the circumstances considered by the court was that Chesapeake
represented that its only risk on the transaction was the tax risk.
* Judge Kroupa also upheld the
imposition of a substantial understatement penalty under § 6662(a) in the
amount of $36,691,796. Even though the taxpayer received a "should" opinion
from PWC that the 1999 transaction would not be treated as an asset sale and
gain would be deferred, the reasonable cause exception of § 6664(c)(1) did not
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apply, because (1) "the opinion was riddled with questionable conclusions and
unreasonable assumptions," and (2) PWC was actively involved in planning the
transaction and its opinion was tainted by a conflict of interest, which caused it
have "crossed over the line from trusted adviser for prior accounting purposes
to advocate for a position with no authority that was based on an opinion with a
high price tag-$800,000." She described the opinion as "littered with
typographical errors, disorganized and incomplete." Judge Kroupa concluded
that PWC's opinion was based on the size of its fee, rather than on legal
reasoning, stating as follows:
We are also nonplused by Mr. Miller's failure to
give an understandable response when asked at trial how
PWC could issue a "should" opinion if no authority on point
existed. He demurred that it was what Chesapeake
requested. The only explanation that makes sense to the
Court is that no lesser level of comfort would have
commanded the $800,000 fixed fee that Chesapeake paid for
the opinion.
* Judge Kroupa found that the taxpayer
"essentially bought an insurance policy as to the taxability of the transaction,"
and continued to conclude as follows:
PWC's opinion looks more like a quid pro quo arrangement
than a true tax advisory opinion. If we were to bless the
closeness of the relationship, we would be providing carte
blanche to promoters to provide a tax opinion as part and
parcel of a promotion. Independence of advisers is
sacrosanct to good faith reliance. We find that PWC lacked
the independence necessary for Chesapeake to establish
good faith reliance. We further find that Chesapeake did not
act with reasonable cause or in good faith in relying on
PWC's opinion.
B. Identified "tax avoidance transactions."
1. Now let me get this straight. I followed the Code
and Regs meticulously, claimed my loss deduction, but it was disallowed
because I really had no possibility of actually making money on the deal
and all I was looking for was a nice tax loss, and even though I've got
this letter from my lawyer saying the deduction is 100% legal, I'm still
looking at a 40 percent penalty on the deficiency. But my neighbor who
deducted the cost of his kid's college education as a business expense,
which every kindergartner knows you can't do, doesn't have to pay any
penalty because he's dumb and his dumb, but probably honest, CPA
said it was OK. Say What!? Well, we don't have to "know it when we see
it" because Congress has defined it for us. The 2010 Health Care
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Reconciliation Act added new Code § 7701(o), codifying the economic
substance doctrine, which has been applied by the courts for several decades
as a judicial interpretive doctrine to disallow tax benefits otherwise available
under a literal reading of the Code and regulations.
* Background - Codification of the
economic substance doctrine has been on the legislative agenda many times
since early in the first decade of this century, or for the past ten years (for those
of us still hung up on Y2K). The move for codification was motivated in part
by the insistence of not a few tax practitioners that the economic substance
doctrine simply was not actually a legitimate element of the tax doctrine,
notwithstanding its application by the courts in many cases over several
decades. This argument was based on the assertion that the Supreme Court had
never actually applied the economic substance doctrine to deny a taxpayer any
tax benefits, ignoring the Supreme Court's decision in Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960), and instead focusing on the Supreme Court's subsequent
decisions in Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991), and
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), in which a transaction
that on the facts showed the total lack of "economic substance" was upheld.
Congressional concern was intensified by the decision of the Court of Federal
Claims in Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004),
vacated and remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1261 (2007), which questioned the continuing viability of the doctrine, stating
that "the use of the 'economic substance' doctrine to trump 'mere compliance
with the Code' would violate the separation of powers." See STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS AMENDED,
IN COMBINATION WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT," 144 (JCX- 18-10 3/21/10). However, in that case the trial court found that
the particular transaction at issue in the case did not lack economic substance,
and thus the trial court did not actually rule on its validity, and on appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Court of Federal Claims
decision and, reiterating the validity of the economic substance doctrine and, in
the opinion of some, expanding it greatly, held that transaction in question
lacked economic substance. Although the economic substance doctrine has
been articulated in a number of different manners by different courts over the
years, its purpose is aptly described by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Coltec Industries v. United States, supra.
The economic substance doctrine represents a
judicial effort to enforce the statutory purpose of the tax
code. From its inception, the economic substance doctrine
has been used to prevent taxpayers from subverting the
legislative purpose of the tax code by engaging in
transactions that are fictitious or lack economic reality
simply to reap a tax benefit. In this regard, the economic
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substance doctrine is not unlike other canons of construction
that are employed in circumstances where the literal terms of
a statute can undermine the ultimate purpose of the statute.
* The modem articulation of the
doctrine traces its roots back to Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561
(1978), where the Court upheld the taxpayer's treatment of an early version of a
SELO, stating as follows:
[W]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party
transaction with economic substance which is compelled or
encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued
with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped
solely by tax avoidance features that have meaningless
labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation
of rights and duties effectuated by the parties.
* This passage - which sets forth a
statement as to what was sufficient for economic substance, but which was
subsequently interpreted to be a statement as to what was necessary for
economic substance2 - has led courts to two different formulations of the
economic substance doctrine. One, the so-called "conjunctive test" requires that
a transaction have both (1) economic substance and (2) a non-tax business
purpose in order to be respected for tax purposes. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic
Investment Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Pasternak v.
Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993); James v. Commissioner, 899
F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1990); New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Commissioner, 132
T.C. No. 9 (2009); Coltec, supra. Under the other formulation, the so called
"disjunctive test," represented principally by IES Industries v. United States,
253 F.3d 350, 358 (8th Cir. 2001), and Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985), a transaction would be respected
for tax purposes if it had either (1) economic substance and (2) a non-tax
business purpose. Yet a third articulation appeared in ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017
(1999), where the court concluded that, that "these distinct aspects of the
economic sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a 'rigid two-step
analysis,' but rather represent related factors both of which inform the analysis
of whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart from its tax
consequences, to be respected for tax purposes." The courts also have differed
with respect to the nature of the non-tax economic benefit a taxpayer is required
to establish to demonstrate that a transaction has economic substance. Some
2. Ira believes that the interpretation contains an error in logic which takes a
statement from the Frank Lyon case as to what is "sufficient" for economic
substance and construes it as a statement as to what is "necessary" for economic
substance. Marty and Dan do not so believe, or think that the alleged error is
irrelevant.
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courts required a potential economic profit. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). Other courts have applied the economic
substance doctrine to disallow tax benefits where - even though the taxpayer
was exposed to risk and the transaction had a profit potential - compared to the
tax benefits, the economic risks and profit potential were insignificant. Sheldon
v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738 (1990); Goldstein, supra. Yet other courts have
asked whether a stated business benefit - for example, cost reduction, as
opposed to profit-seeking - of a particular transaction was actually obtained
through the transaction in question. See Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States,
454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007). Finally,
notwithstanding that several courts have rejected the bootstrap argument that an
improved financial accounting result - derived from tax benefits increasing
after-tax profitability - served the valid business purpose requirement, see,
e.g., American Electric Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, affd,
326 F.3d.737 (6th Cir. 2003); Wells Fargo & Company v. United States, 91
Fed. Cl. 35 (2010), taxpayers continued to press such claims.
* The Codified Economic Substance
Doctrine - The codification of the economic substance doctrine in new
§ 7701(o) clarifies and standardizes some applications of the economic
substance doctrine when it is applied, but does not establish any rules for
determining when the doctrine should be applied. According to the legislative
history, "the provision [I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C)] does not change present law
standards in determining when to utilize an economic substance analysis." See
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS
AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," 152 (JCX-18-10 3/21/10). Thus, "the fact that a
transaction meets the requirements for specific treatment under any provision of
the Code is not determinative of whether a transaction or series of transactions
of which it is a part has economic substance." Id. at 153. Codification of the
economic substance doctrine was not intended to alter or supplant any other
judicial interpretive doctrines, such as the business purpose, substance over
form, and step transaction doctrines, any similar rule in the Code, regulations,
or guidance thereunder; § 7701(o) is intended merely (merely?) to supplement
all the other rules. Id. at 155.
* Conjunctive analysis of objective
and subjective prongs - One of the most important aspects of new § 7701(o)
is that it requires a conjunctive analysis under which a transaction has economic
substance only if (1) the transaction changes the taxpayer's economic position
in a meaningful way apart from Federal income tax effects and (2) the taxpayer
has a substantial business purpose, apart from Federal income tax effects, for
entering into such transaction. (The second prong of most versions of the
codified economic substance doctrine introduced in earlier Congresses added
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"and the transaction is a reasonable means of accomplishing such purpose."
See, e.g., H.R. 2345, 110th Cong, 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. 2, 108th Cong., 1st
Sess. (2003). It is not clear what difference in application was intended by
adoption of the different final statutory language.) This conjunctive test resolves
the split between the Circuits (and between the Tax Court and certain Circuits)
by rejecting the view of those courts that find the economic substance doctrine
to have been satisfied if there is either (1) a change in taxpayer's economic
position or (2) a nontax business purpose, see, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v.
Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985); IES Industries, Inc. v. United
States, 253 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 2001). Section 7701(o)(5)(D) allows the
economic substance doctrine to be applied to a single transaction or to a series
of transactions. The Staff of the Joint Committee Report indicates that the
provision "does not alter the court's ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or
otherwise recharacterize a transaction when applying the doctrine," and gives as
an example the courts' ability "to bifurcate a transaction in which independent
activities with non-tax objectives are combined with an unrelated item having
only tax-avoidance objectives in order to disallow those tax-motivated
benefits."
* Claim of Profit Potential - Section
7701(o)(2) does not require that the taxpayer establish profit potential in order
to prove that a transaction results in a meaningful change in the taxpayer's
economic position or that the taxpayer has a substantial non-Federal-income-tax
purpose. Nor does it specify a threshold required return if the taxpayer relies on
the profit potential to try to establish economic substance. (In this respect the
enacted version differs from earlier proposals that would have required the
reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction to exceed a risk-free rate
of return. See, e.g., H.R. 2345, 110th Cong, 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. 2, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).) But if the taxpayer does rely on a profit potential
claim, then the profit potential requires a present value analysis:
The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken into
account in determining whether the requirements of [the
§ 7701(o) test for economic substance] are met with respect
to the transaction only if the present value of the reasonably
expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in
relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits
that would be allowed if the transaction were respected.
* Thus the analysis of profit potential
by the Court of Federal Claims in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v.
United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228 (2009), which appears not to have thoroughly
taken into account present value analysis, would not stand muster under the
new provision. In all events, transaction costs must be taken into account in
determining pre-tax profits, and the statute authorizes regulations requiring
foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in determining pre-tax profit in
appropriate cases. Any State or local income tax effect that is related to a
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Federal income tax effect is treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax
effect. Thus, state tax savings that piggy-back on Federal income tax savings
cannot provide either a profit potential or a business purpose. Similarly, a
financial accounting benefit cannot satisfy the business purpose requirement if
the financial accounting benefit originates in a reduction of Federal income tax.
* Don't worry, be happy! [?] -
Section 7701(o)(5)(B) specifically provides that the statutory modifications and
clarifications apply to an individual only with respect to "transactions entered
into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in for the
production of income." (We wonder what else anybody would have thought
they might apply to? The home mortgage interest deduction? Charitable
contributions of appreciated property? How about a Son of Boss transaction
where there is no possibility for profit?) More importantly, according to STAFF
OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS AMENDED,
IN COMBINATION WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT," 152-153 (JCX-18-10 3/21/10), "[t]he provision is not intended to alter
the tax treatment of certain basic business transactions that, under longstanding
judicial and administrative practice are respected, merely because the choice
between meaningful economic alternatives is largely or entirely based on
comparative tax advantages." The list of transactions and decisions intended to
be immunized for the application of the economic substance doctrine includes:
(1) the choice between capitalizing a business enterprise
with debt or equity; (2) a U.S. person's choice between
utilizing a foreign corporation or a domestic corporation to
make a foreign investment; (3) the choice to enter a
transaction or series of transactions that constitute a
corporate organization or reorganization under subchapter C;
and (4) the choice to utilize a related-party entity in a
transaction, provided that the arm's length standard of
section 482 and other applicable concepts are satisfied.
* Leasing transactions will continue to
be scrutinized based on all of the facts and circumstances.
* Jettisoned along the way - Many
earlier versions of the codification of economic substance doctrine, some of
which were adopted by the House, also provided special rules for applying what
was essentially a per se lack of economic substance in transactions with tax
indifferent parties that involved financing, and artificial income and basis
shifting. See, e.g., H.R. 2345, 110th Cong, Ist Sess. (2007); H.R. 2, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). These rules did not make it into the enacted version.
Special statutory rules for determining the profitability of leasing transactions
also did not find their way into the final statutory enactment.
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* Penalties, oh what penalties! -
New §§ 6662(b)(6), in conjunction with new § 6664(c)(2), imposes a strict
liability 20 percent penalty for an underpayment attributable to any
disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking
economic substance, within the meaning of new § 7701(o), "or failing to meet
the requirements of any similar rule of law." (Does that extend to substance
versus form in a SILO? How about business purpose in a purported tax-free
reorganization?) The penalty is increased to 40 percent if the taxpayer does not
adequately disclose the relevant facts on the original return or an amended
return filed before the taxpayer has been contacted for audit - an amended
return filed after the initial contact cannot cure original sin. I.R.C. § 6664(i).
Because the § 6664(c) "reasonable cause" exception is unavailable, outside (or
in-house) analysis and opinions of counsel or other tax advisors will not
insulate a taxpayer from the penalty if a transaction is found to lack economic
substance. Likewise, new § 6664(d)(2) precludes a reasonable cause defense to
imposition of the § 6662A reportable transaction understatement penalty for a
transaction that lacks economic substance. (Section 6662A(e)(2) has been
amended to provide that the § 6662A penalty with respect to a reportable
transaction understatement does not apply to a transaction that lacks economic
substance if a 40 percent penalty is imposed under § 6662(i)). A similar no-fault
penalty regime applies to excessive erroneous refund claims that are denied on
the ground that the transaction on which the refund claim was based lacked
economic substance. § 6676(c). However, under the "every dark cloud has a
silver lining" maxim, the §§ 6662(b)(6) and 6664(c)(2) penalty regime does not
apply to any portion of an underpayment on which the § 6663 fraud penalty is
imposed.
* Effective date - Section 7701(o)
and the revised penalty rules applies to transactions entered into after the date of
enactment and to underpayments, understatements, and refunds and credits
attributable to transactions entered into after 3/30/10.
a. Better than a sharp stick in the eye, but
not much better. The IRS is catching conjunctivitis, weighing in on the
conjunctive test. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (9/13/10). The IRS
indicates that it will rely on relevant case law in applying the two-pronged
conjunctive test for economic substance. Thus, both in determining whether
a transactions meets both of the requirements of the conjunctive test, the IRS
will apply cases under the common law economic substance doctrine to
determine whether tax benefits are allowable because a transaction satisfies
the economic substance prong of the economic substance doctrine and to
determine whether a transaction has a sufficient nontax purpose to satisfy the
requirement that the tax benefits of a transaction are not allowable because
the taxpayer lacks a business purpose. The IRS adds that it will challenge
taxpayers who seek to rely on case law that a transaction will be treated as
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having economic substance merely because it satisfies either of the tests. The
IRS also indicates that it anticipates that the law of economic substance will
continue to evolve and that it "does not intend to issue general administrative
guidance regarding the types of transactions to which the economic
substance doctrine either applies or does not apply."
* The Notice also indicates that, except
for reportable transactions, disclosure for purposes of the additional penalty of
§ 6621(i) will be adequate if the taxpayer adequately discloses on a timely filed
original return, or a qualified amended return the relevant facts affecting the tax
treatment of the transaction. A disclosure that would be deemed adequate under
§ 6662(d)(2)(B) will be treated as adequate for purposes of § 6662(i). The
disclosure should be made on a Form 8275 or 8275-R.
C. Disclosure and Settlement
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2010.
D. Tax Shelter Penalties, Etc.
1. Magistrate Judge Bush decided that valuation
misstatement penalties are inapplicable in a Son of Boss tax shelter case
in which the IRS determined that the transaction were shams that
lacked economic substance. Bemont Investments LLC v. United States, 105
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1338 (E.D. Tex. 3/9/10). Magistrate Judge Bush based his
decision on Weiner v. United States, 389 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 2004), which
cited with approval a line of cases that held that valuation penalties are not
applicable if the IRS's disallowance of tax benefits is not "attributable to" a
valuation misstatement.
2. The IRS states that it will suspend the collection
of penalties under § 6707A from small businesses that "inadvertently"
invested in listed tax shelters. 2009 TNT 128-15 (7/6/09). Letter from
Commissioner Shulman, which reads in part, "Given your indication of a
commitment to enact legislation to address this issue, and to provide the
Congress that opportunity, we will not undertake any collection enforcement
action through September 30, 2009, on cases where the annual tax benefit
from the transaction is less than $100,000 for individuals or $200,000 for
other taxpayers per year."
a. The IRS agreed to extend the moratorium
through the end of 2009. Letter from Commissioner Shulman. 2009 TNT
184-23 (8/24/09).
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b. And again, to extend the moratorium
through 4/1/10. 2009 TNT 245-1 (12/23/09).
c. Yet another extension to 6/1/10. 2010 TNT
42-2 (4/3/10).
d. Relief from tax shelter penalties under
§ 6707A for small businesses. The § 6707A penalty is limited to 75 percent
of the decrease in tax shown for any reportable transaction. Under § 2041 of
the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, the § 6707A penalty is limited to 75
percent of the decrease in tax shown for any listed or reportable transaction.
Formerly, penalty imposed for failure to include information on a listed
transaction by a taxpayer other than a natural person was $200,000
regardless of how small the claimed benefits from the transaction happened
to be. The limitation applies to penalties assessed after 12/31/06.
3. If the tax advisor's fee is big enough, it's not a
reliable opinion! Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235
(8/16/10). The taxpayers conceded that their Son-of-Boss tax shelters lacked
economic substance, and the only issue was whether the 40 percent accuracy
related penalty was properly assessable. The court held that the taxpayers
had not established that acted with reasonable cause or in good faith, and that
the penalty wa0s properly assessed. Reliance on the advice of E&Y was not
reasonable: "Because E&Y had a financial interest in having the Murphys
participate in COBRA, the firm had an inherent conflict of interest in
advising on the legitimacy of that transaction." Furthermore, "[t]hat conflict
of interest was exacerbated by the fee structure," under which E&Y's fee
would be a percentage of the taxpayer's desired tax loss. "The Murphys
knew that E&Y stood to earn millions by advising them to participate in
COBRA, and they therefore knew or should have known that E&Y's advice
lacked the trustworthiness of an impartial opinion." Judge Damich also had a
host of other reasons for finding that the taxpayers' reliance was not
reasonable or in good faith.
IX. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A. Exempt Organizations
1. The IRS gives small exempt organizations until
10/15/10 to comply with filing requirements. IR-2010-87 (7/26/10). The
IRS has granted relief to small exempt organizations that failed to file
required returns for 2007, 2008 and 2009 by extending to 10/15/10 the
deadline for complying with filing requirements in order to keep tax exempt
status. The information release provides for late electronic filing of the Form
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990-N, Electronic Notice (e-Postcard) and for a voluntary compliance
program to file the Form 990-EZ.
2. Tax Blues for Bluetooth. Bluetooth SIG, Inc. v.
United States, 611 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 7/8/10). The taxpayer sought tax
exempt status under § 501(c)(6) as a "business league." The corporation
(1) develops, refines, and adapts the Bluetooth specification, (2) engages in
marketing, public relations, and other promotional activities designed to
influence the acceptance, understanding, and use of Bluetooth enabled
products, (3) enforces its trademark both by ensuring that its members
conform to the "Bluetooth Brand Book" and by detecting unauthorized use
of the Bluetooth trademark, and (4) operates a certification and listing
program. The taxpayer had 4,148 members, all of which independent
businesses. It had three membership classes: Adopters, Associates, and
Promoters. Adopters pay no annual fee, but pay a listing fee of $10,000 per
product. Associates pay an annual fee of either $7,500 or $35,000 depending
on the size of the manufacturer. They pay a reduced listing fee of $5,000 per
product and have the right to participate in the continuing development of the
Bluetooth specification. They receive certain marketing and promotional
opportunities that may not be available to Adopters. Promoters pay no annual
fee but enjoy the same benefits as Associates, plus a seat on the board of
directors. Each of the original five companies involved with the technology
has Promoter status. The court affirmed the district court's summary
judgment that the taxpayer did not qualify for tax exempt status, because it
activities were activities ordinarily conducted for profit, which is not
permitted under Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1. Further, the taxpayer's activities were
not directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines
of business as distinguished from the performance of particular services for
individual persons. A benefit to nonmembers is a key characteristic of
business leagues, but the taxpayer did not benefit nonmembers. Rather, the
taxpayer engaged in particular services for particular member-manufacturers.
3. The exclusivity of a gated parking lot for the
neighborhood beach club has a tax price. Ocean Pines Association v.
Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 13 (8/30/10). The taxpayer was a homeowners
association that was tax-exempt under § 501(c)(4) as a not-for-profit
organized to promote community welfare. In addition to enforcing zoning
and providing roads and recreational facilities within Ocean Pines, funded by
members' dues (but which were open to both members and nonmembers), it
operated a beach club and parking lots eight miles from the area (Ocean
Pines) in which its members lived. The primary beach club facilities (e.g.,
pool, locker room, etc.) and parking lots were accessible only to the
association's members and their guests, but the snack bar, restaurant, and
beach itself were open to the public. The taxpayer charged its members a
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separate fee for parking permits, and maintained a parking permit system and
guards. It also leased the parking lots to third-party businesses at night and in
the off season. The taxpayer did not report any of the income as subject to
the unrelated business income tax (UBIT). The IRS issued a deficiency
notice determining that the net income from the parking lots and beach club
facilities was subject to UBIT, because their operation was not substantially
related to the promotion of community welfare. The Tax Court (Judge
Morrison) upheld the deficiency. The court concluded that the operation of
the beach club and the parking lots did not promote community welfare
because they were not accessible to nonmembers, i.e., the general public.
Therefore, unless an exception applied, the income was subject to UBIT.
Finally, the court held that the § 512(b)(3)(A)(i) exception for rents from real
property did not apply, because Reg. § 1.512(b)-I (c)(5) provides that income
from the operation of a parking lot is not rent from real property.
B. Charitable Giving
1. A "gotcha" for the IRS! The Tax Court just says
"no" to deductions for contributions of conservation easements on
mortgaged properties. Kaufman v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 9
(4/26/10). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that as a matter of law no
charitable contribution deduction is allowable for the conveyance of an
otherwise qualifying conveyance of a facade conservation easement if the
property is subject to a mortgage and the mortgagee has a prior claim to
condemnation and insurance proceeds. Because the mortgage has priority
over the easement, the easement is not protected in perpetuity - which is
required by § 170(h)(5)(A). The deduction cannot be salvaged by proof that
the taxpayer likely would satisfy the debt secured by the mortgage.
2. A personal sperm bank can't qualify as a tax
exempt organization. Was this foundation founder thinking he could get
a tax deduction for producing sperm? Free Fertility Foundation v.
Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 2 (7/7/10). A not-for-profit corporation
established for the sole purpose of providing the founder's sperm free of
charge to women seeking to become pregnant through artificial insemination
or in vitro fertilization was held not to promote health for the benefit of the
community, and thus did not operate for exempt purposes and did not qualify
for an exemption under § 501 (c)(3). The founder and his father were the only
board members and decided in their sole discretion who would receive the
founder's sperm.
3. Both their house and their claimed charitable
contribution deduction went up in smoke. District Court denies
deduction for about-to-be-demolished house to local fire department on
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"qualified appraisal" and "contemporaneous written acknowledgment"
grounds, but ducks the issue of whether taxpayers could claim a
deduction for this type of donation. Hendrix v. United States, 106
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5373 (S.D. Ohio 7/21/10). When the taxpayers found it
would cost $10,000 to demolish their house so they could build a new house
on the land, in 2004 they entered into a transaction under which the local fire
department could use their house for training and return the cleared land to
the taxpayers. They claimed a charitable contribution deduction of $287,400
- based upon an appraisal of $520,000 for the property. The District Court
(Judge Frost) denied the deduction on failure to obtain a "qualified appraisal"
as required by § 170(f)(11)(A) and failure to obtain a "contemporaneous
written acknowledgment" as required by § 170(f)(8). While Judge Frost did
not answer the question of whether "taxpayers may be able to claim a
deduction for the type of donation involved in this case" if a qualified
appraisal and written acknowledgment had been obtained, he did include in
his opinion that Deloitte & Touche had advised the taxpayers that
"[d]onation of property to a fire department is aggressive and not explicitly
sanctioned by the Internal Revenue Code."
a. Now the Tax Court holds that the gambit
does not work at all. Rolfs v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 24 (11/4/10).
The taxpayers donated a home, but not the underlying land, to the local
volunteer fire department to be burned down in a training exercise. The fire
department could not use the house for any purpose other than destruction by
fire in training exercises. The taxpayers claimed a charitable contribution
deduction of $76,000 based on a "before and after" valuation, comparing the
value of the parcel with the building intact and the value of the parcel after
demolition of the building; they complied with all record keeping and
substantiation requirements. The Tax Court (Judge Gale) upheld the IRS's
denial of the deduction. First, based on expert testimony, he found that the
taxpayers received a quid-pro-quo in the amount of $10,000, which was the
value of the demolition services provided to them by the donee fire
department. Second, he found that the building, with ownership severed from
the land and burdened by the condition that it be removed, i.e., in this case
demolished, had no value. The lack of value was established by the expert
testimony of home movers, who testified that considering the costs of
removal to another site, the modest nature of the home, and the value of
nearby land, no one would purchase the home for more than a nominal
amount, between $100 and $1,000, sufficient to render the contract
enforceable. Applying the principles of Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680 (1989), and United States v. American Bar Foundation, 477 U.S.
105 (1986), Judge Gale held that because they consideration received by the
taxpayers exceeded the value of the transferred property, there was no
charitable contribution. He rejected application of the "before and after"
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valuation method, because that method did not take into account the
restrictions that would have affected the marketability of the structure
severed from the land.
4. No Mardi Gras beads from the Tax Court for
this taxpayer. Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 131
T.C. 112 (10/30/08). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that, as a
precondition to using the replacement cost approach to valuing real estate,
the taxpayer must show that the property is unusual in nature and other
methods of valuation, such as comparable sales or income capitalization, are
not applicable. The income approach to valuation is favored only where
comparable market sales are absent. On the facts, the value of the
contribution of a conservation facade easement for an historic structure on
the edge of the French Quarter in New Orleans was overstated. The
accuracy-related penalty for gross overvaluation was proper because there
was no good faith investigation into the value.
a. Regardless of which valuation method is
used, it still must relate to the property's "highest and best use."
Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 615 F.3d 321 (5th
Cir. 8/10/10). In an opinion by Judge Barksdale, the Fifth Circuit vacated the
Tax Court's decision and remanded the case for a determination of the
easement's value, although it rejected the taxpayer's arguments that the
IRS's expert was unqualified and that his report was unreliable and should
not have been admitted. But the Court of Appeals agreed with the taxpayers'
argument that the Tax Court "miscomprehended the highest and best use" of
the building subjected to the conservation easement, and thereby
undervalued the easement.
In sum, the tax court erred in declining to consider the
Maison Blanche and Kress buildings' highest and best use in
the light of both the reasonable and probable condominium
regime and the reasonable and probable combination of
those buildings into a single functional unit, both of which
foreclosed the realistic possibility, for valuation purposes,
that the Kress and Maison Blanche buildings could come
under separate ownership. This combination affected the
buildings' fair market value.
* As result the court did not reach the
Tax Court's holding that the income and replacement-cost methods of valuation
were inapplicable and directed the tax court to consider those methods, in
addition to comparable sales method on remand. Because the holding on the
valuation was vacated, the Tax Court's holding that the gross overvaluation
penalty also was vacated.
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5. "Praise the Lord, [but] pass the ammunition."
Or, is it that the judge was hypertechnical? Lord v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2010-196 (9/8/10). A charitable contribution deduction for a
conservation easement was denied because the appraisal in the amount of
$242,000 submitted to comply with Reg. 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i)(A) was not a
"qualified appraisal." The Tax Court (Judge Foley) held that this was
because the appraisal itself did not include: (1) the easement contribution
date; (2) the date the appraisal was performed; or (3) the appraised fair
market value of the easement contribution on the contribution date. Judge
Foley further held that the doctrine of substantial compliance was not
applicable because significant information was omitted from the appraisal.
* The background facts were that
taxpayer granted a deed of conservation easement to the Land Preservation
Trust on 12/30/99; that the Paige Appraisal Company produced an appraisal
report [stating the fair market value of the easement] with an effective date of
12/31/99; and that the report date was 1/4/00.
a. Retrospective "as of" appraisals don't cut
the mustard. Evans v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-207 (9/22/10).
Judge Wherry disallowed the taxpayers' deduction for the contribution of a
conservation facade easement due to inadequate substantiation. The appraisal
introduced at trial was not a qualified appraisal because it was prepared
almost four years after the date of the donation, and the appraiser testified
that she was unfamiliar with the standards for a qualified appraisal. Qualified
appraisals by qualified appraisers, upon which taxpayer relied in preparing
the return were not introduced into evidence because the appraisers did not
testify at trial. However, an asserted § 6662 accuracy related penalty was not
sustained because in preparing the return the taxpayer reasonably relied on
qualified appraisals by the qualified appraisers.
X. TAX PROCEDURE
A. Interest, Penalties and Prosecutions
1. No free trade agreement for SSNs. T.D. 9437,
Amendments to the Section 7216 Regulations - Disclosure or Use of
Information by Preparers of Returns, 73 F.R. 76216 (12/16/08). This
Treasury Decision amends Reg. § 301.7216-3(b)(4) to permit disclosure by a
tax return preparer of a taxpayer's SSN to another tax return preparer located
outside the United States only with the taxpayer's consent. The amended
regulation applies to disclosures of tax return information occurring on or
after 1/1/09.
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a. But there is some freedom for preparers
to use taxpayer return information to increase their own profitability.
T.D. 9478, Amendments to the Section 7216 Regulations - Disclosure or
Use of Information by Preparers of Returns, 75 F.R. 48 (12/29/09). Temp.
Reg., § 301.7216-2T(n) allows preparers to compile, maintain, and use a list
containing solely the names, addresses, e-mail addresses, phone numbers,
taxpayer entity classification, and income tax return form numbers of
taxpayers whose tax returns the tax return preparer has prepared, if the list is
used only to contact the taxpayers on the list either (1) to provide tax, general
business, or economic information for educational purposes, or (2) for
soliciting additional tax return preparation services. Temp. Reg. § 301.7216-
2T(p) allows return preparers to disclose return information without penalty
for the purpose of a quality or peer review, but only to the extent necessary
to accomplish the review. The information also may be used to perform a
conflict of interest check. Identical proposed regulations were published
simultaneously. REG-131028-09, Amendments to the Section 7216
Regulations - Disclosure or Use of Information by Preparers of Returns, 75
F.R. 94 (12/29/09).
(1) Rev. Rul. 2010-5, 2010-4 I.R.B. 312
(12/30/09). This revenue ruling provides further guidance and allows
disclosure of return information to a return preparer's malpractice carrier to
the extent necessary to obtain insurance or to defend against claims; to
defend claims, the tax return itself may be disclosed and it may be disclosed
to attorneys engaged to defend against the claim.
(2) Rev. Rul. 20104, 2010-4 I.R.B. 309
(12/30/09). This revenue ruling provides further guidance and details
circumstances that justify use of lists to contact clients and allowing
disclosure of information to a third-party provider who prepares the mailings.
2. The instructions for the new FBAR are FUBAR.
IR-2009-58 and Announcement 2009-51, 2009-25 I.R.B. 1105 (6/5/09). The
IRS announced that for the Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts
(FBARs) due on 6/30/09, filers of Form TD F 90-22.1 (Rev. 10-2008) need
not comply with the new instruction relating to the definition of a United
States Person, i.e.:
United States Person. The term "United States person"
means a citizen or resident of the United States, or a person
in and doing business in the United States. See 31 C.F.R.
103.11(z) for a complete definition of 'person.' The United
States includes the states, territories and possessions of the
United States. See the definition of United States at 31
C.F.R. 103.11(nn) for a complete definition of United States.
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A foreign subsidiary of a United States person is not
required to file this report, although its United States parent
corporation may be required to do so. A branch of a foreign
entity that is doing business in the United States is required
to file this report even if not separately incorporated under
U.S. law.
* Instead, for this year, taxpayers and
others can rely on the definition of a United States person included in the
instruction to the prior form (7-2000):
United States Person. The term "United States person"
means: (1) a citizen or resident of the United States; (2) a
domestic partnership; (3) a domestic corporation; or (4) a
domestic estate or trust.
a. Notice 2009-62, 2009-35 I.R.B. 260
(8/7/09). By this notice, the IRS extended the filing deadline until 6/30/10 to
report foreign financial accounts on Form TD F 90-22.1 for persons with
signature authority over (but no financial interest in) a foreign financial
account and persons with signature authority over, or financial interests in, a
foreign commingled fund.
b. Still clear as mud: New definitions and
instructions. RIN 1506-ABO8, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network;
Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations - Reports of Foreign
Financial Accounts, 75 F.R. 8844 (2/26/10). This proposed rule would
include a definition of "United States person" and definitions of "bank
account," "securities account," and "other financial account," as well as of
"foreign country." It also includes draft instructions to Form TD F 90-22.1
(FBAR).
(1) Notice 2010-23, 2010-11 I.R.B. 441
(2/26/10). Provided administrative relief to certain person who may be
required to file and FBAR for the 2009 and earlier calendar years by
extending the filing deadline until 6/30/11 for persons with signature
authority, but no financial interest in, a foreign financial account for which
an FBAR would have otherwise been due on 6/30/10. It also provides relief
with respect to mutual funds.
(2) Announcement 2010-16, 2010-11
I.R.B. 450 (2/26/10). The IRS suspended, for person who are not U.S.
citizens, U.S. residents, or domestic entities, the requirement to file an FBAR
for the 2009 and earlier calendar years.
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3. Meeting five out of six criteria for being a
"responsible person" buys a 100% penalty. Erwin v. United States, 591
F3d 313 (4th Cir. 1/13/10). The Fourth Circuit, in a majority opinion by
Judge Motz, upheld the District Court's finding on summary judgment that
the taxpayer was liable for the § 6672 failure to withhold and pay-over
penalty. To determine whether a particular individual is a "responsible
person" liable for the § 6672 failure to withhold and pay-over penalty, the
Fourth Circuit will examine whether he: (1) served as an officer or director
of the company; (2) controlled the company's payroll; (3) determined which
creditors to pay and when to pay them; (4) participated in the corporation's
day-to-day management; (5) had the ability to hire and fire employees; and
(6) possessed the power to write checks. Undisputed facts established that
the taxpayer met the first five criteria, even though he delegated some
responsibilities to others. Considering "the totality of the circumstances," he
was a responsible person even though he did not have check-writing
authority.
Judge Hamilton dissented,
concluding that a "reasonable fact-finder, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Erwin and drawing all reasonable inferences from such evidence in
his favor, could find that he was not a responsible person ... ", even though he
did not believe that as a matter of law Erwin could not be a responsible person.
Judge Hamilton thought that only the first factor cut in favor of the government,
and he would have vacated and remanded for a trial, because it was a "close
case."
4. The District Court needs to justify home
imprisonment in lieu of time in the big house for criminal tax evasion.
United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 1/13/10). The defendant pled
guilty to tax evasion for 2004. Although he was charged with tax evasion
only for 2004, the information alleged that he had evaded taxes for 16 years
between 1984 and 2002 and owed taxes on more than $600,000 - when
interest and penalties were tacked on the amount exceeded $2 million. The
District Court sentenced Engle to four years probation, conditioned on 18
months of home detention, with work release and international travel
privileges. The district judge reasoned that it was more important that the
back taxes be paid than that Engle be imprisoned and that if Engel were
imprisoned he would be deprived of his livelihood and hence be unable to
pay the taxes that he had evaded. The Fourth Circuit (Judge Traxler) vacated
the sentence because the district court did not adequately explain its decision
to vary significantly from the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines' recommendations in imposing the lenient sentence that did not
include prison time. Judge Traxler noted, after requiring that further
proceedings be in front of a different judge:
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The district judge in this case [Judge Mullin] also
presided over the tax evasion trials and sentencings in
[other] cases that, though not formally consolidated with this
case, were argued before this court seriatim with this appeal.
In the sentencing hearing for [another criminal defendant],
the district judge, who has taken senior status, stated that he
no longer intended to handle criminal matters.
5. Yip[e]! United States v. Yip, 592 F.3d 1035 (9th
Cir. 1/13/10). The Ninth Circuit held that under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,
"[o]bstruction during an IRS audit justifies enhancing a defendant's sentence
for obstruction 'during the course of the investigation."'
6. The defendant was a little bit too "Cheeky"3 for
his own good; instead, he should have turned the other cheek(s). United
States v. Phipps, 595 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 1/25/10). The defendant's conviction
for tax evasion was upheld. His claim of good faith belief that he was not
required to pay taxes on proceeds from a pyramid marketed tax evasion
scheme was belied by his receipt of prior notice from the IRS regarding his
tax liability coupled with his advice to participants in the scheme to plan a
"reliance defense" based "on the advice of income tax professionals and
other credible sources that could be used to convince a jury that the
participant sincerely believed he or she was not liable for federal or state
income tax." Because he was advising others to employ calculated tactics to
avoid paying income taxes ... a rational jury reasonably could have found
that [he] ... willfully evaded paying income tax."
7. "Abatement" is all or nothing. "Reduction" is not
a lesser included option. It couldn't have happened to a nicer union.
Service Employees International Union v. United States, 598 F.3d 1110 (9th
Cir. 3/17/10). SEIU filed its information return late and the IRS assessed a
$50,000 penalty under § 6652(c)(1)(A). On appeal from an adverse CDP
determination, the district court (which at the time had jurisdiction)
concluded that there was no "reasonable cause" for the late filing, but
nevertheless held that in its discretion the IRS should have reduced the
penalty and entered judgment in favor of the IRS for only 25% of the
$50,000 penalty. The Court of Appeals reversed. The penalty under
§ 6652(c)(1)(A) is "'either fully enforceable or fully unenforceable,"' citing
In re Sanford, 979 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1992). Section 6652(c)(4),
providing for abatement of the penalty if there was "reasonable cause" for
the late filing, is mandatory, not discretionary. "If a nonprofit fails to file the
3. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), held that Court held that a
good-faith belief as to the law need not be objectively reasonable to be a defense to
criminal tax fraud.
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informational return on time for reasonable cause, the IRS has no discretion
whether to impose or reduce the penalty; it is flatly prohibited from imposing
any penalty at all." Neither the IRS nor any reviewing court has discretion to
reduce, rather than to abate for "reasonable cause," a § 6652(c)(1)(A) penalty
for late filing of an informational return.
8. The "TurboTax got it wrong for me just like
Wikipedia says it did for Timothy Geithner" defense doesn't cut the
mustard. Lam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-82 (4/19/10). Based on a
stipulation, the Tax Court (Judge Wherry) upheld a deficiency determined by
the IRS based on the application of § 280A to disallow claimed rental real
estate losses and recharacterization of claimed ordinary losses as capital
losses. The court also upheld accuracy related penalties, finding that there
was no substantial authority for the taxpayer's positions and that the
reasonable cause exception did not apply. The taxpayers argued that they
consistently filled out their tax returns using TurboTax and that they
confused capital gains and losses with ordinary income and expenses. Even
though Judge Wherry believed that the errors were made in good faith, he
held that they did not behave in a manner consistent with that of a prudent
person. They did not consult a tax professional or visit the IRS's web site for
instructions on filing the Schedule C. He did not accept their misuse of
TurboTax, even if unintentional or accidental, as a defense to the penalties,
because they did not attempt to show a reasonable cause for their
underpayment of taxes. Rather, they analogized their situation to that of the
Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner.
Citing a Wikipedia article, Ms. Lam essentially argues that,
like Secretary Geithner, she used TurboTax, resulting in
mistakes on her taxes. In short, it was not a flaw in the
TurboTax software which caused petitioners' tax
deficiencies. "Tax preparation software is only as good as
the information one inputs into it." [citation omitted].
Because petitioners have not "shown that any of the
conceded issues were anything but the result of [their] own
negligence or disregard of regulations," they are liable for
the section 6662(a) penalties.
a. Another case on TurboTax. The case does
not reflect whether the IRS was ashamed, but it was undeterred in
seeking penalties for conduct unpenalized with respect to the Secretary
of Treasury. Parker v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-78 (6/21/10).
The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) held that the taxpayer's compensation from
the International Monetary Fund was subject to self-employment taxes.
Accuracy-related penalties were imposed despite taxpayer's argument that he
relied on his tax return preparation software.
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b. Ouch! The Tax Court again rejected
taxpayers' use of the "Geithner defense" and held that blaming H&R
Block tax preparation software for errors on their return did not excuse
them from penalties. Au v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-247
(11/10/10). In this pro se case, the court (Judge Cohen) upheld the imposition
of the accuracy related penalty on taxpayers who deducted gambling losses
in the absence of any gambling winnings, stating:
Petitioners contend that they followed the
instructions on the [H&R Block Tax Cut] tax preparation
software that they used in preparing their 2006 tax return,
asserting that the software was "approved by the IRS." They
indicate that they were unaware of the provisions of the
Code and that they did not consult any Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) publications or professional tax advisers
before claiming deductions equaling almost half of their
reported income in 2006. The software instructions are not
in the record, so we cannot determine how the error
occurred. We doubt that the instructions, if correctly
followed, permitted a result contrary to the express language
of the Code. Petitioners may have acted in good faith but
made a mistake. In the absence of evidence of a mistake in
the instructions or a more thorough effort by petitioners to
determine their correct tax liability, we cannot conclude that
they have shown reasonable cause for the underpayment of
tax on their 2006 return.
9. T.D. 9488, Interest and Penalty Suspension
Provisions Under Section 6404(g) of the Internal Revenue Code, 75 F.R.
33992 (6/16/10). Final Reg. § 1.6404-4(b)(5), replacing Temp. Reg.
§ 1.6404-4T(b)(5), provides guidance regarding the exception for any listed
transaction as defined in § 6707A(c) or any undisclosed reportable
transaction from the general rule of suspension of any interest under
§ 6404(g)(1) if the IRS does not contact the taxpayer regarding adjustments
within the requisite period of time, generally 36 months after the later of the
due date or the return filing date.
10. He might have played a DC cop in "Murder at
1600," but now he'll be a convict for real at an FCI thanks to 1111
Constitution Ave. United States v. Snipes, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5256 (11th
Cir. 7/16/10). Snipes earned more than $27 million dollars in gross income
from 1999 to 2004, but he did not file individual federal income tax returns
for any of those years. Snipes was involved with co-defendant Eddie Ray
Kahn's organization, American Rights Litigators (ARL), which purported to
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assist customers in resisting the IRS. ARL employees, including co-
defendant Douglas Rosile, and ARL members, including Snipes, sent
voluminous letters to the IRS, challenging the IRS's authority to collect
taxes. The centerpiece of this resistance was the "861 argument" that the
domestic earnings of individual Americans are not income subject to tax.
Snipes personal arguments to the IRS over the curse of several years were
described by the court, in part, as follows:
Snipes's correspondence with the IRS advanced
several arguments justifying his failure to file his personal
tax returns, including that he was a "non-resident alien to the
United States," that earned income must come from "sources
wholly outside the United States," that "a taxpayer is defined
by law as one who operates a distilled spirit Plant," and that
the Internal Revenue Code's taxing authority "is limited to
the District of Columbia and insular possessions of the
United States, exclusive of the 50 States of the Union."
Snipes also claimed that as a "fiduciary of God, who is a
'nontaxpayer,"' he was a "foreign diplomat" who was not
obliged to pay taxes. When Snipes consulted his long-time
tax attorneys about his resistance to paying federal income
taxes, they advised him that his position was contrary to the
law and that he was required to file tax returns. The firm
terminated Snipes as a client when Snipes refused to file his
tax returns.
* Snipes also integrated the ALR tax
"teachings" into the accounting methodology of his film production companies.
After June 2000, his companies stopped deducting payroll and income taxes
from employees' salary checks. Snipes began to proselytize this theory of tax
resistance. Not surprisingly, The Eleventh Circuit upheld Wesley Snipes's
conviction of willful failure to file tax returns and the imposition of a 36-month
prison sentence.
11. Cheatin' tax advisor blinded by his own
brilliance. United States v. Jewell, 614 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 7/30/10). The
defendant was a tax attorney who concocted a scheme to assist his clients in
underreporting several million dollars of income and was convicted of aiding
and abetting tax evasion. Among the many issues he raised on appeal was
that his clients ultimately had settled the tax deficiency with the IRS. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The court held that the fact that
the taxpayer whose taxes were evaded eventually paid those taxes is not a
defense to aiding and abetting tax evasion if the advisor had the intent to
assist the taxpayer with evading taxes in the taxable year in question and at
the time taxes were due for the year in question there was a deficiency.
2011] 711
Florida Tax Review
12. "Sorry, I spent it all" not only doesn't vitiate
willfully not paying, but helps to prove willfulness. United States v.
Blanchard, 618 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 8/30/10). The defendant was convicted
under § 7202 of failure to pay over to the IRS employee's withheld taxes.
The Sixth Circuit held that inability to pay over to trust fund is pertinent to
whether the defendant willfully failed to pay, but ability to pay over the taxes
is not an element of the offense that the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt. Evidence of the taxpayer's discretionary expenditures,
including gambling losses, vacation trips, jewelry purchases, and leases of
multiple Cadillacs, in lieu of the defendant meting his tax obligations was
"probative" of his guilt.
13. Let the sunshine in. Rev. Proc. 2011-13, 2011-3
IRB 318 (12/29/10). This revenue identifies circumstances under which the
disclosure on a taxpayer's income tax return with respect to an item or a
position is adequate for the purpose of reducing the understatement of
income tax under § 6662(d), relating to the substantial understatement
accuracy-related penalty, and for the purpose of avoiding the tax return
preparer penalty under § 6694(a) (relating to understatements due to
unreasonable positions) with respect to income tax returns for any income
tax return filed on a 2010 tax form for a taxable year beginning in 2010, and
to any income tax return filed on a 2010 tax form in 2011 for a short taxable
year beginning in 2011. It does not apply with respect to any other penalty
provisions (including the disregard provisions of the § 6662(b)(1) accuracy-
related penalty, the § 6662(i) increased accuracy-related penalty for
undisclosed noneconomic substance transactions, and the § 6662(j) increased
accuracy-related penalty in the case of undisclosed foreign financial asset
understatements.
14. Literal compliance with the tax laws in a
transaction that lacks economic substance results in a valid indictment
of a tax advisor. United States v. Daugerdas, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-7432
(12/23/10 S.D.N.Y.). The district court (Judge Pauley) denied the defendants
motion to dismiss over twenty counts of an indictment for aiding and
abetting tax evasion in connection with the design, marketing, and
implementation of four tax shelters: the Short Sale, Short Options Strategy
("SOS"), Swaps, and HOMER tax shelters. All of the shelters were based on
the Tax Court's decision in Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 75-160.
The defendant's argued that the indictment failed to allege willfulness for
three reasons: "(1) a transaction's economic effect is measured by whether it
subjects the taxpayer to market risk, not whether it provides a realistic
possibility of profit; (2) even if the possibility-of-profit test is proper, there
was no known legal duty to account for fees when measuring a transaction's
profit potential; and (3) Helmer-based tax strategies were not outlawed by
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the IRS until after Defendants executed the transactions at issue." The court
rejected all three arguments. As the first argument, the court concluded,
"Defendants mistakenly assert that the economic effect component of the
economic substance doctrine asks only whether a transaction subjects the
taxpayer to market risk. 'The nature of the economic substance analysis is
flexible."' As to the second argument the court concluded, "Because the
Indictment alleges that the all-in fee was integral to the tax shelters, such a
formulation is particularly appropriate. Indeed, ignoring fees associated with
a tax shelter conflicts with rational decision making-absent tax benefits, no
rational investor would entertain an investment where the total costs
exceeded any potential return. Finally, as to the third argument, the court
concluded, "While the Indictment describes transactions apparently modeled
on Helmer, its center of gravity focuses on the shelters as a whole and the
fact that in the aggregate they were shams. Thus, Defendants' technical
adherence to the contingent liability rule articulated in Helmer is irrelevant.
The economic substance doctrine is designed to ferret out improper conduct
'despite literal compliance' with tax laws.
B. Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
1. Reversed by a divided First Circuit in an en banc
rehearing. The First follows the Fifth to El Paso. United States v. Textron
Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 8/13/09) (3-2), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320
(5/24/10). The majority (Judge Boudin) held that the work product privilege
protects only work done for litigation purposes (the "prepared for" test or the
"primary purpose" test), and abandoned the prior First Circuit "because of'
test, encompassing work done in preparing financial statements that also is
prepared in contemplation of litigation. The majority followed United States
v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982). Judge Boudin concluded:
Textron apparently thinks it is "unfair" for the
government to have access to its spreadsheets, but tax
collection is not a game. Underpaying taxes threatens the
essential public interest in revenue collection. If a blueprint
to Textron's possible improper deductions can be found in
Textron's files, it is properly available to the government
unless privileged. Virtually all discovery against a party
aims at securing information that may assist an opponent in
uncovering the truth. Unprivileged IRS information is
equally subject to discovery.
The practical problems confronting the IRS in
discovering under-reporting of corporate taxes, which is
likely endemic, are serious. Textron's return is massive -
constituting more than 4,000 pages - and the IRS requested
the work papers only after finding a specific type of
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transaction that had been shown to be abused by taxpayers.
It is because the collection of revenues is essential to
government that administrative discovery, along with many
other comparatively unusual tools, are furnished to the IRS.
As Bentham explained, all privileges limit access to
the truth in aid of other objectives, 8 Wigmore, Evidence §
2291 (McNaughton Rev. 1961), but virtually all privileges
are restricted - either (as here) by definition or (in many
cases) through explicit exceptions - by countervailing
limitations. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is qualified, among other doctrines, by the
required records exception, and the attorney client privilege,
along with other limitations, by the crime-fraud exception.
To sum up, the work product privilege is aimed at
protecting work done for litigation, not in preparing financial
statements. Textron's work papers were prepared to support
financial filings and gain auditor approval; the compulsion
of the securities laws and auditing requirements assure that
they will be carefully prepared, in their present form, even
though not protected; and IRS access serves the legitimate,
and important, function of detecting and disallowing abusive
tax shelters. [footnote and internal citations omitted]
a. Even after Textron, the government is still
not home free when it wants to run barefoot through tax audit
workpapers and tax opinions, and to run roughshod over work product
protections. The D.C. Circuit accepted that dual-purpose documents
could be covered by the work product doctrine, and it refused to find
that disclosure to the auditing CPA firm constituted waiver of work
product protection. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir.
6/29/10). The government sought discovery of three documents in the
possession of Deloitte, Dow Chemical's independent auditor, that the
taxpayer, claimed were attorney work product. One document was a draft
memorandum prepared by Deloitte that summarized a meeting between Dow
employees, Dow's outside counsel, and Deloitte employees about the
possibility of litigation over a partnership in which Dow was a member and
the necessity of accounting for such a possibility in an ongoing audit. The
district court had concluded that, although the document was created by
Deloitte, it was nonetheless Dow's work product because "its contents record
the thoughts of Dow's counsel regarding the prospect of litigation." The
second document was a memorandum and flow chart prepared by two Dow
employees, an accountant and an in-house attorney. The third was a tax
opinion prepared by Dow's outside counsel. The district court held that all
three documents were protected under the work-product doctrine. On appeal,
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the government contends that the Deloitte memorandum was not work
product because it was prepared by Deloitte during the audit process. It
conceded that the other two documents were work product, but argued that
Dow waived work-product protection when it disclosed them to Deloitte.
* The Court of Appeals (Judge
Sentelle) vacated the district court's decision that the memorandum prepared by
Deloitte was work product and remand for in camera review to determine
whether it is entirely work product. It affirmed the district court's holding that
Dow did not waive work-product protection when it disclosed the other two
documents to Deloitte. In analyzing whether the Deloitte memorandum could
be work product, the Court of Appeals applied the "'because of test, asking
'whether, in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the
particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or
obtained because of the prospect of litigation."' It rejected the government's
argument that the memorandum was not protected work product under United
States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.22 530 (1982), reasoning that El Paso was decided
under the "primary motivating purpose test," which is a different test than the
"because of' test, as well as the government's argument that United States v.
Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009), supported its position, reasoning that
the holding in Textron was fact specific. In rejecting the government's
argument that the Deloitte memorandum could not be work product because it
was prepared in the course of a financial audit, the Court of Appeals held that a
document can contain protected work-product material even though it serves
multiple purposes, so long as the protected material was prepared because of
the prospect of litigation.
* However, having determined that the
Deloitte memorandum could be work product, when it turned to whether it was
work product, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court lacked a
sufficient evidentiary foundation for its holding that the memorandum was
purely work product and remanded for further consideration. Turning to waiver
issue with respect to the other two documents, the Court of Appeals held that
there was no waiver. Deloitte was neither a potential adversary in the matter
with respect to which the documents had been prepared nor a conduit to other
adversaries - the only relevant adversary was the IRS. "Dow had a reasonable
expectation of confidentiality because Deloitte, as an independent auditor, has
an obligation to refrain from disclosing confidential client information."
* We note that one left coast tax
professor vented on this case so vehemently that a casual observer might fear
that he would burst a ventricle. 2010 TNT 125-1.
C. Litigation Costs
1. The IRS position can't be "unreasonable" when a
"novel" issue of law is involved. Bale Chevrolet Co. v. United States, 620
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F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 9/2/10). The Eighth Circuit held that even though the IRS
eventually settled the taxpayer's case and rescinded a $100,000 penalty
under § 6721(e) for failure to comply with § 60501, the government's
administrative and litigating positions were substantially justified because
the "case involve[d] a novel issue apparently not yet addressed by any court
of appeals." The issue whether a company that fails to adopt an adequate
reporting system after acknowledging that its current system is deficient is
subject to intentional disregard penalties pursuant to § 6721(e).
2. A lawyer doesn't pay himself attorneys fees that
can be recovered. United States v. Hudson, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 7017 (2d Cir.
11/10/10). The Second Circuit affirmed a district court decision holding that
a prevailing taxpayer who appears pro se cannot recover under § 7430 an
amount representing the value of his own time expended in presenting his
case, but can recover out-of-pocket litigation costs, including court filing
fees, postage and delivery charges, transportation (mileage), and parking.
D. Statutory Notice of Deficiency
1. If you pay without a statutory notice, you can't
get a refund. Bush v. United States, 599 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 3/31/10).
During the pendency of a partnership level proceeding, the taxpayers entered
into closing agreements with the IRS with respect to their § 465 at-risk
amounts in the partnership. The closing agreements did not waive the right to
a deficiency notice. Subsequently, the IRS issued Notices of Adjustment,
without issuing any deficiency notices, based on the application of the agreed
upon at-risk amount in the closing agreements. The taxpayers paid the
assessed taxes and sought a refund. A deficiency notice is not required if a
tax liability issue has been resolved in a partnership-level proceeding. In that
case any additional tax due is assessed as a computational adjustment,§ 6230(a)(1), which § 6231(a)(6) defines for this purpose as the "change in
the tax liability of a partner which properly reflects the treatment under this
subchapter of a partnership item." But a deficiency notice is required if the
additional tax asserted by the IRS to be due does not involve such a
"computational adjustment." Thus, a deficiency notice is required if the
deficiency is attributable to "affected items which require partner level
determinations." I.R.C. § 6230(a)(2)(A)(i). The court (Judge Dyk), held for
the government, concluding that on the facts of the case, the IRS's failure to
issue a deficiency notice was harmless error. After first concluding that
§ 6213(a) "does not broadly provide for a refund of amounts paid by the
taxpayer after assessment or provide for a refund where the taxpayer
voluntarily pays the assessment before collection proceedings are initiated,"
the court continued as follows:
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The IRS did not issue a demand for payment (which is a
predicate to collection, see I.R.C. § 6303) or initiate
collection proceedings. The taxpayers do not ... seek
repayment of funds improperly collected. Rather, the
taxpayers paid the assessments and then sued for a refund,
alleging that they are entitled to a refund simply because the
IRS failed to issue the requisite notice, without regard to
whether the tax was in fact owed, and without any showing
that the taxpayers were prejudiced by litigating the tax issue
in the refund proceedings rather than in the Tax Court.
Nothing in the language of the statute confers such a refund
right on the taxpayer, and the failure in the statute to provide
for a refund under such circumstances strongly suggests that
no such automatic refund was intended.
* Finally, the court explained that
despite the taxpayers not having received a deficiency notice, had they not
voluntarily paid the tax, they could have had their day in Tax Court simply by
not paying and seeking collection due process relief under § 6330 when the IRS
subsequently took actions to collect the assessed taxes.
a. Decision withdrawn and en banc hearing
granted. (Fed. Cir. 10/29/10).
2. The Tax Court loves its jurisdiction. Winter v.
Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 12 (8/25/10). The taxpayer reported passed-
through losses from an S corporation in which he was a shareholder in excess
of the amount reported on his Schedule K-1. Rather that treat the adjustment
resulting from the inconsistency as correction of a mathematical error, as
provided by § 6037, subject to summary assessment under § 6213(b), the
IRS issued a deficiency notice with respect to both the adjustment resulting
from disallowing the excess loss and the inclusion of unreported interest,
dividends, and gambling income. The IRS issued a summary assessment
based on the mathematical error only after the taxpayer had filed the Tax
Court petition. The principal issue was whether the Tax Court had
jurisdiction over the adjustment to the taxpayer's distributive share of S
corporation income or whether the IRS was required to assess the tax related
to the adjustment as a math error under § 6213(b), precluding the inclusion in
the notice of deficiency of the increase in tax relating to that adjustment.
Both the taxpayer and IRS argued that the court had jurisdiction, but the
court nevertheless addressed the question, and in a reviewed opinion (10-1-1)
by Judge Goeke, the Tax Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the
taxpayer's claim that his income from the S Corporation was less than the
amount reported on the Schedule K- 1 he received from it. The decision was
based on two alternative grounds; first, the taxpayer assigned error to the
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entire deficiency and the alleged unreported income was one of the IRS's
adjustments contributing to that deficiency; second, pursuant to the Tax
Court's overpayment jurisdiction (which the taxpayer had invoked), the Tax
Court has "authority to decide all the issues necessary to determine the
correct amount of income tax for the taxable year in issue," which even
includes amounts that cannot be assessed because the statute of limitations
on assessment and collection has expired.
Judge Holmes, in a long4 and lonely
dissent, argued that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review the deficiency
attributable to the inconsistency between the taxpayer's return and the S
corporation's Schedule K-I with respect to the taxpayer. He reasoned that even
though the IRS did issue a deficiency notice, it had no power to do so because
§ 6037 required that the IRS treat the inconsistency solely as a mathematical
error. That treatment would leave the taxpayer in the position of being required
to pay the assessed amount and seek a refund.
3. If you really owe the tax and have already paid it
you can't it get it back on an IRS procedural foot-fault. Principal Life
Insurance Company v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-7034 (Fed. Cl.
11/12/10). An assessment is necessary only for the IRS to collect taxes that
have not been paid. A tax liability paid before the deadline for payment will
not be subject to refund merely because the IRS fails to timely assess the tax
or assesses it beyond the statute of limitations.
E. Statute of Limitations
1. The courts hold that overstating basis is not the
same as understating gross income, but the Treasury Department
ultimately plays its trump card by promulgating regulations. Section
6501(e)(1) extends the normal three-year period of limitations to six years if
the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount in excess of 25 percent of
the gross income stated in the return. Section 6229(c)(2) provides a similar
extension of the statute of limitations under § 6229(a) for assessments arising
out of TEFRA partnership proceedings. A critical question is whether the six
year statute of limitations applies if the taxpayer overstates basis and as a
consequence understates gross income.
a. The Tax Court says overstating basis is
not the same as understating gross income. Bakersfield Energy Partners,
LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207 (6/14/07). The taxpayer overstated basis,
resulting in an understatement of § 1231 gain. Looking to Supreme Court
4. The dissent was 43 typewritten pages, while the majority opinion was
only 14 pages long.
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precedent under the statutory predecessor of § 6501(e) in the 1939 Code
(Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958)), from which the six-year
statute of limitations in § 6229(c)(2) is derived and to which it is analogous,
the Tax Court concluded that this understated gain was not an omission of
"gross income" that would invoke the six year statute of limitations under
§ 6229(c)(2) applicable to partnership audits.
b. The Ninth Circuit likes the way the Tax
Court thinks: Bakersfield Energy Partners is affirmed. Bakersfield Energy
Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 6/17/09). The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court on the grounds that the language at issue in
the instant case was the same as the statutory language interpreted in Colony.
The court noted, however, that "The IRS's interpretation of § 6501(e)(1)(A)
is reasonable."
c. And a judge of the Court of Federal
Claims agrees. Grapevine Imports, Ltd v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505
(7/17/07). In a TEFRA partnership tax shelter case, the Court of Federal
Claims (Judge Allegra) held that the § 6501(e) 6-year statute of limitations
does not apply to basis overstatements, citing Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner,
357 U.S. 28 (1958). Section 6501(e), rather than § 6229(c)(2) as in
Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP, applied because in earlier proceedings in
the instant case (71 Fed. Cl. 324 (2006)), the court had held that § 6229 did
not create an independent statute of limitations, but instead only provides a
minimum period for assessment for partnership items that could extend the
§ 6501 statute of limitations, and because the FPAA was sent within this six-
year statute of limitations under § 6229(d) the statute of limitations with
respect to the partners was suspended.
d. But a District Court in Florida disagrees.
Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5347 (M.D.
Fla. 7/30/07). The court refused to follow Bakersfield Energy Partners and
Grapevine Imports and held that the § 6501(e) 6-year statute of limitations
does apply to basis overstatements. The court reasoned that as a result of
subsequent amendments to the relevant Code sections, the application of
Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958) is limited to situations
described in § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i), which applies to trade or business sales of
goods or services. ["In the case of a trade or business, the term "gross
income" means the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of
goods or services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return)
prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or services."] The court
reasoned that to conclude otherwise would render § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)
superfluous. Because the transaction at issue was the partnership's sale of
stock, which was not a business sale of goods or services, the gross receipts
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test did not apply. On the facts, the partners and partnership returns (and
statements attached thereto), taken together "failed to adequately apprise the
IRS of the true amount of gain on the sale of the ... stock." Thus, the
partnership did not show that the extended limitations period was
inapplicable.
e. And a different judge of the Court of
Federal Claims agrees with the District Court in Florida and disagrees
with the prior Court of Federal Claims opinion by a different judge in
Grapevine Imports. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189
(11/9/07). The court (Judge Miller) refused to follow Bakersfield Energy
Partners and Grapevine Imports and held that the § 6501(e) 6-year statute of
limitations does apply to basis overstatements. Judge Miller reasoned that an
understatement of "gain" is an omission of gross income, and that omission
can result from a basis overstatement as well as from an understatement of
the amount realized. Like the Brandon Ridge Partners court, Judge Miller
concluded that the application of Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28
(1958), is limited to situations described in § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i), which applies
to trade or business sales of goods or services. ("In the case of a trade or
business, the term 'gross income' means the total of the amounts received or
accrued from the sale of goods or services (if such amounts are required to
be shown on the return) prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or
services.") Because the transaction at issue was the partnership's sale of a
ranch, which was not a business sale of goods or services, the gross receipts
test did not apply. On the facts, the partners' and partnership returns failed to
adequately apprise the IRS of the amount of gain in a variant of the Son-of-
Boss tax shelter. Accordingly, the partnership did not show that the extended
limitations period was inapplicable. The amended order certified an
interlocutory appeal and stayed the case pending further court order, because
of the split of opinion between Salman Ranch, on the one hand, and
Bakersfield Energy Partners and Brandon Ridge Partners, on the other hand.
f. And the pro-government opinion by
Judge Miller is slapped down by the Federal Circuit. Salman Ranch Ltd.
v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 7/30/09). Following Colony, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), the Federal Circuit (Judge Schall, 2-1)
held that "omits from gross income an amount properly includable therein"
in § 6501(e)(1)(A) does not include an overstatement of basis. Accordingly,
the six-year statute of limitations on assessment did not apply - the normal
three-year period of limitations applied. Judge Newman dissented.
g. But a second District Court sees it the
government's way. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 599 F.
Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. N.C. 10/21/08). The court held that §6501(e) extends the
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statute of limitations for deficiencies attributable to basis overstatements that
result in omitted gross income exceeding 25 percent of the gross income
reported on the return. The court refused to follow the Tax Court's decisions
in Bakersfield Energy Partners and Grapevine Imports, because it concluded
that those cases were erroneously decided.
h. A hiccup from Judge Goeke in the Tax
Court: overstated basis in an abusive tax shelter is a substantial
omission from gross income that extends the statute of limitations.
Highwood Partners v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 1 (8/13/09). The
taxpayers invested through partnerships in foreign currency digital options
contracts designed to increase partnership basis and generate losses marketed
by Jenkens & Gilchrist (Son of Boss and miscellaneous other names). After
expiration of the three-year statute of limitations, the IRS issued an FPAA to
the partnership based on the six-year statute of §6501(e)(1) applicable if
there was a greater than 25 percent omission of gross income on each
partner's or the partnership's return. The court (Judge Goeke) held that the
digital options contracts produced § 988 exchange gain on foreign currency
transactions, which, under the regulations, are required to be separately
stated. The long and short positions of the options contracts were treated as
separate transactions. Thus, failure to report the gain on the short position,
not offset by losses on the accompanying stock sale, represented an omission
of gross income. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that
because the IRS asserted that the options transactions should be disregarded
in full, there can be no omission of gross income from the disregarded short
position. Finally, the court refused to apply the adequate disclosure safe
harbor of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) because the taxpayer's netting of the gain and
loss from the long and short positions was intended to mislead and hide the
existence of the gain and did not apprise the IRS of the existence of the gain.
i. But Judge Haines follows the Tax Court
orthodoxy. Beard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-184 (8/11/09), rev'd,
107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-552 (7th Cir. 1/26/11). In a basis offset deal involving
contributions of long and short positions in Treasury notes contributed to S
corporations, the court (Judge Haines) granted summary judgment to the
taxpayer holding that the basis overstatement attributable to the short sale
was not an a substantial omission of gross income. Because the transaction
involved Treasury notes, there were no § 988 issues involved. This holding is
consistent with Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767
(9th Cir. 6/17/09), and Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362
(Fed. Cir. 7/30/09).
j. And the IRS loses again in the Tax Court.
Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
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2009-195 (9/1/09). The court (Judge Wherry), again following Bakersfield
Energy Partners LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207 (2007), granted
summary judgment to the taxpayer holding that a basis overstatement is not a
substantial omission from gross income that triggers the six year extended
statute of limitations under § 6229.
k. Finally, the IRS gets the upper hand with
temporary regulations. T.D. 9466, Definition of Omission from Gross
Income, 74 F.R. 49321 (9/24/09). Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-lT and
301.6501(e)-iT both provide that for purposes of determining whether there
is a substantial omission of gross income, gross income as it relates to a trade
or business includes the total amount received from the sale of goods or
services, without reduction for the cost of goods sold, gross income
otherwise has the same meaning as under § 61(a). The regulations add that,
"[i]n the case of amounts received or accrued that relate to the disposition of
property, and except as provided in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, gross
income means the excess of the amount realized from the disposition of the
property over the unrecovered cost or other basis of the property.
Consequently, except as provided in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, an
understated amount of gross income resulting from an overstatement of
unrecovered cost or other basis constitutes an omission from gross income
for purposes of section 6229(c)(2)."
1. But the IRS still suffers from a hangover
in cases on which the extended statute had run before the effective date
of the regulations. UTAM, Ltd v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-253
(11/9/09). Judge Kroupa followed Bakersfield Energy Partners to hold that
the statute of limitations is not extended to six years pursuant to § 6229(c)(2)
or § 6501(e)(1)(A) as a result of a basis overstatement that causes gross
income to be understated by more than 25 percent.
* Although the date of the decision was
after the effective date of Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1T and 301.6501(e)-
IT, the result was dictated by prior law effective when the FPAA was issued in
1999.
m. Judge Wherry shoves it up the
Commissioner all the way to his "Colon(-y)" in a reviewed Tax Court
decision that holds the Temporary Regulations invalid. Intermountain
Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 11 (5/6/10)
(reviewed, 7-0-6), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2009-195 (9/1/09) (granting
summary judgment to the taxpayer, holding that a basis overstatement is not
a substantial omission from gross income that triggers the six year extended
statute of limitations under § 6229). On IRS motions to reconsider and vacate
in light of Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1T and 301.6501(e)-1T, the Tax
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Court (Judge Wherry) held that the Supreme Court's opinion in Colony, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), "'unambiguously forecloses the [IRS]
interpretation' ... and displaces [the] temporary regulations." The first
ground was that the temporary regulations were specifically limited their
application to "taxable years with respect to which the applicable period for
assessing tax did not expire before September 24, 2009," and in this case that
period was not open as of that date. The second ground was that the Supreme
Court had held in Colony that the statute was unambiguous in light of its
legislative history, and foreclosed temporary regulations to the contrary.
* Judges Halpern and Holmes
concurred in the result. They stated that they were not persuaded by either of
the majority's analyses, but that the temporary regulations should be invalidated
on procedural grounds for failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure
Act's notice-and-comment requirement.
n. "Tax Court, we'll see ya at high noon in
front of the courts of appeals," says the IRS. T.D. 9511, Definition of
Gross Income, 75 F.R. 78897 (12/17/10). The IRS and Treasury have
finalized amendments to Regs. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1 and 301.6501(e)-1,
replacing Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-lT and 301.6501(e)-iT, T.D. 9466,
Definition of Omission from Gross Income, 74 F.R. 49321 (9/24/09). The
final regulations are identical to the Temporary Regulations in providing that
for purposes of determining whether there is a substantial omission of gross
income, gross income as it relates to a trade or business includes the total
amount received from the sale of goods or services, without reduction for the
cost of goods sold, gross income otherwise has the same meaning as under
§ 61(a).
* The IRS and Treasury declared in the
preamble that they believed that the Tax Court's decision in Intermountain
Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 11 (5/6/10),
invalidating the Temporary Regulations, was erroneous:
The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service
disagree with Intermountain. The Supreme Court stated in
Colony that the statutory phrase "omits from gross income"
is ambiguous, meaning that it is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation. The interpretation adopted by the
Supreme Court in Colony represented that court's
interpretation of the phrase but not the only permissible
interpretation of it. Under the authority of Nat'1 Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982-83 (2005), the Treasury Department and the Internal
Revenue Service are permitted to adopt another reasonable
interpretation of "omits from gross income," particularly as
it is used in a new statutory setting.
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* According to the preamble, the final
regulations have been clarified to emphasize that they only apply to open tax
years, and do not reopen closed tax years. However, the preamble states:
The Tax Court's majority in Intermountain erroneously
interpreted the applicability provisions of the temporary and
proposed regulations, which provided that the regulations
applied to taxable years with respect to which 'the applicable
period for assessing tax did not expire before September 24,
2009." The Internal Revenue Service will continue to adhere
to the position that "the applicable period" of limitations is
not the "'general"' three-year limitations period. ...
Consistent with that position, the final regulations apply to
taxable years with respect to which the six-year period for
assessing tax under section 6229(c)(2) or 6501(e)(1) was
open on or after September 24, 2009.
The Supreme Court's decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (1/11/11), see Part XI.A.1.h. of
this outline, holding that Treasury Regulations are entitled to deference under
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), could affect whether the IRS will win this shoot-out.
o. And Government wins a big shoot-out in
the Seventh Circuit, without any help from the Temporary Regulations.
Beard v. Commissioner, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-552 (7th Cir. 1/26/11), revg
T.C. Memo 2009-184 (8/11/09). The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Evans, reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that an overstatement of
basis results in an omission of gross income that triggers the six year statute
of limitations under § 6501(e)(1)(A). In a very carefully reasoned opinion,
the court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Colony, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), was not controlling. The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that Colony was both factually different - Colony involved an
overstatement of the basis of lots held by a real estate developer for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business, while the instant case involved
an overstatement of basis in a partnership interest in a Son-of-BOSS tax
shelter transaction - and legally different because of changes between 1939
Code § 275(c), which was interpreted in Colony and 1954 Code § 6501(e).
The court held that "Colony's holding is inherently qualified by the facts of
the case before the Court, facts which differ from our case, where the
Beards' omission was not in the course of trade or business." Applying
principles of statutory interpretation, the court focused on the impact of the
addition of § 6501(e)(1)(B)(ii) in the 1954 Code, which provides that "in
determining the amount omitted from gross income, there shall not be taken
into account any amount which is omitted from gross income stated in the
return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to
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the return, in a manner adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature and
amount of such item." Quoting Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.
1968), the court stated "[w]e conclude that the enactment of subsection (ii) of
section 6501(e)(1)[(B)] makes it apparent that the six year statute is intended
to apply where there is either a complete omission of an item of income of
the requisite amount or misstating of the nature of an item of income which
places the "commissioner ... at a special disadvantage in detecting errors."
(emphasis supplied). Even though it distinguished Colony and concluded that
it was "left without precedential authority," the court nevertheless concluded
that because the language of § 6501(e)(1)(A) at issue in the case was
identical to the language of § 275(c) interpreted in Colony, it ivas required to
interpret § 6501(e)(1)(A) in light of Colony. However, it also reasoned that it
must "bear in mind" that Congress did add subsections (i) and (ii) to §
6501(e)(1)(B) and that "the section as a whole should be read as a gestalt."
In analyzing Colony, the court noted that the Supreme Court had found §
275(c) to be ambiguous, but was more persuaded by the taxpayer's argument
that focused on the word "omits." The Seventh Circuit noted that an issue
that Colony "does not address in depth is 'gross income' which is defined
generally in Section 61 of the Code as 'all income from whatever source
derived,' " but which is not defined in § 6501(e) except for the special
definition in § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i) that applies to trade or business income. The
court then went on to hold:
Using these definitions and applying standard rules of
statutory construction to give equal weight to each term and
avoid rendering parts of the language superfluous, we find
that a plain reading of Section 6501(e)(1)(A) would include
an inflation of basis as an omission of gross income in non-
trade or business situations. ... It seems to us that an
improper inflation of basis is definitively a "leav[ing] out"
from "any income from whatever source derived" of a
quantitative "amount" properly includible. There is an
amount-the difference between the inflated and actual basis-
which has been left unmentioned on the face of the tax
return as a candidate for inclusion in gross income.
The court was reenforced in its conclusion by the existence of §
6501(e)(1)(B)(i), reasoning that "[i] the omissions from gross income
contemplated Section 6501(e)(1)(A) were only specific items such as
receipts and accruals, then the special definition in subsection (i) would be, if
not superfluous, certainly diminished. The addition of this subsection
suggests that the definition of gross income for the purposes of Section
6501(e)(1)(A) is meant to encompass more than the types of specific items
contemplated by the Colony holding." The Seventh Circuit considered
Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.
6/17/09), and Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.
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7/30/09), to have been erroneously decided. Finally, the court addressed the
parties' arguments regarding the impact of Temp. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-
I T(a)(1)(a). Rather than ruling on the validity of the regulation, however, the
court stated that because it did not find Colony controlling and reached its
decision that the six-year statute of limitations applied on the face of the
Code section, it would not reach the validity of the regulation. However, in
dictum, the court stated that it would be inclined to grant deference to Temp.
Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(1)(a), even though it was issued without notice and
comment, citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002), for the
proposition that "the absence of notice-and-comment procedures is not
dispositive to the finding of Chevron deference."
2. The statute of limitations remains open for any
tax return in connection with which required information about foreign
transfers is not reported to the IRS. Section 513 of the 2010 HIRE Act
amended I.R.C. § 6501(c)(8) by providing that the statute of limitations
remains open for any tax return relating to which information about foreign
transfers is not furnished to the IRS and Treasury. The statute of limitations
remains open until three years after the required information is furnished.
Section 511 and 512 of the 2010 HIRE Act also provide for extended
limitations for tax returns that are not fully compliant with respect to foreign
assets.
3. A refund of fraudulently reported withholding
results in an underpayment. Feller v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 25
(11/8/10) (reviewed). The taxpayer, who controlled the corporation by which
he was employed, fraudulently overstated withholding tax credits on his
income tax returns and on the Forms W-2 issued to him for tax years 1992
through 1997. The IRS assessed tax and fraud penalties in 2006, on the
theory that there was fraudulent underpayment and that, therefore, pursuant
to § 6501(c)(1) the statute of limitations did not bar the assessment. The
taxpayer argued that Reg. § 1.6664-2(c)(1) and (g), Ex. (3), which provide
that overstated prepayment credits (e.g., overstated withholding) result in
underpayments of tax within the meaning of § 6664, was invalid. In a
reviewed opinion by Judge Haines (joined by ten other judges), the Tax
Court, applying the Chevron test (because the case was appealable to the
Sixth Circuit, which applies the Chevron test to Treasury regulations),
upheld the validity of Reg. § 1.6664-2(c)(1) and (g), Ex. (3). The
assessments were upheld.
* Judges Wherry and Gustafson (joined
by Judge Halpern) dissented and would have invalidated the regulations as an
impermissible construction of the statute.
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F. Liens and Collections
1. In this much-discussed case, taxpayer's poverty
trumps a proposed levy. Vinatieri v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 16
(12/21/09). The taxpayer submitted a settlement offer for delinquent taxes,
but the IRS determined to levy on the taxpayer's wages and car. Even though
the IRS concluded that the levy would create an economic hardship, the
settlement officer determined collection alternatives to the levy, including an
installment agreement, an offer-in-compromise, and reporting the account as
currently not collectible, were not available because the taxpayer had not
filed returns for several years. In a review of a § 6330 CDP hearing, Judge
Dawson held that it was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion for the IRS
to proceed to levy on the taxpayer's wages and car, because a levy would
have left the taxpayer impoverished. Section 6343(a)(1) requires that the IRS
must release a levy upon all, or part of, a taxpayer's property if it determines
that the levy creates an economic hardship due to the taxpayer's financial
condition. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4) provides that a levy creates an economic
hardship due to the financial condition of an individual taxpayer and must be
released "if satisfaction of the levy in whole or in part will cause an
individual taxpayer to be unable to pay his or her reasonable basic living
expenses." Because the taxpayer had demonstrated that a levy would render
her unable to pay her reasonable basic living expenses, the IRS was barred
from levying. Judge Dawson rejected the IRS's argument that because the
taxpayer was not in compliance with the filing requirements for all required
tax returns, its determination to levy was not unreasonable.
The requirement that taxpayer be
currently in compliance with his or her obligations to the IRS under its
"currently not collectible" ("CNC") program does not apply to relief under
§ 6343.
a. Appeals must address credible claims of
economic hardship. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2011-005 (12/22/10). In
response to the Vinatieri case, the Chief Counsel now requires Appeals to
address credible claims of economic hardship.
2. You only imagined that a discharge in
bankruptcy from personal liability for back income taxes really got you
off the hook. Wadleigh v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 14 (6/15/10). This
case involved a review of the IRS's determination in a § 6330 CDP hearing
not to release a levy on the taxpayer's pension. The tax lien had not been
perfected by filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, and prior to the IRS issuing
its Notice of Intent to Levy, the taxpayer's personal liability for the income
taxes in question had been discharged in bankruptcy. The Tax Court (Judge
Marvel) held that because the taxpayer's pension was an excluded asset
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under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) that was never part of the bankruptcy estate - in
contrast to an exempt asset, which initially is part of the bankruptcy estate
but which is unavailable to satisfy creditor's claims - the § 6231 unperfected
tax lien on the taxpayer's pension survived his bankruptcy and could be
enforced notwithstanding his personal discharge. However, the lien was not
enforceable until the pension entered payout status. Nevertheless, Judge
Marvel remanded the case to the Appeals Division, but retained jurisdiction,
because the record was inadequate to determine whether the IRS abused its
discretion in levying on the taxpayer's retirement income, in the face of the
taxpayer's claim that the levy would result in economic hardship by leaving
him destitute.
3. Just because the IRS thinks it's not worth trying
to levy on it doesn't necessarily mean it's not a fraudulent conveyance if
you give it away. Rubenstein v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 13 (6/7/10).
The taxpayer's father, who was insolvent and had substantial unpaid income
tax liabilities of which the taxpayer was aware, transferred to the taxpayer for
little or no consideration the condominium in which they both resided, which
was worth approximately $44,000. In the course of evaluating an offer in
compromise previously submitted by the father, but which was rejected, the
IRS had determined that the net realizable equity value in the condominium
was zero. After the transfer, the IRS asserted transferee liability equal to the
condominium's fair market value on the date of the transfer on the ground
that the transfer was constructively fraudulent under Florida's Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (FUFTA). Under Florida law the condominium was
the father's homestead, and thus was generally exempt from creditor's claims
under nonbankruptcy law. However, the FUFTA excludes from the
definition of "assets" property that is "generally exempt under
nonbankruptcy law." On this basis the taxpayer argued that the condominium
was not an "asset" for purposes of the FUFTA and its transfer to him thus
was not avoidable. The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held that because a
homestead property is reachable by the United States through judicial
process to enforce collection of unpaid income tax liabilities, even if it is
exempt from the claims of other creditors under state law, the homestead
condominium was not "generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law" within
the meaning of the FUFTA. Thus, the condominium was an "asset" for
purposes of the IRS's claim under the FUFTA. Furthermore, because the
care that the taxpayer had provided for his father was not bargained for, but
was provided out of love and respect, it did not constitute "reasonably
equivalent value" for the condominium within the meaning of the FUFTA.
Accordingly, the transfer was fraudulent. Finally, the IRS was not equitably
estopped from asserting transferee liability by virtue of having previously
determined that the condominium had zero net equity value.
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4. Here's a case in which a partner's draw is
"salary or wages," much to his dismay. United States v. Moskowitz,
Passman & Edleman, 603 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 4/29/10). The Second Circuit
held that a continuing levy on "salary" under § 6331(e) reached a partner's
"near-weekly" draw against the law firm's profits. Reg. § 301.6331-1(b)(1)
defines "salary or wages" to "'include[] compensation for services paid in
the form of fees, commissions, bonuses, and similar items."' (emphasis
supplied by the court). Because the partner's draw was "compensation for
services," the court concluded that it was within the sweep of the Regulation,
and thus § 6331(e). The court rejected the law firm's argument that payments
of partnership draw to the partner were not "salary or wages" under
§ 633 1(e) at the time of the levy because "'a partner only realizes income on
the last day of the partnership's taxable year.'
5. No need for actuarial values to decide how much
of the entirety the tax-deadbeat hubby owned. United States v. Barr, 106
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5590 (6th Cir. 8/4/10). In an opinion by Judge Rogers, the
Sixth Circuit held that to satisfy a husband's separate tax liability, the
government could levy on his one-half interest in a house owned with his
wife in tenancy by the entirety under Michigan law. The taxpayer's wife was
entitled to only one-half of the sales proceeds, despite her longer life
expectancy.
6. Just because you gave it away to a trust for your
kids doesn't mean you still really own it. Dalton v. Commissioner, 135
T.C. No. 20 (9/23/10). The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that the IRS abused
its discretion in rejecting the taxpayer's offer in compromise. The IRS
treated property that had been deeded to the taxpayer's father before a tax
lien arose, and which subsequently was transferred by the taxpayer's father
to a trust for the benefit of the taxpayer's children, as held by the trust as a
nominee for the taxpayer. On this basis, the IRS treated the trust's assets as
available for the payment of taxpayer's tax liability. After examining both
state law and federal tax principles, Judge Wells concluded that the trust did
not hold the property as a nominee for the taxpayer.
7. Ya gotta tell the court ya want a speedy trial.
Thompson v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-6464 (N.D. Ill. 9/29/10).
The failure of the district court to review a jeopardy assessment within 20
days, as required by § 7429(b)(2) is not alone grounds for entering judgment
for the taxpayer. The taxpayer bears the responsibility for informing the
district court of the statutory time deadline. The taxpayer failed to do so.
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G. Innocent Spouse
1. That regulation ain't got no equity and it ain't
got no empathy, so it's invalid. The Tax Court majority responds to "the
sound of [congressional] silence." Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 8
(4/7/09) (reviewed, 12-4). The taxpayer sought equitable relief from joint
income tax liability under § 6015(f), but the IRS denied relief on the ground
that she had not requested relief within two years from the IRS's first
collection action, as required by Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1). Consequently, the
IRS did not reach the substantive issues of the claim. In a reviewed opinion
by Judge Goeke, joined by eleven judges, with four dissents, the Tax Court
held Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1) to be invalid as applied to § 6015(f) relief.
(Following the Golsen rule, the Tax Court applied Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because the Seventh
Circuit held in Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States,142 F.3d 973, 979
(7th Cir. 1998), that regulations issued under general or specific authority of
the IRS to promulgate necessary rules are entitled to Chevron deference;
Reg. § 1.6015-5 was issued under both a general grant of authority under
§ 7805 and a specific grant of authority in § 6015(h).) The court focused on
the explicit inclusion of a two-year deadline in both § 6015(b) and § 6015(c),
in contrast to the absence of any deadline in § 6015(f), to find that the
regulation was not a reasonable interpretation of the statute under the
Chevron standard.
"'It is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely' when it 'includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another.' ... We find that
by explicitly creating a 2-year limitation in subsections (b)
and (c) but not subsection (f), Congress has "spoken" by its
audible silence. Because the regulation imposes a limitation
that Congress explicitly incorporated into subsections (b)
and (c) but omitted from subsection (f), it fails the first
prong of Chevron. ...
Had Congress intended a 2-year period of
limitations for equitable relief, then of course it could have
easily included in subsection (f) what it included in
subsections (b) and (c). However, Congress imposed no
deadline, yet the Secretary prescribed a period of limitations
identical to the limitations Congress imposed under section
6015(b) and (c).
* As a result, the IRS abused its
discretion in failing to consider all facts and circumstances in the taxpayer's
case. Further proceedings are required to fully determine the taxpayer's
liability.
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a. You don't have to actually know the IRS
denied § 6015(b) relief for the statute of limitations on seeking review to
have expired, but you can always turn to § 6015(f), which for now
appears to have an open-ended period for review. Mannella v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 10 (4/13/09), rev'd, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-519
(3d Cir 1/19/11). The IRS sent the taxpayer a notice of intent to levy and
notice of the right to a § 6330 CDP hearing on 6/4/04. On 11/1/06, more than
two years later, the taxpayer requested § 6015 relief from joint and several
liability, which the IRS denied on the grounds that the request was untimely.
The taxpayer claimed that she did not receive her notice of intent to levy
because her former husband received the notices, signed the certified mail
receipts, and failed to deliver of inform her of the notices. Judge Haines held
that actual receipt of the notice of intent to levy or of the notice of the right to
request relief from joint and several liability is not required for the 2-year
period in which to request relief under §§ 6015(b) and (c) to begin. The
taxpayer's request for relief under §§ 6015(b) and (c) was not timely.
However, the taxpayer's claim for relief under § 6015(f), was timely because
Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 8 (4/7/09), held that Reg. § 1.6015-
5(b)(1), requiring a request for relief within two years from the IRS's first
collection action, is invalid as applied to § 6015(f) relief.
b. But the IRS will fight this one to the
bitter end! CC-2010-005, Designation for Litigation: Validity of Two-Year
Deadline for Section 6015(f) Claims Under Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1)
(3/12/10). This Chief Counsel Notice states that because the issue of the
validity of the two-year deadline in Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1) for filing a claim
for § 6015(f) relief, which was held to be an invalid regulation in Lantz v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 8 (2009), has been designated for litigation by
the Office of Chief Counsel, the IRS will continue to deny claims for relief
under § 6015(f) as untimely and will not settle or concede this issue.
However, depending on the facts of the case, the merits of the § 6015(f)
claim might be conceded.
c. And the IRS's bitter-end fight to validate
the regulation ended up in the Seventh Circuit, where Judge Posner
denied the existence of "audible silence." Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d
479 (7th Cir. 6/8/10). The taxpayer was described as "a financially
unsophisticated woman whose husband, a dentist, was arrested for Medicare
fraud in 2000, convicted and imprisoned. They had been married for only six
years when he was arrested and there is no suggestion that she was aware of,
let alone complicit in, his fraud." She received a packet that included a notice
of a proposed levy on her in 2003, but did not respond because her estranged
husband told her "he'd deal with the matter." He asked the IRS to be sent the
application form for seeking innocent-spouse relief, explaining that his wife
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was an "innocent spouse," but he died before filing it. In 2006, the IRS
applied taxpayer's $3,230 income tax refund for 2005 to her joint and several
liability for 1999 of more than $1.3 million. "Unemployed and impecunious,
she applied for innocent-spouse relief but the IRS turned her down because
she'd missed the two year-deadline .... " The Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner),
sustained the regulation and agreed with the IRS's denial of relief, stating,
"... any statute of limitations will cut off some, and often a great many,
meritorious claims."
* Judge Posner denied the existence of
"audible silence" in the following words:
But even if our review of statutory interpretations by the Tax
Court were deferential, we would not accept "audible
silence" as a reliable guide to congressional meaning.
"Audible silence," like Milton's "darkness visible" or the
Zen koan "the sound of one hand clapping," requires rather
than guides interpretation. Lantz's brief translates "audible
silence" as "plain language," and adds (mysticism must be
catching) that "Congress intended the plain language of the
language used in the statute."
* In sustaining the regulation Judge
Posner reasoned as follows;
Agencies ... are not bashful about making up their
own deadlines[,] ... and because it is as likely that Congress
knows this as that it knows that courts like to borrow a
statute of limitations when Congress doesn't specify one, the
fact that Congress designated a deadline in two provisions of
the same statute and not in a third is not a compelling
argument that Congress meant to preclude the Treasury
Department from imposing a deadline applicable to cases
governed by that third provision;" if there is no deadline in
subsection (f), the two-year deadlines in subsections (b) and
(c) will be set largely at naught because the substantive
criteria of those sections are virtually the same as those of
(f). ...
We must also not overlook the introductory phrase in
subsection (f)-"under procedures prescribed by the
[Treasury Department]"-or the further delegation in 26
U.S.C § 6015(h) to the Treasury to "prescribe such
regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of'
section 6015. In related contexts such a delegation has been
held to authorize an agency to establish deadlines for
applications for discretionary relief.
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* The opinion concludes with the hope
that the IRS would grant taxpayer relief under § 6343 from its levy on taxpayer
by declaring the taxes "currently not collectible" as follows:
Ironically, the Service declared the taxes owed by Lantz's
husband - the crooked dentist - "currently not collectible."
She is entitled a fortiori to such relief, and there is no
deadline for seeking it. We can at least hope that the IRS
knows better than to try to squeeze water out of a stone.s
d. And the Tax Court responds with a big
"raspberry" to Judge Posner. Hall v Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 19
(9/22/10). In a reviewed opinion by Judge Goeke, in which seven judges
joined, the Tax Court adhered to its position in Lantz, supra, that Reg.
§ 1.6015-5(b)(1) imposing a two-year statute of limitations on claims for
relief under § 6015(f) is invalid, notwithstanding the reversal of its decision
in Lantz by the Seventh Circuit. Five judges dissented.
e. The Third Circuit likes the way Judge
Posner thinks and gives a big "raspberry' to the Tax Court. Mannella v.
Commissioner, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-519 (3d Cir. 2011), rev'g 132 T.C.
No.10 (4/13/09). In a 2-1 decision written by Judge Greenberg, the Third
Circuit reversed the Tax Court and upheld the two-year statute of limitations
on taxpayers seeking § 6015(e) equitable relief provided in Reg. § 1.6015-
5(b)(1). According to Judge Greenberg's opinion, "[w]e cannot say that
section 6015, in terms, requires that we embrace any particular view of
Congress's intent with respect to a subsection (f) filing deadline, and "the
absence of a statutory filing deadline in subsection (f) similar to those in
subsections (b) and (c) does not require us to conclude that the Secretary
cannot impose a two-year deadline by regulation." In the course of applying
step one of its Chevron analysis, the court stated "[w]e agree with the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that this silence is not made audible by the
presence of deadlines in subsections (b) and (c)." Turning to step two of its
Chevron analysis, the court acknowledged that the taxpayer's argument that
the legislative history of § 66(c), which provides relief similar to § 6015(e)
relief for taxpayers in community property states who do not file a joint
return and which was enacted at the same time as § 6015(e), suggested that
there should not be a rigid statute of limitations on seeking § 6015(e)
equitable relief, "lends some support to [the taxpayer's] position, but
concluded that "it fails to overcome the deference that we must give to
Treasury Regulation § 1.6015-5(b)(1) under Chevron and it does not clearly
demonstrate that Congress intended that requests for relief under subsection
6015(f) not be subject to a two-year filing deadline." Additionally, the court
5. But cf, Exodus 17:1-7 and Numbers 20:1-13.
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likewise rejected the taxpayer's argument that "the inclusion of deadline
periods in subsections (b) and (c) but omission of such a period in subsection
(f) "demonstrates Congressional intent that requests for equitable relief not
be subject to a bright-line time limitation, but rather allow the taxpayer to
request relief during the 10-year collection period of 26 U.S.C. § 6502."
However, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Tax Court to
determine whether the statute of limitations in Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1) is
subject to equitable tolling and, if so, whether the taxpayer met the standards
for equitable tolling.
Judge Ambro dissented. He
agreed with the majority, and disagreed with the Tax Court, on the question of
whether Congress had spoken directly on the issue of the time frame in which
the taxpayer must seek § 6015(e) relief, but would have invalidated Reg. §
1.6015-5(b)(1) in step two of the Chevron analysis on the ground that in
promulgating the regulation, "the IRS has not advanced any reasoning for its
decision to impose a two-year limitations period on taxpayers seeking relief
under subsection (f), leaving us no basis to conduct the analysis mandated by
Chevron step two." He reasoned that "it is ... a necessary corollary of the
deference owed to agencies-that courts may not supplement deficient agency
reasoning," and did not find Judge Posner's reasoning in Lantz v.
Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479 (7" Cir. 6/8/10), to be convincing.
2. One spouse pays and the other spouse doesn't,
and no one is innocent. One is just more cooperative with the IRS.
Jordan v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 1 (1/11/10). The Tax Court (Judge
Wells) held that spouses may separately agree to a waiver of the 10-year
period of limitations on collections for a year with respect to which they filed
a joint return. The waiver may be effective with respect to one spouse, but
not with respect to the other spouse if the other spouse did not also execute
the waiver or has the right to repudiate it.
3. The statute might not have correctly articulated
the statutory cross reference, but the Tax Court got the drift of
congressional intent anyway. Adkison v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 97
(10/16/07). The Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to review a claim for
apportioned liability relief under § 6015(c) when the tax liability in question
relates to partnership income and the deficiency notice on which the
jurisdiction was asserted to be based is invalid because the partnership items
are subject to determination in a TEFRA partnership level proceeding that
has not yet been resolved. Section 6230(a)(3)(A), which still refers to former
§ 6013(e), the statutory predecessor of § 6015, evidences congressional
intent that the spouse of a partner can initiate a claim for innocent spouse
relief with respect to a deficiency attributable to an adjustment of a
partnership item only after the IRS issues a notice of computational
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adjustment following the completion of the partnership-level proceeding.
Judge Cohen concluded that Congress simply overlooked the need to correct
the cross references in § 6230 when it replaced § 6013(e) with § 6015.
a. Affirmed on other grounds: The Tax
Court had jurisdiction, but cannot grant any relief until the TEFRA
proceeding is concluded. Adkison v. Commissioner, 592 F.3d 1050 (9th
Cir. 1/21/10). Judge Bybee's opinion for the Ninth Circuit described the Tax
Court's holding as "dismiss[ing] for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that
because a separate partnership proceeding involving the transaction from
which the deficiency arose was already pending, the Commissioner did not
"assert" a deficiency against Adkison within the meaning of [§
6015(e)(1)(A)]." However, Judge Bybee concluded that the Tax Court did
have jurisdiction, because nothing in § 6320 divests the Tax Court of
jurisdiction under § 6015. He found that "the Commissioner, joined by the
Tax Court, has confused the availability of a remedy with the question of the
Tax Court's jurisdiction." However, he continued to conclude that:
Although ... the Tax Court has jurisdiction over Adkison's §
6015 petition, the Tax Court's instincts were correct: in light
of the ... TEFRA proceeding ..., there is no "appropriate
relief available" to Adkison." TEFRA plainly contemplates
that when a partnership proceeding is pending, the
Commissioner will not assert a deficiency against a
taxpayer-partner until the partnership proceeding determines
the liability of the partnership, and consequently, the
partners. ... Once the TEFRA proceeding is concluded, the
partners are entitled to a "final partnership administrative
adjustment," id. § 6223(a)(2), their tax deficiency is
determined, and at that point, the spouse of a partner may
file a petition for relief under § 6015.
* Thus, the judgment was affirmed on
the grounds that no remedy was available, even though there was jurisdiction.
* We think Judge Bybee was confused
by the phrase "in the case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been
asserted" in § 6015(e) and concluded that the Tax Court has jurisdiction even
though the deficiency notice is invalid. A long line of case law holds that the
Tax Court does not have jurisdiction in every case in which a "deficiency is
asserted," to use Judge Bybee's phrase, but only in those cases in which a valid
deficiency notice has been issued. If the deficiency notice was issued
prematurely, it was not valid, and if the deficiency notice is not valid, although
the Tax Court has no jurisdiction to "redetermine" the asserted deficiency, the
IRS nevertheless is barred from assessing the tax.
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4. The widow inherits the ability to make a
standalone § 6015(c) election, even though § 6015(b) and § 6015(f) relief
were foreclosed by the pleadings in the prior deficiency case. Deihl v.
Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 7 (2/23/10). The taxpayer and her late husband
had contested deficiencies for 1996, 1997, and 1998 in Tax Court
proceedings in 2004. The petition in that proceeding had raised the issue of
§ 6105 relief for 1996, but not for 1997 or 1998; however, in the stipulation
of facts for the consolidated cases, the claim for relief from joint and several
liability was withdrawn. Only the taxpayer's husband signed the petition in
the deficiency proceeding. The taxpayer did not (1) sign any court
documents in the case, (2) review the petitions or the stipulations of facts, or
(3) agree to any of the stipulations. Her husband and their (his) lawyer did
not discuss the documents with the taxpayer, and she saw them for the first
time at trial in the instant case. The taxpayer did not meet with any IRS
personnel, participate in any settlement negotiations with the IRS, or sit in on
any such meetings between her attorneys and the IRS during the litigation in
the earlier case, although she was called as a witness and testified briefly.
The taxpayer's husband died after the trial but before a final order was
entered. After the decision was entered, the taxpayer filed an administrative
claim for relief from joint and several liability for all three years, which the
IRS denied on the ground that the claim was barred by res judicata under
§ 6015(g)(2). The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) held that § 6015(g)(2) applied
because the Tax Court entered final decisions for 1996 through 1998.
However, because § 6015 relief was raised only in the pleadings for 1996,
§ 6015 relief for 1997 and 1998 was not an issue in the prior proceeding, and
because the taxpayer did not meaningfully participate in the prior preceding,
the exception in § 6015(g)(2) applied for 1997 and 1998 and the taxpayer
was not barred from seeking relief for those years. Furthermore, because the
petition in the 2004 proceeding did not specifically invoke § 6015(c), and the
taxpayer was ineligible to make a § 6015 election at the time because her
husband was alive, a § 6015(c) election was not an issue in the prior
proceeding, the taxpayer was not barred from seeking § 6015(c) apportioned
liability for 1996. However, relief from joint and several liability for 1996
was raised by the petition and thus was at issue in the earlier proceeding, and
§ 6015(g)(2) barred the taxpayer from claiming relief from joint and several
liability under § 6015(b) and (f) for 1996.
5. Pyrrhic victory on the meaning of "no reason to
know." Greer v. Commissioner, 595 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2/17/10). The
taxpayer sought § 6015(b) relief with respect to a deficiency attributable to
her husband's disallowed tax shelter deductions and credits. In the Tax
Court, Judge Goeke found that "rather than having "'no reason to know' of
the tax understatement, as required for relief, she 'chose not to know,"' and
denied relief. In affirming, the Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Moore,
736 [Vol. 10:9
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
adopted the test of Price v. Commissioner, 887 F2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989),
under which "in erroneous-deduction cases, '[a] spouse has "reason to know"
of the substantial understatement if a reasonably prudent taxpayer in her
position at the time she signed the return could be expected to know that the
return contained the substantial understatement."' The court rejected
application of the knowledge of the transaction test, which applies to income
omission cases, on the following reasoning.
The knowledge-of-the-transaction test leaves room for a
taxpayer to claim innocent-spouse relief in omitted-income
claims, because the understatement arises in such cases from
information being left off a return, and the spouse otherwise
may not have known or had reason to know that information.
In erroneous-deduction cases, the understatement arises from
information being included on the return, so a spouse who
signs a tax return necessarily learns of the transaction. The
knowledge-of-the-transaction test writes the innocent-spouse
provision out of the law in such cases. A more nuanced
approach is thus required, especially given that an
understatement arising from a deduction usually is not
obvious from the face of a tax return. A taxpayer who knows
how much money the family earned will know that tax has
been understated if income is omitted from the return, as it is
common knowledge that income is taxable. ... By contrast, a
taxpayer who is aware of an investment may or may not
know that tax benefits claimed on its basis are
impermissible, depending on that taxpayer's level of
sophistication and how much he or she knows about the
investment. .... The Price test takes account of this
difference.
* Nevertheless, relief was denied
because the Tax Court did not clearly err. "[T]he low level of taxes owed
relative to the income reported ... should have given Mrs. Greer pause." Section
6015(f) equitable relief also was denied, on the ground that the taxpayer failed
to demonstrate economic hardship.
* Note that current Reg. §1 .6015-
3(c)(2)(i)(b)(1), which was effective for the year in which the taxpayer sought
relief but which was not cited by the court, expressly provides: "In the case of
an erroneous deduction or credit, knowledge of the item means knowledge of
the facts that made the item not allowable as a deduction or credit."
6. It's tough to get back money you never paid the
IRS, even if you might be an innocent spouse. Kaufman v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2010-89 (4/27/10). The Tax Court held that - assuming for the
sake of argument that the surviving spouse would be entitled to § 6015(f)
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relief - no relief was available because she was seeking a refund of amounts
paid by her husband's estate, not amounts paid by her.
H. Miscellaneous
1. Claims for a method for hedging risk in
commodities trading are held not to concern patent-eligible subject
matter. This leads to the possible conclusion that tax strategies are not
patentable. However, the Federal Circuit did not overrule the State
Street case and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case. In
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 10/30/08) (9-3), cert. granted sub nom.
Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (6/1/09). The Federal Circuit (Judge Michel)
affirmed a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that
claims for a method for managing (hedging) the risks in commodities trading
did not constitute a patent-eligible subject matter. The meaning of a
patentable "process" under 35 U.S.C. § 101 ["Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine [etc.] ... may obtain a patent therefore
... .] includes only the transformation of a physical object or substance, or an
electronic signal representative of a physical object or substance."
a. Federal Circuit is affirmed, in that the
hedging method did not constitute a patent-eligible subject matter, but
the Supreme Court's long-awaited opinion leaves the law farkockteh
[utterly messed up] and leaves tax practitioners farblonjet [completely
confused]. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (6/28/10). Tax method patents
appear to be permissible under the Court's opinion if they constitute a
process related to a machine (and that test is not the exclusive test).
Moreover, business method patents are not categorically excluded from
patentability. There is much more, but it is patent law and not of interest to
non-masochistic tax practitioners.
2. Burton Kanter got in trouble. Investment
Research Associates, Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-407
(12/15/99). In a 600-page opinion, Burton Kanter was held liable for the
§ 6653 fraud penalty by reason of his being "the architect who planned and
executed the elaborate scheme with respect to ... kickback income payments
a. For a detailed outline of developments in
this matter between 2000 and December 2009, please see McMahon,
Shepard & Simmons, Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation:
The Year 2009, 10 Florida Tax Review, 79, 249 - 254 (2010).
b. A former member of the University of
Chicago Law School faculty, members of which took a pro-Kanter stand
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during the entire litigation because the School was getting big bucks from
Kanter and/or his estate, decided the last appeal in this matter in favor of
Burton Kanter's estate. Result: The late Burton Kanter = 1; the IRS = zero;
the Tax Court = minus 1. Did we mention that the former faculty member
was married to a current member of the faculty? Kanter v. Commissioner,
590 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 12/1/09). The Seventh Circuit reversed, vacated and
remanded T.C. Memo. 2007-21 (2/1/07), with instructions to "enter an order
approving and adopting the STJ's report as the decision of the Tax Court."
Judge Wood found that the STJ's findings were not "clearly erroneous" but
"freely acknowledge[d] that a rational person could just as easily have come
to the opposite conclusion on this record."
* On his federal income tax returns for
the years 1979 through 1989, Burton Kanter reported that he had no income tax
liability. That return position has been vindicated. So it goes.
c. Chutzpah on steroids by this influential
Chicago family. According to Tax Analysts, the Kanter family has called
for removal of several Tax Court judges. "Taxes, taxes, we don't have to
pay no steenking income taxes." 2010 TNT 44-1 (3/8/10). "As attorneys for
the Kanter family, we call on the president, who has the power to remove a
Tax Court judge, to immediately institute an investigation on whether such
removal is justified," Lanny J. Davis of McDermott Will & Emery told Tax
Analysts. "We also call on the committees of Congress that have oversight of
the Tax Court to institute an investigation of Judge Dawson and other Tax
Court judges who appear to have been at least complicit in knowing about
Judge Dawson's pattern of deception and not reporting him to senior
authorities or, even worse, participated in a cover-up of his deception in the
summer of 2005 after the Supreme Court forced the disclosure of Judge
Couvillion's original opinion."
* The Kanter family is also upset
because the IRS is auditing Burton Kanter's estate tax return. Why on earth
would the IRS do something like that?
3. When the IRS says it's going negative on a
private letter ruling you better withdraw it the way the Rev. Proc says
to. Does this taxpayer really think that captioning the case as
"Anonymous v. Commissioner" will help hide from the IRS? Anonymous
v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 2 (1/19/10). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke)
held that it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the issuance of a private letter ruling
after the taxpayer failed to withdraw the request following notification that
the ruling would be adverse. (The Tax Court does have jurisdiction to
determine whether certain items in a private letter ruling must be redacted
prior to publication.) Judge Goeke summarized taxpayer's argument (before
rejecting it) as follows:
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Petitioner . . . argues that the [administrative
Procedure Act] provides this Court with the authority to
order respondent not to disclose the PLR at issue because the
PLR was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
Petitioner alleges section 6110(f)(3) grants the Court the
express authority to review written determinations open to
public inspection like PLRs. Petitioner contends that the
contents of the PLR are contrary to law and thus respondent
acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in bad faith in issuing it.
Petitioner further argues that for the same reason the PLR
should not be disclosed to Department of the Treasury
officials.
4. "The whistleblower talks twice." Chief Council
Notice CC-2010-004 (2/17/10). This Chief Counsel notice clarifies the
limitations on contacts between IRS employees and informants, including
informants who have filed claims under § 7623, by permitting more than one
contact with informants [including those informants who are current
employees of the taxpayer]. There are safeguards to prevent the informant
from becoming an instrument or agent of the government, as well as a
prohibition on accepting any information from an informant who is the
taxpayer's representative in any administrative matter pending before the
IRS.
5. Congress discovers that corporations as well as
unincorporated businesses might cheat less if payors rat them out to the
IRS. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 6041 to extend to payments to
corporations the information reporting requirement for all payments by a
business to any single payee .other than a payee that is a tax exempt
corporation) aggregating $600 or more in a calendar year for amounts paid in
consideration for property or services. However, the expanded rule does not
override other specific Code provisions that except payments from reporting,
for example, securities or broker transactions as defined under § 6045(a) and
the regulations thereunder. The new rule is effective for payments made after
12/31/11.
There is a move in Congress to repeal
this provision in exchange for tax increases on multinational corporations.
6. Reporting, reporting, there's lots of health care
reporting.
a. Employer reporting, Act 1. The 2010
Health Care Act amended § 6051 of the Code to require reporting on each
employee's annual Form W-2 the value of the employee's health insurance
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coverage sponsored by the employer for taxable years beginning after
12/31/10.
b. Employer reporting, Act 2. The 2010
Health Care Act added new § 6056 to the Code and amended § 6724(d) to
impose health insurance reporting requirements on employers. Applicable
large employers subject to the employer responsibility provisions of new
§ 4980H, and other employers who offer minimum essential coverage to
their employees under an employer-sponsored plan and pay premiums in
excess of 8 percent of employee wages, must report specified health
insurance coverage information to both its full-time employees and to the
IRS. An employer who fails to comply with these new reporting
requirements is subject to the penalties for failure to file an information
return and failure to furnish payee statements, respectively. The new rules
are effective for calendar years beginning after 2013.
c. Insurer reporting. The 2010 Health Care
Act added new § 6055 to the Code and amended § 6724(d). Insurers,
including employers who self-insure, that provide minimum essential
coverage to any individual must report certain health insurance coverage
information to both the individual and to the IRS. An insurer who fails to
comply with these new reporting requirements is subject to the penalties for
failure to file an information return and failure to furnish payee statements,
respectively. The new rules are effective for calendar years beginning after
2013.
7. Disclosure of return information is OK if the
purpose is to verify eligibility / ineligibility for cost-sharing benefits and
an advance § 36B premium credit through an American Health Benefits
Exchange. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 6103 to the Code to allow
the IRS to disclose to HHS certain return information of any taxpayer whose
income is relevant in determining the amount of the tax credit or cost-sharing
reduction, or eligibility for participation in the specified State health subsidy
programs (i.e., a State Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social
Security Act, a State's children's health insurance program under title XXI
of such Act, or a basic health program under § 2228 of such Act).
8. IRS releases recommendations that paid tax
return preparers would be required to register. IR-2010-1, 2010 TNT 2-1
(1/4/10). The IRS released a list of recommendations that would require that
individuals who sign a tax return as a paid preparer pay a user fee to register
online with the IRS and obtain a preparer tax identification number [PTIN].
All preparers - except attorneys, CPAs and enrolled agents - would have to
pass competency exams and complete 15 hours of annual CPE in federal tax
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law topics. The IRS proposes to expand Circular 230 to cover all signing and
nonsigning return preparers. Registered preparers would be listed on a
publicly-searchable data base and would be required to have PTINs in 2011.
a. We wish we had Karen's confidence in
Accenture. The IRS Office of Professional Responsibility is not at all
concerned with the task of registering paid tax preparers. That is because
Accenture will be the vendor to establish a system for on-line registration,
with a target date of 9/1/10. Accenture will undoubtedly bring to this task the
same thoughtful foresight and judgment it used when it selected Tiger
Woods as its leading spokesperson. 2010 TNT 85-24 (5/4/10). The IRS
announced that Accenture National Security Services, LLC, will be the
vendor to establish a system for on-line registration of paid tax return
preparers. "The vendor will develop and maintain the registration application
system and address related questions." Karen Hawkins, Director of the IRS
Office of Professional Responsibility recently stated that she was not worried
about registration of paid preparers because Accenture would take care of it
completely.
b. Some of us learned about the concept of
"fee simple" in school but these will not be "simple fees"; instead there
will be multiple fees - some of which will be raked off by Accenture.
REG-139343-08, User Fees Relating to Enrollment and Preparer Tax
Identification Numbers, 75 F.R. 43110 (7/23/10). Registration for an
identifying number, together with a $50 fee will be required for all tax return
preparers who prepare all, or substantially all, of a return or claim for refund
of tax after 12/31/10. Accenture may charge a "reasonable fee" that is
independent of the $50 user fee.
* The IRS later confirmed that the user
fee for the first year of registration will be $64.25; the excess $14.25 will permit
Accenture to "wet its beak."
c. The IRS issued proposed regulations
which would regulate tax return preparers, and establish a new class of
practitioner - a "registered tax return preparer" - whose qualifications
obviously exceed those of any other class of practitioner. REG-138637-
07, Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 75
F.R. 51713 (8/19/10). These proposed regulations would amend Circular 230
to apply to all paid return preparers and identify exactly which preparers
have a registration obligation. They would also change the general Circular
standard of contact from "more likely than not" to "reasonable basis" [sic].
Specifically, the proposed regulations establish "registered
tax return preparers," as a new class of practitioners.
Sections 10.3 through 10.6 of the proposed regulations
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describe the process for becoming a registered tax return
preparer and the limitations on a registered tax return
preparer's practice before the IRS. In general, practice by
registered tax return preparers is limited to preparing tax
returns, claims for refund, and other documents for
submission to the IRS. A registered tax return preparer may
prepare all or substantially all of a tax return or claim for
refund, and sign a tax return or claim for refund,
commensurate with the registered tax return preparer's level
of competence as demonstrated by written examination. The
proposed regulations also revise section 10.30 regarding
solicitation, section 10.36 regarding procedures to ensure
compliance, and section 10.51 regarding incompetence and
disreputable conduct.
Proposed regulations under section 6109 of the Code
(REG-134235-08) published in the Federal Register (75 FR
14539) on March 26, 2010, also implement certain
recommendations in the Report. The proposed regulations
under section 6109 provide that, for returns or claims for
refund filed after December 31, 2010, the identifying
number of a tax return preparer is the individual's preparer
tax identification number (PTIN) or such other number
prescribed by the IRS in forms, instructions, or other
appropriate guidance. The proposed regulations under
section 6109 provide that the IRS is authorized to require
through other guidance (as well as in forms and instructions)
that tax return preparers apply for a PTIN or other prescribed
identifying number, the regular renewal of PTINs or other
prescribed identifying number, and the payment of user fees.
d. Proposed amendments to Circular 230.
REG-138637-07, Rules Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue
Service, 2010-44 I.R.B. 581 (8/19/10). These proposed regulations contain
standards with respect to tax returns under § 10.34, as well as new rules
governing the oversight of tax return preparers under §§ 10.3 through 10.6.
There are also proposed revisions to § 10.30 regarding solicitation, § 10.36
regarding procedures to ensure compliance, and § 10.51 regarding
incompetence and disreputable conduct.
e. Final § 6109 regulations. T.D. 9501,
Furnishing Identifying Number of Tax Return Preparer, 75 F.R. 60309
(9/28/10). Final regulations amending § 1.6109-2 explaining how the IRS
will define those required to obtain a PTIN as a return preparer, with four
examples.
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f. David Williams is to be given "broad
responsibility." IR-2010-107 (10/26/10). In a speech to the AICPA Fall
Meeting, IRS Commissioner Shulman announced the creation of a Return
Preparer Office under David R. Williams at the IRS itself, which office is to
have "broad responsibility" for the return preparer initiative. The office will
complement the work of the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility under
Karen Hawkins.
g. Register those staff members as
"supervised preparers"! Notice 2011-6, 2011-3 I.R.B. 315 (12/30/10). This
notice provides guidance on the new regulations § 1.6901-2 governing tax
return preparers, including the exemption from continuing education
requirements and competency exams for non-signing supervised staff
members employed and supervised by an attorney, CPA or enrolled agent;
however, these "supervised preparers" must obtain PTINs and pass the
mandatory tax compliance and suitability checks [and pay the $64.25 annual
fee]. The notice also contains a list of forms that do not require that their
preparer have a PTIN, as well as interim rules that permit individuals to
obtain provisional PTINs before the first offering of competency
examinations, which PTINs may be renewed until the end of 2013.
9. This whistleblower gets a chance to let the Tax
Court decide whether or not he was whistling in the dark. Cooper v.
Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 4 (7/8/10). The Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) held
that it has jurisdiction under § 7623(b)(4) to review the denial of a claim for
a whistleblower award. The court rejected IRS's argument that the Tax
Court's jurisdiction is limited to appeals of a determination of the amount of
the award.
10. Might this case lead to DOMA becoming the
Twenty Eighth Amendment? Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 106
A.F.T.R.2d 2018-5184 (D. Mass. 7/8/10). District Court Judge Tauro held
that § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, which limits the
meaning of the word "marriage" to "a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife," and provides that "the word 'spouse' refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife" for purposes
of all federal laws is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection in
violation the equal protection principles embodied in the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Joint return filing status under the Code was one of
the issues addressed in the case; also addressed were government benefits
available to married individuals, e.g., employee health benefits, social
security benefits.
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11. The Constitution does not require Appeals
Officers for CDP hearings to be appointed by the President. Tucker v.
Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 6 (7/26/10). The taxpayer requested a CDP
hearing after the IRS issued a notice of filing of a tax lien. After the
settlement officer had upheld the tax lien notice, the taxpayer requested a
remand for a hearing to be heard by an officer appointed by the President or
the Secretary of the Treasury, in compliance with the Appointments Clause
of U.S. Const., art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2. Judge Gustafson held that an "officer or
employee" or an "appeals officer" under § 6320 or § 6330 is not an "inferior
Officer of the United States" for purposes of the Appointments Clause. They
are instead properly hired, pursuant to § 7804(a), under the authority of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The taxpayer's motion to remand was
denied.
12. "Sorry, you can't cite the other guy's PLR to
support your argument," but this case involved rulings with respect to
the same liability issued to the seller which the buyer attempted to use.
AmerGen Energy Co., LLC v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 413 (9/1/10). The
Court of Federal Claims (Judge Bush) held that private letter rulings issued
to the seller of a business relating to the treatment of certain operating
expenditures were not precedential or relevant evidence in buyer's case
regarding the same issue. The IRS was not bound by the private letter
rulings.
The rulings issued to the seller
purportedly concluded that the nuclear decommissioning liabilities were "fixed
and reasonably determinable." The buyer attempted to use the IBM case. Judge
Bush stated:
The court notes that plaintiff relies extensively on
Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 170
Ct. Cl. 357 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (IBM), a case with thirty negative
citing references on Westlaw, and omits any reference to the
precedential limitation of the holding of that case to its facts.
See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. United States, 375 F.3d
1119, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("We need not decide whether
the appellant would be entitled to relief under IBM,
however, because the decision in IBM was effectively
limited to its facts by subsequent decisions of the Court of
Claims . . . .") (citations and footnote omitted). Plaintiff
perhaps believes that this case falls within the fact pattern of
IBM. Nonetheless, plaintiff should have alerted the court to
the binding precedent limiting the scope of the holding of
6. The rulings were ten years old. ". . . but that was in another country, And
besides, the wench is dead." Eliot (quoting Jonson).
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IBM, so that the weight to be accorded IBM was clear. See,
e.g., Jewelpak Corp. v. United States, 297 F.3d 1326, 1333
n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that "officers of our court have
an unfailing. duty to bring to our attention the most relevant
precedent that bears on the case at hand-both good and
bad-of which they are aware") (citations omitted). Plaintiff
could not have been unaware of this binding precedent,
because another case upon which plaintiff greatly relies
discussed, at length, the limits placed on the holding of IBM.
See Vons Cos. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 & nn. 9-10
(2001), modified in part by Vons Cos. v. United States, No.
00-234T, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 241, 2001 WL 1555306
(Fed. Cl. Nov. 30, 2001).
The court, in the context of this discovery dispute
over PLRs, need not reach the issue of whether plaintiff, as a
purchaser of nuclear power plants, is "similarly-situated" to
sellers of nuclear power plants, in regards to the tax
treatment of assumed decommissioning liability.
13. Another court tells the IRS it can't pretend it
doesn't know it has the wrong address for the taxpayer. Terrell v.
Commissioner, 625 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 11/1/10). The Tax Court dismissed the
taxpayer's petition for innocent spouse relief because she failed to file within
90 days from the date IRS first mailed its determination not to grant relief,
had been mailed to the same address shown on prior tax returns that the IRS
had used for multiple prior mailings that had been returned as undeliverable
by the USPS. However, the taxpayer timely filed petition within 90 days of
date IRS re-sent the notice of determination to the new address on her tax
return filed between the date the most recent earlier notice of determination
had been mailed and the date it had been returned as undeliverable. Reg.
§ 1.6212-2 provides that a taxpayer's last known address Is the address that
appears on the taxpayer's most recently filed and properly processed federal
tax return, unless the taxpayer has given the IRS clear and concise
notification of a different address. The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's
decision and remanded the case. The court (Judge Prado) held that even if
the IRS has not received "clear and concise notification" of the taxpayer's
change of address, "the IRS must use 'reasonable diligence' to determine the
taxpayer's address in light of all relevant circumstances." If the IRS knows
or should have known at the time of mailing a notice that the taxpayer's
address on file might no longer be valid, "reasonable diligence" requires
further investigation. The IRS may not rely on a lack of notification once it is
on notice that its address on file is incorrect. Because three separate prior
mailings to taxpayer's address on file with IRS had been returned as
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undeliverable, the IRS should have known that taxpayer's address on the
earlier filed tax return was incorrect.
14. Soon there will no paper trail for anything, but
digital trails might be even longer. T.D. 9507, Electronic Funds Transfer of
Depository Taxes, 75 F.R.75897 (12/2/10). The Treasury and IRS have
promulgated regulations (Reg. §§ 1.1461-1; 1.6302-1; 1.6302-2; 1.6302-3;
1.6302-4; 31.6071(a)-i; 31.6302-1; 31.6302(c)-3; and 301.6302-1) requiring
all federal tax depositors to use electronic funds transfers for all federal tax
deposits. The rules regarding federal tax deposit coupons have been
eliminated.
XI. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A. Employment Taxes
1. Wisdom from the Mount. Medical residents may
be students for FICA taxes. United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center
of Florida, Inc., 486 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 5/18/07). Section 3121(b)(10)
provides that employment taxes are not payable with respect to services
performed in the employ of a college or university by a student who is
enrolled and regularly attending classes. The government argued that
legislative history with respect to the repeal of an exemption for medical
interns in 1965 (former § 3121 (b)(13)) established as a matter of law that
medical residents are subject to employment taxes. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that § 3121(b)(10) is unambiguous in its application to students
and that the statute requires a factual determination whether the hospital is a
"school, college, or university" and whether the residents are "students."
a. This is no April fool. The Minnesota
District Court also finds that medical residents at the University of
Minnesota are students. Regents of the University of Minnesota v. United
States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1532 (D. Minn. 4/1/08). The university's
summary judgment motion was granted by the District Court, which held
that medical residents at the University of Minnesota are not subject to
employment taxes under the student exclusion of § 3121(b)(10). The court
reiterated its conclusion that the full-time employee exception in Reg.
§ 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d), as amended in 2004, is invalid.
b. The District Court finds that the Mount
Sinai Medical Center is a school and the residents are students. United
States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida, Inc., 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-
5373 (S.D. Fla. 7/28/08). After the decision in Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d
742 (8th Cir. 1998), Mount Sinai Medical Center obtained refunds for FICA
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taxes paid in 1996-1997. The United States filed suit against the Medical
Center for erroneous refunds. Following the Eleventh Circuit's direction to
make a factual determination whether the program qualifies for the
§ 3101(b)(10) exception, the District Court found that the Medical Center's
residency programs were operated as a "school, college, or university," that
residents were present for training in patient care, which was an intrinsic and
mandatory component of the training, and that the residents were "students"
who were regularly enrolled and attending classes. The court also found that
the students' performance of patient care services was incident to their
course of study.
c. South Dakota medical residents are also
students. Center for Family Medicine v. United States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d
2008-5623 (D. S.D. 8/6/08). Following Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742
(8th Cir. 1998), the South Dakota District Court held that medical residents
in the Center for Family Medicine (CFM) and University of South Dakota
School of Medicine Residency Program (USDSMRP) were eligible for the
student exception to the definition of employment under § 3101 (b)(10). The
court rejected the government's assertion that CFM was not a school, college
or university because CFM was affiliated with a non-profit hospital. The
court found that CFM's work includes teaching its medical residents the
skills required to practice in their chosen profession. The court also
concluded that the students were "enrolled" in the institution and that their
attendance at noon conferences and medical rounds established that the
students regularly attended classes. Tossing a small bone to the government,
the court held that chief residents in the programs, who are essentially
coordinators for the residency programs, were not students.
d. Residents in Chicago are also students.
University of Chicago Hospitals v. United States, 545 F.3d 564 (7th Cir.
9/23/08). The court affirmed the District Court's denial of the government's
motion for summary judgment based on the government argument that
medical residents are per se ineligible for the student exemption from
employment taxes under § 3121(b)(10). The court indicates that a case-by-
case analysis is required to determine whether medical residents qualify for
the statutory exemption.
e. And ditto for medical residents in Detroit.
United States v. Detroit Medical Center, 557 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2/26/09).
Reversing the District Court's summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit joins the
lineup holding that medical residents at the seven Detroit area hospitals
operated by the Detroit Medical Center in a joint program with Wayne State
University, which provides graduate medical education, may be students
entitled to exemption from employment taxes under § 3121 (b)(10). The court
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remanded the case for further development of the record regarding the nature
of the residents' relationship to the hospitals and the education program. The
court indicated that further development of the record would not preclude
deciding the matter on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit also affirmed
summary judgment that the stipends paid to medical residents were not
scholarships or fellowships excludible from income under § 117. The court
found both that the stipends were received in exchange for services and that
the medical residents were not candidates for a degree as required for
exclusion under the terms of § 117.
f. And ditto again for Sloan-Kettering.
United States v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 563 F.3d 19 (2d
Cir. 3/25/09). Following similar decisions in the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed summary
judgment for the United States holding that the District Courts for the
Northern and Southern Districts of New York erred in holding as a matter of
law that medical residents at the Albany Medical Center and the hospitals of
the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center were not eligible for exclusion
from employment taxes under § 3121(b)(10). The cases were remanded to
the trial courts for factual determinations whether the residents were students
and whether the hospitals were schools.
g. But the tide turns against the Mayo
Clinic; however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Eighth
Circuit. Mayo Clinic residents may or may not be students, the Supreme
Court will decide. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v.
United States, 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 6/12/09), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3353
(6/10/10). For purposes of the student exclusion from FICA taxes under §
3121(b)(10), Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(c) and (d), limit the definition of a
school, college, or university to entities whose "primary function is the
presentation of formal instruction." Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d) provides that
to qualify as a "student" rather than be classified as an employee, any
services rendered must be "incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a
course of study" at the institution for which the student provides the services.
Furthermore, under the regulation, a person whose work schedule is 40 hours
or more per week is a full-time employee rather than a student. The District
Court, in granting refunds of employment taxes, declared the regulation
invalid. Applying the deference standard of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Eighth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case for entry of judgment for the United States. The court
concluded that application of the exemption only to students pursuing a
course of study who are not full time employees is a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. The court declined to consider whether the
portion of the regulation limiting the definition of a school or college is valid
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because the medical residents were not students under the regulation in any
event.
h. The Supremes spread Mayo all over the
Code. National Muffler is dead: long live Chevron. Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (1/11/11).
In a unanimous decision, written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in what undoubtedly will be one of the
most far reaching tax decisions ever rendered by the Court. The Court
applied the two part test of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources.
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to test the validity of the
regulation and upheld it. Under Chevron, the first question is whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the statute
has "directly addressed the precise question at issue" the regulation must
follow the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the second question is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. In this second step, according to the Supreme Court, a court "may not
disturb an agency rule unless it is 'arbitrary or capricious in substance, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."' Thus, a court may not substitute its own
construction for the reasonable interpretation of an agency. In Mayo, the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he principles underlying our decision in
Chevron apply with full force in the tax context." In applying Chevron, the
Court unambiguously overruled its prior decision in National Muffler
Dealers Association v. United States, 440 US 472, 477 (1979), rendering the
National Muffler standards irrelevant in all future cases. Under National
Muffler the inquiry was as follows:
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the
congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see
whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language
of the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A regulation may
have particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous
construction of the statute by those presumed to have been
aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates from a
later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry.
Other relevant considerations are the length of time the
regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the
consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the
degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation
during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.
In overruling National Muffler, the Court unequivocally stated that "an
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute does not turn on such
considerations." The Court specifically stated that "[a]gency inconsistency is
not a basis for declining to analyze the agency's interpretation under the
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Chevron framework." Quoting its earlier decision in Bob Jones University v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983), the Court stated, "[I]n an area as
complex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests with administrative
responsibility must be able to exercise its authority to meet changing
conditions and new problems." The Court also rejected the taxpayer's
argument that a regulation, like the one question, promulgated under the
general authority of § 7805(a) was entitled to less deference than one
"'issued under a specific grant of authority to define a statutory term or
prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision,' and in so doing
overruled its prior decisions in Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247,
253 (1981), and United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982),
which had so held, stating that the court's inquiry does not turn on whether
Congress's delegation of authority was general or specific. Furthermore, the
Court held that "it is immaterial to our analysis that a 'regulation was
prompted by litigation,"' noting that in United Dominion Industries, Inc. v.
United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001), it had "expressly invited the Treasury
Department to 'amend its regulations' if troubled by the consequences of our
resolution of the case." Thus, the Supreme Court has unambiguously stated
that as along as a regulation can withstand Chevron analysis, a Treasury
Regulation can reverse case law. Finally, however, in upholding the validity
of the regulation, the Court emphasized that the regulation was promulgated
after notice and comment, thus leaving open the possibility that
Mayo/Chevron deference might not apply to a Temporary Regulation issued
without notice and comment.
i. And the IRS throws in the towel on
refund claims for FICA taxes paid before April Fools' Day, 2005. I.R.
2010-25 (3/2/10). The IRS has decided to accept the position that medical
residents are exempt from FICA taxes under the student exception and will
issue refunds to hospitals, universities, and medical residents who have filed
claims for refunds of FICA taxes paid before 4/1/05, which is the effective
date of amendments to Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2 providing that employees
who work 40 hours or more during a week are not eligible for the student
exception.
2. REG-137036-08. Section 3504 Agent Employment
Tax Liability, 75 F.R. 1735 (1/12/10). Proposed regulations include Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) withholding taxes within the scope of
current regulatory authority that allows employers to meet their FICA tax
obligations for domestic in-home services through an agent as provided in
§ 3401. The agent files a single return for multiple employers using the
agent's employer identification number.
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3. The gamble doesn't pay off and this tribe sings
the blues. Blue Lake Rancheria v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-638
(N.D. Calif. 1/8/10). Section 3306(c) excludes from employment for FUTA
purposes "service performed . . . in the employ of an Indian tribe, or any
instrumentality" thereof. Section 3309 also allows Indian tribes to opt out of
paying state unemployment taxes if the tribe reimburses the state for actual
costs of providing unemployment benefits to the tribe's employees. Mainstay
is in the business for providing leased employees. It provides over 39,000
employees to business in three states. Mainstay is controlled by Blue Lake
Rancheria Economic Development Corporation, a tribal corporation. (The
tribe has 53 members.) Mainstay sought refund of over $2 million of FUTA
taxes claiming that its employees were the employees of an Indian tribe. The
court concluded that the tribal exception operates to eliminate the existence
of statutory employment "where services performed in a common law
relationship between an employer and employee would normally lead to the
existence of "employment." The court then reasoned that "'employment'
must be defined by reference to the common law employer, and that the
statutory employer must be liable." The court holds, "that the exception to
the definition of 'employment' for 'services performed ... in the employ of an
Indian tribe, or any instrumentality' thereof, § 3306(c)(7), is only available
when an Indian tribe is the common law employer of the employees in
question. When an Indian tribe is merely the statutory employer, the
applicability of this exception depends upon the employee's relationship with
his or her common law employer. Where the common law employer is not an
Indian tribe, and where no other exemption under § 3306(c) applies, the
statutory employer will be liable under FUTA." The court also rejected the
taxpayer's argument that the Indian tribe was not a common law employer of
the leased employees and the exemption therefore did not apply.
4. We don't need no steenking payroll taxes! New
Code § 3111 (d)(1), added by the 2010 HIRE Act, excuses employers from
paying the employer's share of OASDI taxes from 3/19/10 - sort of, see
below - through 12/31/10 for wages paid to newly hired previously
unemployed workers. However, unless employer elects out of the payroll tax
holiday, wages paid to a qualified individual do not qualify for the § 51 work
opportunity credit during the one-year period beginning on the date that the
qualified employer hired the employee.
* A "qualified" employee is an
individual who (1) starts employment after 2/3/10 and before 1/1/11;
(2) provides an affidavit, under penalties of perjury, certifying that he has not
been employed for more than 40 hours during the 60-day period ending on the
date his employment begins; (3) has not been hired to replace another employee
who was discharged without cause; (4) is not related to the employer or a more
than 50 percent owner of the stock of a corporate employer, in a manner that
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would disqualify him for the work opportunity credit under § 5 1(i)(1), i.e., a
long list of relatives, including, inter alia, all ancestors and descendants,
brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews, and close in-laws; however aunts,
uncles, cousins and outlaws appear to be OK.
* Wages paid during the first calendar
quarter of 2010, i.e., between 3/19/10 and 3/31/10, do not actually qualify for
complete forgiveness of the OASDI tax. Rather, the amount by which the
OASDI tax for wages paid during the first calendar quarter of 2010 would have
been reduced if the tax holiday had been in effect for that quarter is treated as a
payment against the employer's OASDI tax on other employees in the second
calendar quarter of 2010.
* The tax waiver applies only to non-
governmental employers except that it also applies to a public institution of
higher education. The tax waiver ends on 12/31/10.
5. Funding health care by making the HI tax more
progressive. Section 1301, as amended by the 2010 Health Care Act,
increases the employee portion of the HI tax is increased by an additional tax
of 0.9 percent on wages in excess of a threshold amount. The threshold
amount is $250,000 of the combined wages of both spouses on a joint return
($125,000 for a married individual filing a separate return. The threshold is
$200,000 for all other individuals. The employer must withhold the
additional HI tax, but in determining the employer's withholding
requirement and liability for the tax, only wages that the employee receives
from the employer in excess of $200,000 for a year are taken into account,
and the employer disregards the employee's spouse's wages. I.R.C.
§ 3102(f). The employee is liable for the additional 0.9 percent HI tax to the
extent the tax is not withheld by the employer. Section 1402(b), as amended,
imposes an additional tax of 0.9 percent self-employment income above the
same thresholds, The threshold amount is reduced (but not below zero) by
the amount of wages taken into account in determining the FICA tax with
respect to the taxpayer. No deduction under § 164(f) for the additional SECA
tax, and the alternative deduction under § 1402(a)(12) is determined without
regard to the additional SECA tax rate. The additional tax applies to wages
received in taxable years after 12/31/12.
6. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 424 B.R. 237,
105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1110 (W.D. Mich. 2/23/10). Severance payments made
to pre-petition and post-petition employees who were involuntarily
terminated were treated as wage-replacement social benefits rather than
taxable remuneration and wages subject to FICA tax. The court concluded
that under § 3402(o) (which treats supplemental unemployment
compensation benefits as wages for withholding) supplemental
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unemployment compensation was not "wages" and therefore was not taxable
for purposes of FICA.
* The result is contrary to the holding
in CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
7. S corporation "John Edwards gambit" dividends
may be treated as wages. David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 714 F.
Supp. 2d 954 (S.D. Iowa 5/27/10). Using a common tax reduction device,
David Watson formed an S corporation that was a member of Watson's
accounting firm. The S corporation contracted with the accounting firm to
provide services. Watson was paid a salary of $24,000 as an employee of the
S corporation, on which the S corporation paid employment taxes. The
remainder of the S corporation income, approximately $200,000 per year,
was distributed to Watson as a dividend, not subject to employee taxes. The
IRS recharacterized the dividends as wages. The S corporation paid an
assessment and brought a refund action. In a motion for summary judgment
the S corporation asserted that its intent controls whether amounts paid are
wages and that it intended to pay dividends in the amount of cash on hand
after the payment of wages. Citing a long line of authorities in support of its
position, the District Court held that the S corporation's "self proclaimed
intent" to pay salary does not limit the government's ability to recharacterize
dividends as wages. The court indicated that whether amounts paid to
Watson were remuneration for services is a question of fact.
* The court's opinion concluded with
the following passage:
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff
points the Court to the following oft-cited statement of Judge
Learned Hand:
Over and over again courts have said that
there is nothing sinister in so arranging
one's affairs as to keep taxes as law as
possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor;
and all do right, for nobody owes any public
duty to pay more than the law demands:
taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary
contributions. To demand more in the name
of morals is mere cant.
See Pl.'s Reply Br. at 5 n. 2 (quoting Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d
Cir.1947) (L. Hand, J., dissenting)). While the Court agrees
fully with Judge Learned Hand, it would remind Plaintiff of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' succinct, yet equally
eloquent statement in Compania General de Tabacos de
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Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue: "Taxes are what
we pay for civilized society." 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, "the greatness of our nation
is in no small part due to the willingness of our citizens to
honestly and fairly participate in our tax collection system."
Manley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo
1983-558 (Sept. 12, 1983). Thus, while Plaintiff is free to
structure its financial affairs in such a way as to avoid
paying "more [taxes] than the law demands," Plaintiff is not
free to structure its financial affairs in a way that avoids
paying those taxes demanded by the law. In this case, the
law demands that Plaintiff pay employment taxes on "all
remuneration for employment," and there is clearly a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the funds paid to
Watson, in actuality, qualify as such.
a. Since the judge gave the IRS everything it
asked for, will the IRS go for the whole kit and caboodle the next time.
David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-321 (S.D.
Iowa 12/23/10. On the merits, Judge Pratt rejected the taxpayer's claim that
the wages subject to employment tax were limited to the $24,000 salary
formally paid to the sole shareholder/sole employee. In addition to the
"salary" in each of the years in question, the corporation distributed
approximately $175,000 of "profits," pursuant to a corporate resolution
authorizing "payment to Watson of 'dividends in the amount of available
cash on hand after payment of compensation and other expenses of the
corporation."' Citing Joseph Radtke, S.C. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 2d
143 (E.D. Wis. 1989), Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.3d 90
(9th Cir. 1990), and Veterinary Surgical Consultants v. Commissioner, 117
T.C. 141 (2001), as particularly persuasive, the court concluded that
"'characterization of funds disbursed by an S corporation to its employees or
shareholders turns on an analysis of whether the payments at issue were
made ... as remuneration for services performed."' After examining the facts,
the court concluded that the reasonable amount of Watson's compensation
for each of the years at issue was $91,044, increasing the $24,000 salary
amount by the full amount of the $67,044 that the corporation claimed was a§ 1368 distribution, thus upholding in full the government's position.
8. Contract workers are employees, and taxpayer
gets no help from § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. Bruecher Foundation
Services, Inc v. United States, 383 Fed. Appx. 381 (5th Cir. 6/18/10). In
1999-2000 the taxpayer employed 13-16 workers as contractors in its
foundation repair, landscaping and grading business. The taxpayer claimed
deductions for the workers' compensation as "contract workers" but filed no
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Form 1099s for the workers. The IRS initiated an audit of employment tax
liabilities without notifying the taxpayer and without informing the taxpayer
of the § 530 safe harbor (Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763, 2885-86)
as required by the statute. When the taxpayer was notified of the audit the
taxpayer filed a Form 1099 for each of the workers. Section 530 bars
reclassification of workers as employees if (1) the worker was not treated as
an employee for any period, (2) the employer filed all returns, including
information returns, in a manner consistent with treating the worker as an
independent contractor, and (3) the employer had a reasonable basis under
common law standards for treating the worker as an independent contractor.
The court rejected the taxpayer's assertion that it complied with the § 530
requirement that it filed returns consistent treating the employees as
independent contractors. Although the court was not willing to go as far as
the IRS argument that timely forms were always required, the court indicated
that the taxpayer's strategic filing of the required returns after the IRS
assessed the tax was not compliance with the statute. The court also held that
the IRS's failure to give early notice of its audit and the availability of § 530
did not shift the burden of proof to the government. Finally, the court
accepted the IRS position that the workers were employees under common
law standards.
9. The Tax Court follows the Sixth and Second
Circuits to hold that pre-2009 employment tax liability of a disregarded
LLC must be paid by the sole-member. Medical Practice Solutions, LLC
v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 125 (3/31/09). Following the decisions in
Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), and McNamee v.
Dept. of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007) [both of which upheld the
validity of the "check-the-box" regulations in the same context, applying
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)], the Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that the check-the-box regulations
treating a single member entity that does not elect to be treated as a
corporation as a disregarded entity, Reg. § 301.7701-3(b), are valid and as a
result the sole member of a disregarded limited liability company is
responsible for the LLC's unpaid employment taxes. After 1/1/09, under
Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv), a disregarded entity is treated as a corporation
for purposes of employment tax reporting and liability. The court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that the amendment to the regulations, which reverses
the prior rule, demonstrates that the prior regulation imposing employment
tax liability on the sole-member of the disregarded entity was unreasonable.
The court stated that, "In light of the emergence of limited liability
companies and their hybrid nature, and the continuing silence of the Code on
the proper tax treatment of such companies in the decade since the present
regulations became effective, we cannot conclude that the above Treasury
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Regulations, providing a flexible response to a novel business form, are
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."
a. The First Circuit agrees. Britton v.
Shulman, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-6048 (1st Cir. 8/24/10). In a one-paragraph
memorandum opinion, the First Circuit finds no error or abuse of discretion
in the Tax Court opinion in Medical Practice Solutions, LLC v.
Commissioner.
10. Independence massages away employment taxes.
Mayfield Therapy Center v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-239
(10/28/10). The taxpayer rented booth space to massage therapists,
cosmetologists and nail technicians for $80 base rent or 25 percent of the
service provider's gross revenue. The service providers set their own hours,
their appointments were made by a receptionist at taxpayer's facility, they
were free to charge prices that differed from posted prices, they provided
their own supplies, and in some cases they individually decorated their own
space, but occasionally shared space. Each provider was a separately
licensed professional. Payments were collected centrally and divided in
accord with the amount paid by each provider's individual client. Applying
the 20 factors of Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (which one of us had a
hand in drafting as a Professor-in-Residence in the Office of Chief Council),
the court (Judge Thornton) concluded that - although the financial
arrangement represented payment by the taxpayer to the service providers -
the weekly rent arrangement and compensation to the service providers on a
commission basis with no guaranteed return favored independent contractor
status. The court also pointed to the fact that the workers provided their own
expenses, bore the risk of losses, that they could increase their income by
working longer hours, and were not directed in providing services to clients
as supporting independent contractor status. While indicating that the case
was close, the court decided that factors indicating the service provider's
autonomy predominate over factors indicating the taxpayer's control and
concluded that the service providers were independent contractors for whom
the taxpayer was not liable for employment taxes.
11. Social Security is cheaper for 2011, but the
deficits grow. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 601, reduces the
employee portion of the Old-Age, Survivors, And Disability Insurance Tax
(OASDI) from 6.2% to 4.2% for calendar year 2011.
* The 4.2% rate also applies to the
railroad retirement tax.
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B. Self-employment Taxes
1. Self employment taxes reduced. The Compromise
Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 601, reduces self employment taxes from 12.4% to
10.4% for calendar year 2011.
C. Excise Taxes
1. Employers who aren't willing to pay health
insurance premiums on their employees must pay Uncle Sam a very
healthy nondeductible excise tax. Under § 4980H, added by the 2010
Health Care Act and effective after 12/31/13, an applicable large employer,
i.e., an employer that employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees
during the preceding calendar year, that fails to offer its full-time employees
and their dependents the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage
under an employer sponsored health insurance plan is subject to an
assessable excise tax if (1) there is a waiting period, or (2) any of its
employees are certified to the employer as having enrolled in health
insurance coverage purchased through an American Health Benefits
Exchange with respect to which a premium tax credit or cost-sharing
reduction is allowed or paid to such employee or employees. (An employee
is eligible for the premium credit if the employer does not offer health
insurance for all its full-time employees, it offers minimum essential
coverage that is unaffordable ("unaffordable" means a premium required to
be paid by the employee that is more than 9.5 percent of the employee's
household income), or it offers minimum essential coverage under which the
plan's share of the total allowed cost of benefits is less than 60 percent.) For
an employer not offering coverage, the amount of the excise tax amount for
any month equals the number by which full-time employees exceeds 30-
employees (regardless of how many employees are receiving a premium tax
credit or cost-sharing reduction) multiplied by $166.67 (one-twelfth of
$2,000). The amount is nothing to sneeze at. STAFF OF THE JOlNT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," As AMENDED, IN
COMBINATION WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT," 39-40 (JCX-18-10 3/21/10) gives the following example:
For example, in 2014, Employer A fails to offer minimum
essential coverage and has 100 full-time employees, ten of
whom receive a tax credit for the year for enrolling in a State
exchange-offered plan. For each employee over the 30-
employee threshold, the employer owes $2,000, for a total
penalty of $140,000 ($2,000 multiplied by 70 ((100-30)).
This penalty is assessed on a monthly basis.
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* For each full-time employee
receiving a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy through an American
Health Benefits Exchange for any month, the monthly excise tax equals one-
twelfth of $3,000. The tax is capped, however, by the amount that would have
been the excise tax if the employer had provided no coverage. STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS AMENDED,
IN COMBINATION WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT," 39-40 (JCX-18-10 3/21/10) gives the following example:
For example, in 2014, Employer A offers health coverage
and has 100 full-time employees, 20 of whom receive a tax
credit for the year for enrolling in a State exchange offered
plan. For each employee receiving a tax credit, the employer
owes $3,000, for a total penalty of $60,000. The maximum
penalty for this employer is capped at the amount of the
penalty that it would have been assessed for a failure to
provide coverage, or $140,000 ($2,000 multiplied by 70
((100-30)). Since the calculated penalty of $60,000 is less
than the maximum amount, Employer A pays the $60,000
calculated penalty. This penalty is assessed on a monthly
basis.
* The excise tax is not deductible as a
business expense under § 162. The restrictions on assessment under § 6213 do
not apply.
2. Did Congress call them fees, instead of excise
taxes, because there are no percentages in the formulae or because they
are earmarked to fund PCORTF? New § 4375, added by the 2010 Health
Care Act, imposes a fee on each health insurance policy, to be paid by the
insurer, of $2 ($1 for years ending in U.S. fiscal year 2013) multiplied by the
average number of lives covered under the policy, and new § 4376 imposes a
like fee on self-insured health plans, to be paid by the employer. The fees are
earmarked to fund the Patient Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund
(PCORTF), to carry out provisions in the Act relating to comparative
effectiveness research.
3. That's not a "nice healthy" tan, it's a "dangerous
pre-cancer glow." New § 5000B of the Code imposes a 10 percent sales tax
on the amount paid for indoor tanning services. The tax is collected by the
service provider and remitted to the IRS quarterly. The tax kicks in on
6/1/10, just in time for the summer tanning season.
4. A nondeductible tax on Cadillacs, and we're not
talking about any G.M. cars here. New § 49801, added by the 2010 Health
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Care Act, imposes an excise tax on insurers if the aggregate value of
employer-sponsored health insurance coverage and health benefits (except
separate dental and optic coverage) for an employee (including former
employees, surviving spouses and any other primary insured individuals)
exceeds a threshold amount. The amount of the tax is 40 percent of the
aggregate value that exceeds the threshold amount. For 2018, the threshold
amount is $10,200 for individual coverage and $27,500 for family coverage,
multiplied by the health cost adjustment percentage (a multiplier designed to
increase the thresholds if the actual growth in health care between 2010 and
2018 exceeds the projected growth for that period), increased by an age and
gender adjusted excess premium amount. The threshold amounts are
increased for individuals who have attained age of 55 who are non-Medicare
eligible and receiving employer-sponsored retiree health coverage or who are
covered by a plan sponsored by an employer the majority of whose
employees covered by the plan are engaged in a certain high risk professions.
For a self-insured group health plan, a Health FSA or an HRA, the excise tax
is paid by the entity that administers the plan. If the employer acts as the plan
administrator, the excise tax is paid by the employer. Employer-sponsored
health insurance coverage includes both insured and self-insured health
coverage excludable from the employee's gross income; for a self-employed
individual, the coverage for any portion of which a deduction is allowable
under § 162(1). If an employer reports to insurers, plan administrators, and
the IRS a lower amount of insurance cost subject to the excise tax than
required, the employer is subject to a penalty equal to the sum of any
additional excise tax that each such insurer and administrator would have
owed if the employer had reported correctly and interest attributable to that
additional excise tax. The excise tax is not deductible under the income tax.
* Although the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation did not score this provision for revenue effects, because
its effective date is outside the 5-year window for scoring revenue effects,
despite being in the "Revenue Provisions" of the Act, Congress does not really
intend that provision raise much revenue. It intends to discourage employers
from providing high cost, i.e., Cadillac, health plans.
XII. TAX LEGISLATION
A. Enacted
1. H.R. 4462, P.L. 111-126, was signed by President
Obama on 1/22/10. The law permits donors who itemize deductions on their
2009 tax returns to deduct on their 2009 returns any charitable contributions
for the relief of victims of the Haitian earthquake made in cash after 1/11/10
and before 3/1/10.
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2. H.R. 4691, the Temporary Extension Act of 2010,
P.L. 111-144, was signed by President Obama on 3/2/10. The signing
ceremony consisted of a "TEA party" at which the president was tea-bagged,
i.e., tea bags were thrown at him.
3. The Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment
("HIRE Act"), P.L. 111-147, was signed by President Obama on 3/18/10. It
is a $17.6-billion "jobs package."
4. H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act ("PPACA" - pronounced "pee-pac-a"), P.L. 111-148, was signed
by President Obama on 3/23/10.
5. H.R. 4872, the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 ("2010 Health Care Act" or "2010
Reconciliation Act"), P.L. 111-152, was signed by President Obama on
3/30/10.
6. The Continuing Extension Act of 2010, P.L. 111-
157, was signed by President Obama on 4/15/10. It extends the COBRA
subsidy to May 31, 2010.
7. HR 3962, the Preservation of Access to Care for
Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 2010, P.L. 111-192, was
signed by President Obama on 6/25/10.
8. The Homebuyer Assistance and Improvement
Act of 2010, P.L. 111-198, was signed by President Obama on 7/2/10.
9. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, P.L. 111-
240, was signed by President Obama on 9/27/10. This Act will create
millions upon millions of good paying jobs.
The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010 ("the Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010"), P.L.
111-312, was signed by President Obama on 12/17/10. It was a compromise
arrived at between president Obama and Republican congressional leaders,
and was based in part upon S. 3793, the Job Creation and Tax Cuts Bill of
2010, which was introduced on 9/16/10 by Sen. Baucus. The Act extends
individual tax reductions (the so-called "Bush tax cuts") for two years,
contains economic stimulus incentives, and provides energy related tax
breaks and disaster relief. Many provisions of the Act renewed various
expiring and expired tax benefits for individuals and businesses, and they are
thus sometimes referred to as the "Jimmy Johnson" provisions. The Act,§§ 301-304, also included estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer tax
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relief for the years 2011 and 2012, including "portability" of the marital
deduction. It is the great post-election compromise of 2010.
